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Introduction
The last 10 years represent a fascinating time for monetary policy. It also
coincides with my own period of study on the subject. Starting my undergraduate
degree in 2005, I am incredibly fortunate to have been witness to the asking of
some fundamental questions around monetary policy.
First the nancial crisis of 2008 forced central banks to evaluate their relation-
ship with the nancial system. Their role as lender of last resort and the conict
it may present when banks get too big to fail was one of the big themes of the
early part of the crisis. It has lead to a wider discussion on the risks and linkages
within the nancial sector and resulted in many central banks being given an
expanded remit to consider macroprudential policy. Whilst not the focus of this
thesis, these themes continue to interest me and gure in my research.
Since 2009, faced with the zero lower bound constraining their favoured pol-
icy instrument, policymakers have had to (re)nd alternative instruments to spur
demand stimulate their economies. This has lead them to expand their balance
sheets and under take purchases of assets from the private sector on an unprece-
dented scale. This has raised questions about how such policies might a¤ect
the economy, and a range of empirical work aimed at helping policymakers to
calibrate their interventions.
Concurrent with these policy developments, the 2008/09 crisis has served to
spark a deep and fundamental debate about how economists model and view the
world. The limitations of the benchmark New Keynesian model that prevailed
prior to the crisis has resulted in a renewed enthusiasm for models which try to
break some of the key assumptions that lay behind it.
These issues have been the focus of my own research throughout my doctorate.
In the pursuit of a deeper understanding of them I have employed a range of
modelling and econometric techniques, data analysis and discussion with both
academics and practical policymakers. The resultant thesis draws on a number
of articles and papers I have worked on in the last four years, distilling them
down to what I consider some of the more interesting concepts and results. Like
all good academic work, I hope it raises as many questions as it answers and
represents at least a small step in the ongoing process that is the renement of
monetary policy. I know that the process of writing it has at any rate greatly
advanced my own understanding
The rst two chapters are intended as an introduction to these innovations,
rst from a theoretical and then a practical standpoint. They provide context for
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the work that follows and should be viewed as a springboard for further reading
and research. The third chapter turns to the data and tries to take an econometric
approach to understanding the largest innovation in monetary policy in recent
years - large scale asset purchases. It forms part of a growing literature which
nds a signicant role for asset purchases by central banks in the manipulation
of interest rates. The fourth chapter then investigates some of these features in
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting.
Through this combination of data analysis, econometrics, macroeconomic
modelling and theoretical understanding, I hope that I have presented a rela-
tively complete view of how monetary policy has evolved along many dimensions.
I am sure that it will continue to do so, and I look forward to both following it,
and trying to make what contribution I can in the future.
2
Theory for unconventional central bankers: a
framework for asset purchases
Jack Meaning
Abstract
Since 2008, central banks in the major advanced economies have purchased
unprecedented quantities of assets from the private sector, expanding their
balance sheets and dramatically changing the characteristics of their portfolios.
While there is a growing consensus in the empirical literature that these policies
have succeed in lowering interest rates, agreement on a theoretical explanation
as to how and why this might be the case is far less unanimous. The favoured
framework of the last decade or so, the New Keynesian model, has very little to
say about asset purchases, other than they may act as a signal for the path of
interest rates, or a commitment to a given path of policy. This paper looks
to highlight why this result is a product of the models assumptions, before
presenting a framework to think about alternative ways in which asset purchases
can be motivated in a theoretical context.
3
1 Introduction
The widespread use of asset purchase programmes by central banks in recent
years has posed a challenge for economic theory. The consensus model of the last
decade or so struggles to provide any direct mechanism by which such purchases
can have any traction on interest rates, or the wider economy. And yet, there is
a growing body of empirical work which supports the hypothesis that large-scale
asset purchases have succeeded in reducing interest rates in advanced economies,
and may have stimulated demand.
This paper is intended as an overview of some of the issues at the heart
of the theoretical debate around asset purchases. To that end, it develops a
simple, stylised model within which the discussion can be framed. This model
is a generalised version of the canonical three equation log-linear New Keynesian
model, which can be returned as a special case under a specic parameterisation.
The paper will rst describe the baseline New Keynesian model, its underlying
assumptions and its implications for monetary policy. In this version of the world,
monetary policy is conducted solely by the setting of the short-term nominal
interest rate. There exists no role for asset purchases, other than as a signal
for, or commitment to a future path of that policy rate. However, this result is
predicated on a number of assumptions, most notably a representative agent with
rational expectations who operates in unconstrained nancial markets. The rest
of the paper seeks to investigate how relaxing these assumptions may give rise to
theoretical channels through which asset purchases can stimulate the economy.
First, money is explicitly introduced to the baseline model via a simple,
stylised money demand function. This is an uncontroversial innovation as a
money demand curve of some form is often assumed to lie implicitly behind the
three equation model. Its omission is normally justied by the lack of additional
insight it provides, as money moves passively to clear the money market at the
central banks target rate. In the context of asset purchases though, the inclusion
of money and the acceptance that the supply of an asset can have implications
for its price is an important initial step.
We also include two additional assets which are priced in as general a form
as possible, but which under certain parameterisations allow changes in supply
to have a signicant impact on interest rates. This framework enables us to
deviate from the baseline New Keynesian model in a number of interesting ways.
We begin by analysing a world in which money demand is less than perfectly
elastic and Wallace neutrality fails to hold for money. Under these conditions the
central bank can alter interest rates in the economy by manipulating the money
4
supply. In fact, in order to clear the money market, for a given money demand
the central bank must vary the money supply in order to elicit an interest rate
response. However, it makes no di¤erence in this parameterisation of the model
which assets are bought and sold in order to manipulate the money supply, or
even whether any assets are bought at all.
The paper then turns to discussing under what conditions this may not be
the case and changes in supply may have consequences for the prices of assets
other than money. Drawing on the growing literature in this area a number of
candidate explanations can be found, but crucially all must in some way lead
to a less than perfectly elastic demand curve for assets and a failure of Wallace
neutrality. The implications of such a result are then discussed in the context of
the stylised model of this paper. It is shown that, should such supply e¤ects exist,
however motivated, then the central bank will be able to stabilise the economy
more e¤ectively as asset purchases will not only act to lower interest rates on
wider assets indirectly through their inuence on the short-term nominal interest
rate, but also directly by changing the supply of the asset itself. The magnitude of
this channel depends crucially on the degree of inelasticity in the assets demand
curve and the extent to which assets are imperfect substitutes for one another,
both parameters which can be easily manipulated in our stylised framework.
The paper then considers the impact of the lower bound on nominal interest
rates within these various versions of the world. With the short-term nominal
interest rate unable to fall any lower, the New Keynesian model has only one
policy prescription which is to lower agents expectations of future policy rates by
committing to hold rates "lower for longer". Given forward-looking and rational
agents this acts to lower long rates and stimulate activity today. With the money
supply expanded such that the money market is clearing at zero, money demand is
e¤ectively satiated and so further expansion cannot reduce interest rates further.
Thus at the lower bound the second parameterisation of the model collapses
to the rst, with the same implication for policy. Importantly though, if supply
e¤ects exist then even with the short-term nominal interest rate constrained asset
purchases can directly lower interest rates by reducing the premium associated
with supply.
The paper then discusses some potential mechanisms through which asset
purchases can stimulate the economy other than through their direct inuence on
interest rates including stimulating bank lending, reducing collateral constraints,
relaxing constraints on the scal authority and a monetarist view of monetary
expansion.
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2 The New Keynesian model
The New Keynesian models which came to dominate the economic debate in
central banks around the turn of the century were the culmination of a number
of signicant developments in economic thought.
The rst crucial element is that of rational expectations, which developed
through the 1960s and 1970s thanks to work by Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972,
1976). This way of describing the formation of expectations states that agents
within the model are aware of its structure and base their expectations on what
that structure implies for the future paths of variables, given all the information
available to them at that time.
From this grew the real business cycle (RBC) agenda pioneered by Kydland
and Prescott (1982). RBC models brought rational expectations to the earlier
neoclassical growth models. They consisted of forward-looking representative
agents who optimised an objective function consistent with rational expectations.
These optimisation problems were built up from microfoundations to ensure they
were as theoretically consistent as possible.
Fundamental to the core RBC framework was the assumption of perfectly
competitive markets in which all agents were price-takers. This left no signicant
role for monetary policy as perfectly exible prices could adjust instantly to
clear markets. This ran counter to the traditional Keynesian view that nominal
rigidities caused price inertia which monetary policy could exploit, Keynes (1936).
However, Keynesian models failed to motivate the existence of such rigidities
through micro-founded optimising behaviour. What is more, rather than forward-
looking rational expectations, traditional Keynesian models most commonly
employed adaptive expectations, where agents views of the future depend on
the past. This left them vulnerable to the Lucas Critique, Lucas (1970).
In response to these criticisms, and concurrent with the development of the
RBC literature, a body of work emerged looking to introduce nominal frictions
into models with rational expectations. First steps involved the use of long-term
nominal contracts to generate a slow adjustment of prices, for instance Fisher
(1977), Phelps and Taylor (1977) and Taylor (1979). Then, in 1983, Guillermo
Calvo introduced staggered pricing contracts under which any given rm could
only change the price they charged in the next period with a probability of less
than one, Calvo (1983). This meant that even assuming rational and optimising
agents, there was a degree of price inertia at the aggregate level following a shock
as not all rms would be able to adjust instantly.
New Keynesian models as they are generally understood today began to
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emerge in the early 1990s. The seminal volumes by Mankiw and Romer (1991)
brought together numerous contributors to lay out the foundations of the New
Keynesian framework. They sought to reconcile the monopolisticly competitive
rms and price and wage rigidities of traditional Keynesian models with the
microfoundations and rational optimising behaviour of the RBC literature. This
amalgamation of features has lead to New Keynesianism sometimes being referred
to as the New Neoclassical Synthesis.
A number of expositions of the basic model can be found, for example
Woodford (2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) or Kerr and King (1996),
but in its most basic form the model can be represented by three loglinearised
equations; an expectational IS curve, a New Keynesian Phillips Curve and a rule
for determining the nominal interest rate.
The IS curve is derived from the optimising decision of the household, based
on an Euler relationship. It relates output today inversely to the real rate of
interest and can be written1
yt = Etyt+1 − σ [it − Etπt+1] + gt (1)
where y is real output, i is the one period nominal interest rate and π is the
one-period ination rate. g represents an exogenous demand shock.
The supply side of the economy is represented by the NK Phillips curve. This
is a log-linear approximation to the rst order condition for the rm seeking to
set prices optimally under Calvo-style staggered price contracts. κ is know as
the Calvo parameter and represents the speed of adjustment of prices. u is an
exogenous supply shock.
πt = κyt + βEtπt+1 + ut (2)
Lastly the model is closed out by a rule which determines the short-term
nominal interest rate. Following Taylor (1993, 1999), this usually takes the form
of a feedback rule on deviations in output and ination from target
it = ρit−1 + φ
yyt + φ
ππt (3)
A key nding of Taylor was that, in order to bring stability to the system of
equations, the parameter φπ must be greater than one. The reasoning for this
can be intuitively seen, as only when φπ > 1 does the central bank denitely
move the nominal interest rate su¢ciently that the real interest rate moves in the
1All variables are written in deviations from steady state.
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stabilising direction.
2.1 Implication of the NK model for monetary policy
In this representation of the world, monetary policy operates purely through
manipulating the short-term nominal interest rate which passes through the
economy via the traditional Keynesian interest rate channel. If the central bank
cuts the nominal interest rate, this causes a change in the real interest rate as
prices are slow to adjust. This in turn boosts current demand through the IS curve
(1) which raises output today and subsequently generates inationary pressure
through the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (2).
Importantly, the forward looking nature of the New Keynesian model means
that it is not just the contemporary interest rate which matters, but rather the
expectation of the future path of rates as well. To see this, we can iterate equation
1 forward one period at a time and, under the rational expectations assumption
of the model, we can substitute the resulting equation for yt+1 back in for Etyt+1.




[σt [it − Etπt+1] + gt] (4)
and output becomes a function of the full expected future path of interest
rates.
In the three equation representation of the New Keynesian model presented
here, quantities have no direct impact on the economy. However, this result is a
construct of the assumptions which underpin the model, most clearly the existence
of complete and perfectly functioning nancial markets and a representative
agent.
Perfect and complete nancial markets give rise to the no-arbitrage
assumption which states that any deviation of interest rates from the expectations
hypothesis would open up an arbitrage opportunity. Rational and unconstrained
investors would then instantly exploit this opportunity so that it was immediately
exhausted and prices returned to their previous level. Interest rates on all assets
are thus determined purely by their expected payo¤s in di¤erent states of the
world, and not by their supply, Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1981).
Even if the expectations hypothesis did not hold, it can still be argued
that central bank asset purchases are irrelevant for determining interest rates
in the New Keynesian framework. Assuming an innitely lived and rational
representative agent, a sale which moves assets between the private and public
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sectors should be ine¤ective. This is because the asset the private sector agent
has given up is now held by the public sector, of which the agent is the ultimate
owner. Therefore they are still exposed to the same payo¤s as before in all
states of the world, albeit that some will now be realised through taxation or
reduced government spending as opposed to the direct impact of holding the
asset. In order to counteract this increased exposure through the State, the
private sector agent will reduce their demand for the asset sold, hedging and
exactly o¤setting the change in supply and leaving the price unchanged, gure 1.
This irrelevance proposition, akin in spirit to Ricardian Equivalence, is known as
Wallace Neutrality. It was rst posited for standard open market operations by
Wallace (1981), but has since been famously reiterated in the New Keynesian
framework and applied to asset purchases more generally by Eggertson and
Woodford (2003).
These core assumptions are vital to the policy prescription of the New
Keynesian model but, as we will discuss in later sections, they are not without
criticism or alternative. It should be noted here that Wallace himself saw his
irrelevance proposition as an unrealistic base from which to build a more realistic
representation of the world, and even Eggertson and Woodford (2003) admits it
is unlikely to hold for money away from the lower bound.
3 Extending the baseline model
3.1 Introducing money
The three equation model abstracts completely frommoney. However, it may be a
more accurate representation of the New Keynesian position to explicitly include
a fourth equation which many consider to be implicitly behind the simplied
three equation variant; a money demand function. Demand for money can be
motivated a number of ways, but the most common is that money provides a
transaction service that no other asset can replicate. This may be because it is
the most widely accepted and e¢cient medium of exchange, or because it is the
only asset which can be used to settle accounts with the State. Money is also
an extremely liquid and secure store of value. These store of value, liquidity and
transaction services provide a utility to the holder for which they are willing to
pay.
Theoretically a number of models have looked to incorporate this feature
into the New Keynesian paradigm and provide a role for money. Some look to
include real money balances into the households utility function, Walsh (2003).
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These money in utility models are e¤ectively a short-cut, as money does not in
of itself provide utility, rather it is a proxy for the underlying service that money
provides. A similar approach has been the cash-in-advance models, such as the
one presented in the fourth chapter of this thesis and others in which agents
are constrained in their consumption and spending decisions today by the cash
balances they have brought over from the period before. In this way money is a
determining factor in their ability to consume and so a¤ects welfare.
Our rst innovation is therefore to introduce a standard money demand
function of the form
mt = yt − αit (5)
The inclusion of output relates to the increased demand for transaction
purposes and the second term captures the (opportunity) cost of (holding)
obtaining money.
This innovation ties the quantity of money to its price, the short-term nominal
interest rate, in an important way. In order for the money market to clear for a
given money demand, any change in the interest rate must be met with a change
in the money supply, and vice versa. The central bank can approach this problem
in one of two ways. First, it could set the interest rate it is targeting and supply
money perfectly elastically at that rate. Money demand then pins down the
quantity of money, gure 2. This is known as xed-rate full-allotment provision
and is how most practitioners characterised policy in Great Moderation. After
all, the majority of central banks have used the interest rate as their principle
policy instrument since at least the early 90s. The quantity of money in this
case simply follows the interest rate passively to clear the market. As discussed
in Ireland (2005), this particular endogenous view of money adds little to the
basic New Keynesian framework and the benign nature of the quantity of money
in this setup has lead many economists to consider the New Keynesian models
abstraction from money as acceptable, even if they do not believe that strict
Wallace Neutrality holds.2
The alternative manner in which the central bank could set policy is by
determining the quantity of money and leaving the market to clear, resulting
in i∗. This is in essence substituting equation 3 into 5 and then re-writing them
as
2This assertion is rejected by McCallum (2012), who demonstrates that the absence of money
in the three equation New Keynesian model is only valid if the transaction cost which money
serves to eliminate is additively separable in consumption and money, an assumption for which
there is little to no evidence.
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These two approaches are broadly analogous to each other, equating on paper
to the same levels of interest and quantities of money. However, in practice the
latter requires the monetary authority to know the money demand function, a
non-trivial assumption given the recognised instability of money demand through
time. In a seminal paper, Poole (1970) demonstrated that, although in the case
of absolute certainty the two ways of setting policy are equivalent, in an economy
dominated by shocks to the IS curve (g) then it is better to set policy via the
quantity of money, whilst when nancial or money market shocks dominate,
welfare is enhanced by setting the price of money.3 His ultimate conclusion was
that in an economy subject to both real and nancial shocks, the best course
of action for policymakers was to use a combination of both interest rate and
quantity setting, a point picked up on and elaborated by Chadha, Corrado and
Holly (2014).
Our innovation here is far from controversial. Policymakers have accepted it,
either explicitly or implicitly for decades and it lies at the heart of practical policy
action in central banks around the world.
3.2 Adding imperfectly substitutable assets
Having introduced one asset, money, we now extend the model further with the
addition of two new assets; A and B. We keep the nature of these assets as general
as possible, imposing only that they are priced in such a way that the rates of























where MA and MB are the respective maturities of assets A and B, SPAt is
3Pooles analysis was conducted in the IS-LM framework, so by nancial market shocks, it
is meant any exogenouns disturbance to the LM curve.
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the publicly available supply of A and SPBt the publicly available supply of B. It
is important to note here that what is meant by publicly available supply is net
of assets held by the central bank, ie. total supply less that held by the monetary
authority. Thus SPAt and S
PB











where SAt and S
B
t are the total supplies of asset A and asset B and S
CA
t and
SCBt are the quantities of each asset held by the central bank.
βA and βB can be thought of as the interest elasticity of demand, or the slope
of the demand curve for each asset. δ is the extent to which assets A and B are
viewed as substitutes for each other.4
The economic interpretation of these equations is that assets A and B are
priced in accordance with the expectations hypothesis, which is captured in the
rst term in equations 8 and 9, but depending on the parameterisation have
the potential for an additional premium which is a function of the supply of
the asset and its substitutes. This is similar in spirit to Harrison (2012) who
develops a model in which long rates are subject to a premium which is a function
of the relative supplies of long and short bonds. The approach here, though
more stylised aims to be more general in its assertion of the characteristics which
distinguish m, A and B. It may, as in the case of Harrison (2012) be term, or
equally, it may be liquidity, risk or any other feature which can vary between
assets and for which investors may have a preference.
In order to incorporate these two assets into our wider framework, we must
also adjust the IS curve so that it is dependent not only on the risk-free rate,














λi + λA + λB = 1 (13)
This is again similar to the result derived by Harrison (2012) from an
4We will elaborate more on this in the next section.
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optimising household with preferences for liquidity. He shows that the IS
curve becomes a function of the weighted average of both short and long rates.
Conceptually this idea harks back to Tobin (1969) and even Keynes who believed
the monetary tightness or otherwise of an economy could not be accurately
represented by a single interest rate. It is an acceptance that agents store value
for the future via a range of assets, each of which pay a di¤erent return and which
may or may not be perfectly connected through the expectations hypothesis. For




3.3 Open market operations: a link between money and
other assets
To close out the model, we need to describe how the central banks control of the
quantity of money relates to other assets in the economy. To do this, we impose
that the central bank must match the liabilities on its balance sheet (money)
with an equal quantity of assets, which it has purchased from the private sector.
Although the mechanism is stylised, this is how the money supply is controlled
in practice, both for traditional open market operations and also the large-scale
asset purchases experienced in the last decade.
In our three asset world this means that SCAt and S
CB







and in order to increase the money supply, the central bank must increase
either SCAt or S
CB






3.4 The nal model
Our model can therefore be characterised by 10 core equations. First is our
modied IS curve







Then the standard NK Phillips curve
πt = κyt + βEtπt+1 + ut (16)
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Then we have our monetary policy rule which determines the quantity of
money, and the market clearing interest rate, given that quantity of money







For the analysis that follows we assume that assets A and B are one period
assets which di¤er from each other and money due to idiosyncratic features.
Therefore the rates of interest they play can be written
















And lastly we assume that the total supply of assets A and B is exogenously
xed so that movements in the publicly available supply of each asset are











In the simulation examples that follow we make a further simplication
that the central bank controls the money supply exclusively through varying
its holdings of asset A, and so
SCAt = mt (23)
and SCBt is exogenously xed, meaning that S
PB
t is also exogenously xed.
Although it appears quite simple, the general nature of this model means that
it is extremely exible and as such is a useful backdrop on which to frame and
clarify ones thoughts on central bank asset purchases and how they might work.
This is what we will do in the next section.
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4 Central bank asset purchases as a policy tool
The rst thing to note is that the standard New Keynesian model is a special case
of our more general model. By setting α =∞ money demand becomes perfectly
interest rate elastic and the quantity of money supplied does not a¤ect the price of
money, i.5 Similarly, if assets A and B are perfect substitutes, δ = 1, and there are
no frictions which cause prices to deviate from the pure expectations hypothesis
then demand for both assets is also perfectly elastic and so βA = βB = 0. This
returns the New Keynesian result that the only manner by which monetary policy
can inuence the economy is through a change in i, or the future path of i, which
lowers the return on assets A and B through the term structure.
4.1 A world where money matters
Let us now consider a world in which the money demand curve is less than
perfectly elastic andWallace Neutrality fails to hold for money. In our framework,
this equates to the case where −∞ < α < 0. This means we have a downward
sloping demand curve for money of the type inferred by diminishing returns
to transaction and liquidity services discussed earlier. For now we continue to
assume Wallace Neutrality holds for wider nancial markets and demand for A
and B remains perfectly elastic so βA = βB = 0. Under this parameterisation
an open market operation that exchanges money for asset A expands the money
supply. For a given money demand, this expansion lowers it as agents require
further inducement to hold the increased cash balances given the diminishing
marginal utility of money. This feeds through the term structure and lowers
MAP
t=0
it which in turn lowers i
A
t . It also lowers i
B
t by the same mechanism. In fact,
if MB < MA then the interest rate on asset B will fall by more than that on
asset A, despite B not having been involved in the operation at all.
This transmission mechanism can be seen in gure 4 which plots the impulse
responses of the model following a positive shock to the money supply e¤ected
through a reduction in the supply of asset A. The expansion of m causes i to fall.
As all assets in the coded version of the model are one period, all three interest
rates move identically and this stimulates both output and ination.
A key result of this parameter setting is that, under these assumptions the
nature of the asset purchased is wholly unimportant. The impact on interest
rates would be the same were the open market operation to exchange money for
asset A or for asset B. In fact, there is no need for the central bank to make any
5In fact, the quantity of money is not only unimportant, it becomes indeterminate.
15
kind of purchase at all. The e¤ect on the economy would be exactly the same if
the central bank purely printed money and distributed it in the economy, asking
for nothing in exchange. A policy of this kind has become known as a helicopter
drop. The fact that all that matters is the change in the central banks liabilities
aligns this view of the world with a monetarist outlook, although the comparison
is in some ways imperfect as in this model the impact on the economy from an
expansion of the money supply still relies on its ability to move the short term
interest rate.
4.2 Wider supply e¤ects
So far we have looked at a world in which money is a special case, providing
utility beyond its percuniary returns due to its specic characteristics. However,
prices of the other assets in the economy continue to be determined purely by
the expectations hypothesis, una¤ected by their own supply. This is due to the
perfectly elastic demand curves which are a result of the assumptions of complete
and frictionless nancial markets, and the Wallace Neutrality inherent in the
representative agent paradigm. In the words of James Tobin
"all non-monetary assets and debts are to be taken to be perfect
substitutes at a common interest rate plus or minus an exogenous
interest di¤erential" Tobin (1982)
This feature of the New Keynesian model is contradicted by a growing
empirical literature on the existence of signicant supply e¤ects. DAmico and
King (2010) and Meaning and Zhu (2011) both use individual bond level data
to nd signicant changes in bond prices as a result of changes in the supply of
government securities in recent central bank asset purchase programmes in the
US and UK. Joyce et al (2010) nd similar evidence for the UK, as do Breedon
et al (2012) and Banerjee et al (2012). The challenge has been developing a
rigorous theoretical framework to explain such results, with ex Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke describing asset purchases as policies which "work
in practice, but not in theory" Bernanke (2014)
At its heart, it requires the breaking of some of the core assumptions of the
New Keynesian model, most crucially those of a representative agent and perfect
and complete nancial markets.
The idea that there might be imperfect substitutability between assets which
could be exploited for monetary policy purposes has its roots in the work of Tobin
(1963, 1969) and Culbertson (1957) who showed, relatively intuitively that if there
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was imperfect substitutability between assets then changes in supply would induce
movements in rates of interest. Modigliani and Sutch (1966) began to develop a
more rigorous theoretical explanation as to why imperfect substitutability may
exist based on the idea that investors had a preference for certain assets or areas
of the term structure. For instance, they may wish to hold assets with the same
maturity prole as their liabilities, or in an extreme case, be mandated by law
to hold assets with certain characteristics.6 This preference means that they
value certain assets beyond their nancial payo¤, in much the same way as the
transaction service gave an non-percuniary value to money. Investors can be
tempted from their preferred mix of assets, or habitat, but require an increased
payo¤ as inducement to compensate them for the switch. This preferred habitat
theory sat between the two extremes of segmented market theory, which assumed
no substitution between assets, and the expectations hypothesis which assumed
perfect substitutability. More recently, Andres, Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2004)
looked to build imperfect substitutability into a New Keynesian-style DSGE
model. They introduce both long and short bonds which are imperfect substitutes
for two reasons; long bonds incur an additional transaction cost and are also
perceived as more risky and less liquid so households hold more cash to hedge
against this risk which creates a second additional cost to holding long bonds.
This is not however su¢cient to generate a role for supply e¤ects as households
could always choose to by-pass the long bond market entirely and avoid any
premia which occur. To counter this, Andres et al (2004) restrict a fraction
of households to only being able to operate in long bond markets, e¤ectively
breaking the representative agent assumption and imposing the strictest degree of
asset preference for one agent. The result is that changes in the relative quantities
of short term bonds, characterised as money, and long bonds move the long-term
interest rate and this cannot be fully arbitraged away. This then feeds into the
IS curve and a¤ects agents behaviour.
Vayanos and Vila (2009) create a similar framework to introduce imperfect
substitutability between assets. In their model there exist agents who are
restricted to one market segment or another, and a limited number of agents who
can arbitrage and trade across markets. When an arbitrage opportunity arises
these unrestricted investors can exploit it, but in doing so become increasingly
exposed to risk and so demand a higher return to induce them to take on the
carry trade. This leads to an increase in rates and as such a channel by which
6Clear examples here are the UK pensions market which are legally required to hold long-
term government securities, or the need to hold liquid assets under the latest Basel Liquidity
Coverage Ratio.
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changes in supply can a¤ect interest rates.
The risk-aversion mechanism can be couched in terms of another strand of
models. In the nancial accelerator models of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) agents issuing debt have an increasing
incentive to default the more leveraged they become. For a given level of
underlying collateral therefore increasing the supply of debt issued increases the
risk of default. To incentivise the private sector to take on this riskier supply, the
interest rate must rise accordingly.
The existence of credit constraints can also directly limit the extent of
arbitrage. A central tenant of the no-arbitrage condition is that any opportunities
can be exploited in unlimited quantity until the arbitrage is eliminated. If
investors do not have the funds to take advantage of the arbitrage situation then
complete credit markets will a¤ord them the means. In reality credit constraints
may limit their ability to do this, especially if the change in supply required is
extremely large.
The same principle applies to transactions costs. If there are large costs
associated with changing ones portfolio then large changes to take advantage
of arbitrage would inict signicant costs for which the investor would need to
be recompensed, or which might prove prohibitive to exploiting the arbitrage
opportunity itself.
For asset purchases by the central bank to be a viable policy tool though,
it is not su¢cient that the overall supply of an asset has consequences for its
price. It must also be true that investors di¤erentiate between assets they hold
themselves in their own portfolio, and those held on their behalf by the public
sector. In other words, it requires that Wallace Neutrality fails. This can be
achieved theoretically in a variety of ways, most of which rely on the introduction
of heterogenous agents. Without a representative agent, any change in the future
scal position resulting from taking assets on to the public sector balance sheet
need not be distributed amongst private sector agents in an identical manner to
the payo¤s of the asset when it was held by the original private sector investor.
This means agents are unlikely to adjust their demand for assets to perfectly
o¤set the impact on prices. A clear example would be the di¤ering payo¤s to
a pension fund if it holds a government bond on its balance sheet compared to
if it sells that bond to the public sector and experiences a negligible increase in
economy-wide ination. Benigno and Nistico (2015) demonstrate a similar non-
neutrality in the context of open market operations stemming from the removal
of a scal indemnity which results in the central bank having to increase ination
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when faced with losses from asset purchases.
Alternatively, Wallace Neutrality could break due to myopic, or only nitely-
lived agents who do not take account of future tax increases when making their
investment decisions. A similar argument is often heard in the discussion of
Ricardian Equivalence.
The key is that agents actually perceive a change in their personal payo¤s in
future states of nature resulting from the change in the portfolio of assets they
hold directly.
Crucially, our general and stylised model does not seek to critique and evaluate
such underlying mechanisms. Rather it takes the result presented by this strand
of the literature, however arrived at, as one potential version of the world and
investigates its implications for monetary policy.
4.3 Supply e¤ects in our general model
However they are motivated, we can use our general model to think about a Tobin-
esque world in which the supply of assets matters for their price and return. As
with our discussion of money in section 4.1, such a world implies that the demand
curve for assets A and B are less than perfectly elastic, and therefore βA and βB
are both greater than zero.
Let us reconsider our earlier thought experiment; an open market operation
exchanging asset A for newly created money. The rst point of note is that the
existence of supply e¤ects does not preclude the transmission mechanisms we
have previously outlined. The expansion in the money supply works in exactly
the same way as detailed above; it falls to clear the money market and this lowers
both iAt and i
B
t through the term structure. However, we now get an additional
e¤ect on iAt caused by the reduction in the quantity of A available to the public.
Whatever the underlying friction, the change in supply leads to a movement in
the price and yield of A which cannot be fully arbitraged away.
This direct supply e¤ect may also be accompanied by a more broadly "local"
supply e¤ect if asset B is an imperfect substitute for asset A, in other words if
δ > 0. Intuitively δ is the extent to which B operates as a successful substitute
for A. Imagine the two assets are very close substitutes and supply matters for
determining price. In this case the relevant variable is the joint supply of both A
and B, as they are interchangeable, so δ ≃ 1. As δ → 0 the less of an e¤ective
substitute B is for A and the less the supply of B matters in determining the
price of A, and vice versa. Therefore, if 0 < δ < 1, as exchanging asset A for
money increases the price of asset A, at least some investors will be induced to
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switch out of holding A and in to holding asset B. This increase in demand for
asset B will push up on its price and down on its yield, lowering iBt by an amount
in excess of the pure expectations hypothesis. This transmission mechanism has
become known as the portfolio rebalancing channel.
The values of βA, βB and δ are therefore integral to the transmission and
e¢cacy of asset purchases as a monetary policy tool. To see why, let us again
imagine our A for money open market operation, but assuming demand for asset
A is almost entirely inelastic. As βA tends to innity, δ tends to zero. This would
mean that our open market operation would have an increasingly large impact
on iA but the transmission to iB would diminish to nothing. In other words,
there would be a large direct e¤ect, but no portfolio rebalancing. All that the
open market operation is achieving is to disconnect asset A from the yield curve.
Contrast this with the case where demand for assets is perfectly elastic and so βA
and βB tend to zero, but δ tends to one. Now the assets are perfect substitutes, so
a change in the supply of one is equivalent to the change in the supply of the other,
but the perfectly elastic demand means that a change in supply of either has no
impact on iA or iB. This can be seen in gure 5 which applies the same shock to
the supply of money under di¤erent parameterisations of these parameters. When
βA = 0 and δ = 1 then the movement of all variables is the same as the initial
shock presented in gure 4. However, as the demand curve for asset A becomes
less elastic, the impact of the operation on iA increases. Interestingly, the impact
on i reduces, as the heightened sensitivity of other assets to the operation takes
some of the burden of stabilising the economy and so relaxes the amount of work
required by the policy rate. The impact on iB is determined by the interaction
of βB and δ. A higher degree of pass-through from increased substitutability can
be o¤set by a more elastic demand curve.
This has implications for the design of policy. In a world where βA was
large but δ low, asset purchases would represent a useful tool for manipulating
a targeted market, or market segment. Such a scenario is likely to occur when
market functioning is impaired, meaning this may be a practically relevant result.
Putting it in to a real world context, it suggests that in this version of the world
there was a role for targeted asset purchases in impaired markets at the inception
of the 2008 crisis, as the beta values were likely to be high with strain in specic
markets. However, such a characterisation would also mean that asset purchases
were less e¤ective as a tool for macroeconomic stabilisation, as there is little to
no transmission to other rates in the economy. For asset purchases to be e¤ective
as a tool for wider macroeconomic and monetary stabilisation, they require a
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world between these two extremes in which there is less than perfect arbitrage,
but assets are still to some degree substitutable. Moving along the spectrum
between the two poles will alter how asset purchases work and transmit through
the economy.
So, what is likely to determine the values of these parameters? The stronger
the frictions that limit arbitrage opportunities, be they credit constraints,
risk aversion of arbitrageurs or valuing assets for characteristics beyond their
pecuniary return are at their largest the greater we would expect βA to be. This
suggests that asset purchases may be especially e¤ective at manipulating rates in
times of nancial turmoil, as this is exactly when frictions are at their strongest
and markets become most segmented. This is not to discount the importance of
this supply channel in more normal times, as it is highly probable that frictions
exist to one extent or another even when markets are functioning relative well.
In fact, DAmico et al (2012) nd signicant supply e¤ects in a pre-crisis sample
for the US economy.
It is also important to note that βA and δ are unlikely to be independent of
one another. The less there exists close and viable substitutes for asset A, the
more inelastic demand for A will be. Therefore, βA and δ are likely to be inversely
correlated. This is a signicant statement as it highlights a trade-o¤ at the heart
of the debate around supply e¤ects and the use of asset purchases as a policy
tool.
5 A demand shock
Figure 6 shows the response of the model to a demand shock under two
parameterisations. In the rst there are no frictions which give rise to supply
e¤ects for any asset other than money. In the second βA, βB and δ are set so
that there are signicant supply e¤ects on assets A and B. As can be seen, the
monetary authority has to reduce the policy rate by less to stabilise the economy
in the latter case as the reduction in the premium on A moves iA by more. This
is an important result as it means that the correct policy setting, even in normal
times must be aware the extent of supply e¤ect. The existence of supply e¤ects
does appear to lessen the falls in output and ination, though under this setting
the magnitude is not great.
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6 Policies at the zero lower bound
A dominant feature of the recent economic landscape has been the binding of
the lower bound on short-term nominal interest rates. In fact, it has been this
development above all others which has reawakened interest in asset purchases as
an explicit policy tool and spurred the debate surrounding their theoretical basis.
Our discussion thus far has taken place in the context of unconstrained rates,
so all of our insights are valid away from the lower bound. However, applying
our general model we can think about how these insights might change when the
traditional policy channels are constrained.
The cashless version of the New Keynesian model is little a¤ected by the
lower bound. Unable to lower it however, the only mechanism left by which
monetary policymakers can relax the stance of policy and stimulate demand is to
reduce Et
P
it. Shaping expectations in this way has become known as forward
guidance, and has been adopted as part of the policy strategy of almost all major
central banks at some point in recent years.7 To change agents expectations
the central bank has to convince them it will hold the policy rate low for longer
than they currently expect, transmitting along the yield curve and lowering rates
at longer term. Within the New Keynesian model, and often in wider thinking
this is framed as a commitment to hold rates lower than the designated policy
rule would deem appropriate for a period of time, and as such equates to a
commitment to higher future ination, Eggertson and Woodford (2003). This
raises issues of credibility and time-inconsistency as an ination targeting central
bank would have an incentive to renege on such a commitment once ination
was restored to the target level. This argument has lead some to suggest a
subtle mechanism through which asset purchases may aid policy implementation.
By holding lots of nancial assets on an expanded balance sheet, the central
bank is increasingly exposed to interest rate risk. As such, raising rates before
these assets have been returned to the market would inict losses on the central
bank. Assuming the central bank has an aversion to losses which features in its
objective function, this may stay its hand in raising rates, adding credibility to
its low for longer commitment and thus making it more e¤ective at shaping
expectations and lowering rates. This "skin in the game" channel of asset
purchases seems unlikely to be signicant though as there is no evidence that
losses from asset purchase programmes feature in the objective function of central
banks, especially considering that many programmes are subject to an indemnity
7See chapter 2 of this thesis.
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against losses from the scal authority. What is more, to the extent that losses
are a consideration in central bank decision making, they are likely to be dwarfed
by the mandated macrostabilisation objectives.
Besides this, there are a number of other reasons why a commitment to holding
rates lower for longer may not be time-inconsistent in practice. Under the full
information, rational expectations assumptions of the model, agents perfectly
know the central banks reaction function and all agents have the same view of
the future evolution of variables because they know the nature of the underlying
model structure. This means that agents expectations of future interest rates,
by design, arrive at the time-consistent outcome.
In reality though this need not be the case. In fact, it is highly unlikely
to be so. This means that communication that rates will be lower for longer
than markets expect need not be a deviation from the central banks time-
consistent policy rule, but rather a consequence of markets misunderstanding the
central banks reaction function, and so not accurately factoring in the true time-
consistent path for policy. This may be because they have always misunderstood
the reaction function, or that the reaction function itself has changed. Given the
novelty of central banks nding themselves at the lower bound, it is plausible that
neither they, nor markets were sure of their reaction function in this environment.
Similarly, it may be that the central bank has a di¤erent view on the outlook
for the economy and is signalling that they expect the future paths of key
aggregates to be weaker than markets envision. As such, in this context the
signal that rates will be lower for longer than market expectations suggest moves
those expectations towards a time-consistent path for policy, not away from it.
At the lower bound, the variant of our general model which introduced money
collapses to the standard New Keynesian model. This is because the lower bound
represents the point at which the transaction service of money has been exhausted
and money demand has become perfectly elastic. Asset purchases which expand
the monetary base beyond this point have no e¤ect and the economy has entered
a liquidity trap. The policy prescription then becomes equivalent to that of the
standard New Keynesian baseline.
As with our analysis away from the lower bound, the nal Tobin-esque
incarnation of our model allows monetary policy to gain direct traction through
manipulating the supplies of assets. Like the rst two variants, the traditional
interest rate channel is impaired as changes in the supply of money no longer
lower it, although anything which shapes Et
P
it will continue to be e¤ective.




theory, the limit of such a policy is when the supply of assets A and B have been
reduced su¢ciently that iAt and i
B
t both reach their own lower bounds. This is a
theoretical proposition which seems to have begun to be tested by the Bank of
Japan who have reduced premia on some assets by so much that they have had
to expand their purchases to a wider range of assets in search of rates of interest
above their lower bound.
7 Alternative channels for asset purchases
Our exposition so far has focussed on the ability of asset purchases to inuence
interest rates, and from that point has followed the traditional Keynesian interest
rate channel through the IS curve to the households intertemporal decision.
However, there are a number of alternative candidate channels through which
asset purchases may act to stimulate demand.
The Bank of Japans original quantitative easing programme in the early 2000s
placed much importance on the bank lending channel. The core of this idea is
that asset purchases expand the level of deposits and reserves in the banking
system and this leads banks to increase credit creation to the private sector,
which in turn buoys activity. However, the idea that this process works through
a simple function whereby banks extend loans as some xed multiple of reserves
is at best outdated. Not only is this proposition contradicted heavily by the
data, but also by a growing academic literature, the main points of which are
excellently distilled by McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014). Instead, models such
as Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Chadha, Corrado and Meaning (this volume)
look to how the increase of reserves and deposits a¤ects banks funding costs
and as such the optimal quantity of loans they extend. In general, by increasing
deposits and reserves, central banks are providing a cheaper form of funding to
banks than if they went to market and this should incentivise them to use this
funding to nance loans. This has been empirically tested by authors such as
Butt et al (2014) and Joyce and Spaltro (2014), in the UK and Bowman et al
(2011) for Japan and found to be weak at best. A separate strand of literature
on the bank lending channel looks at asset purchases as a way to mend banks
balance sheets. If banks nd themselves credit constrained, or limited in their
ability to lend due to damaged balance sheets and risk, then an injection of safe,
liquid assets in the form of reserves may alleviate such constraints and spur them
to lend. Disyatat (2010) explains this mechanism clearly and develops a model in
which the health of banks balance sheets directly a¤ects the quantity of lending.
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Similarly, Gertler and Karadi (2009) extend a DSGE model with a banking sector
in which the central bank can add capital to commercial banks balance sheets
via asset purchases and relax constraints on lending, boosting demand.
The principle of improving balance sheets that Disyatat (2010) applies to
banks may be broadly applied to households and investors as well. If agents
are credit constrained by the collateral they hold, as in the seminal models by
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), then
providing the private sector with an increased quantity of high quality assets
that they can use as collateral against which to borrow will relax their credit
constraint and allow them to increase their investment or spending.
A more controversial channel through which central bank asset purchases
may help to stimulate the economy is through their interaction with the scal
authority. A large part of the assets purchased by central banks in recent years
has been government securities, with the consequence of substantially reducing
the publicly available stock of such securities and also the cost to governments of
issuing debt. Thinking in terms of a scal budget constraint, this creates scal
space, which might allow the government to increase spending or reduce taxation,
boosting demand. The controversy arises when this is framed as monetary
nancing of scal spending, a subject which is taboo and o¤ limits in the eyes
of many economists. Jordi Gali (2014) shows however how such a policy can be
welfare enhancing, even if the government spending which results is less than fully
e¢cient. This channel is likely to be especially e¤ective when the scal multiplier
is large, as it is often suggested it is when monetary policy is constrained at the
lower bound.
Last is the monetarist view, in which expansion of the money supply is
stimulative in and of itself. Under this view, famously put forward by Milton
Freidman, increases in the quantity of money leads to more money chasing the
same quantity of goods and services in the economy. This bids up asset prices
and prices more broadly and eventually leads to a pick-up in nominal spending.
Bridges and Thomas (2012) provide a framework both for thinking about, and
beginning to quantify such a channel.
8 Conclusions
The standard New Keynesian model contains no direct channel by which asset
purchases can a¤ect the economy. This is because, under its core assumptions of a
representative agent with rational expectations and complete and perfect nancial
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markets any arbitrage opportunities are instantly exploited and any exchange of
assets between the public and private sectors is inconsequential for prices as the
ultimate exposure of the household is left unchanged regardless of whether they
hold the asset directly, or through the government.
The only way in which monetary policy operates is through setting the short-
term nominal interest rate, or manipulating agents expectations of its future
path. Asset purchases are therefore only e¤ective to the extent that they act to
signal that path, or add credibility to the path committed to by the central bank.
By explicitly introducing a money demand function to the baseline New
Keynesian model we show that if that demand is less than perfectly elastic, the
central bank will have to vary the quantity of money in the economy to change
the rate of interest which prevails. Such a downward sloping demand curve can
be motivated theoretically by the transaction and liquidity services of money. It
has also been the bedrock of practical monetary policy for some time as central
banks have used open market operations to ensure the money market clears at
their target interest rate. Augmenting the model in this way provides a role
for asset purchases which expand the monetary base insofar as they lower the
short-term nominal interest rate. However, because the New Keynesian models
assumptions still hold for all nancial assets other than money, the nature of the
assets for which the newly created money is exchanged is irrelevant. In fact, the
same e¤ect could be achieved by a helicopter drop which expanded the money
supply without buying any assets at all. What is more, once the money supply
has been expanded to the point that the transaction and liquidity services of
money are exhausted then money demand becomes satiated and perfectly elastic.
At this point further money creation by the central bank cannot push rates lower,
the lower bound has been reached and the augmented model collapses back to
the standard New Keynesian framework with the same policy prescription.
Further extension of our model allows us to relax the assumption that wider
nancial markets are complete without frictions. Such a setting has been
motivated theoretically by the existence of imperfect substitution between assets,
preferred habitat investors and risk-averse or credit constrained arbitrageurs. It
could also stem more broadly from the existence of heterogenous agents who face
the benets and losses from asset purchases di¤erently, or the failing of the New
Keynesian models strong assumption on complete nancial markets. Whatever
the underlying cause, if its supply has signicant consequences for the price of an
asset then asset purchases by the central bank will be able to exploit these and
directly manipulate a whole range of interest rates The e¢cacy with which it can
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do this will be dependent on the extent to which frictions limit arbitrage and assets
are imperfect substitutes, captured in our model by the parameters βA, βB and δ.
This suggests that asset purchases may be especially e¤ective in times of nancial
market turmoil when frictions are more pronounced and markets generally more
segmented. Importantly such supply e¤ects, if they exist, are little a¤ected by
the lower bound on the short-term nominal interest rate and thus provide a way
for monetary policy to continue to ease policy when confronted with a constraint
on its traditional policy instrument.
Having presented and discussed the main theoretical views on asset purchases
we hope to show that each result rests on the assumptions underlying it.
Ultimately, the only way to validate one over the other is through empirical
testing, something this author attempts to do later in this thesis, and which is at
the heart of a burgeoning quantitative literature. Our results, along with those of
many other authors, increasingly appear to validate the existence of supply e¤ects
and imperfect substitution between assets. More often than not, these are found
alongside weak expectational e¤ects which imply an element of the signalling
channel highlighted by the baseline New Keynesian model. Away from the lower
bound, the money demand curve appears to be inelastic to varying degrees, with
a monetary expansion leading to lower money market rates and so it is likely that
all three elements exist simultaneously to one degree or another supporting the
nal parameterisation of the general model presented in this paper.
The challenge remains to build convincing and robust microfoundations which
can explain this behaviour in a comprehensive macroeconomic framework. This
is part of an ongoing and vital research agenda. For now what seems certain
is that it will require deviations from some of the core assumptions behind the
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Figure 1: A graphical representation of Wallace Neutrality
Figure 2: Setting policy via the interest rate - inelastic money demand with
perfectly elastic money supply
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Figure 3: Setting policy via quantity of money - inelastic money demand with
perfectly inelastic money supply
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Figure 4: An open market operation which increases the money supply by
purchasing asset A
βA = 0, βB = 0, δ = 1
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Figure 5: An open market operation swapping money for asset A under varying
degrees of imperfect substitutability and inelastic demand curves
Parameter values
Perfect substitutability −→ No substitutability
Black line Blue line Red line Green line
βA 0 0.02 0.05 0.07
βB 0 0.02 0.05 0.07
δ 1 0.8 0.3 0
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Figure 6: A demand shock with and without supply e¤ects
Parameter values
No supply e¤ects Supply e¤ects





Figure 7: Monetary expansion beyond the lower bound
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A recent history of monetary policy
Jack Meaning
Abstract
This paper tells the story of four central banks - the Federal Reserve, the Bank
of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan - and how the
way in which they conduct policy has evolved dramatically over the last decade.
It moves from the Great Moderation, in which monetary policy had become
thought of as a science and the short-term nominal interest rate was considered
su¢cient to stabilise the economy, to the present day in which the size and the
composition of central bank balance sheets has taken centre stage. It details each
banks response to the crisis of 2007/8 and how their balance sheets were rst
used to act as lenders of last resort and provide liquidity to an ailing nancial
system, before the lower bound constraint forced them to innovate in order to
stimulate demand more broadly.
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Introduction
In 2000 Mervyn King, then Deputy Governor of the Bank of England claimed
that a successful central banker should be boring, King (2000). He was speaking
at a time when it looked as if the practical questions of how monetary policy
could stabilise the economy had been emphatically answered. Central bankers
could seemingly encourage or dampen inationary pressure in a reliable manner
by setting the short-term nominal interest rate. Consistent with the seminal
analysis of Tinbergen (1952), this single instrument was su¢cient to pursue the
single, simplied objective of ination targetting, which was becoming ever more
widely adopted. This policy framework represented a change from the 1970s and
1980s when the focus of policy had been the explicit control of the money supply.
We are now 15 years after Kings speech, and monetary policy has been
anything but boring. In fact, it has undergone a period of immense change
which has fundamentally altered how it is conducted. In response to a number
of challenges, central banks have moved from relying solely on the short-term
interest rate to employing their balance sheets in a variety of ways in the pursuit
of an expanded set of objectives. The size and composition of central bank balance
sheets has become (once more) a focal part of monetary policy in practice.
This paper seeks to provide the narrative of how this evolution occurred
through the prism of four of the most prominent central banks in the advanced
world. It is intended as a primer, to give some historical context to the more
academic discussions in the rest of this thesis. Although every e¤ort has been
made to be as thorough as possible the sheer volume of policy innovations over
the period considered means that this, indeed any paper, is hard pushed to be
completely comprehensive. Therefore I would suggest a selection of wider reading
for those in search of deeper, or more technical understanding of the policies
described.
For its contribution, this paper details the consensus framework for conducting
policy throughout the Great Moderation in which most central banks targeted
macroeconomic aggregates by means of the short-term nominal interest rate.
The early exception was the Bank of Japan who initiated a quantitative easing
programme in the early part of the last decade. The paper then goes on to describe
the policy responses of each central bank to the nancial crisis of 2007/08. These
can be broadly categorised into three eras. First a period of liquidity provision in
which all four central banks fullled their lender of last resort function to support
a nancial sector in free-fall. As this subsided, the focus turned to stabilising
the macroeconomy and stimulating demand. With the traditional instrument
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of choice constrained by its lower bound, each of the four central banks looked
to other instruments by which policy could gain traction. This lead to a range
of asset purchase programmes and lending facilities which caused central bank
balance sheets to expand dramatically, with some now reaching 60 per cent of
GDP.
Concurrent with the evolution of how central banks conduct monetary policy,
many have found their remits expanded to include new objectives such as
macroprudential regulation and banking supervision. Whilst of great importance
and interest, these innovations are not the focus of this paper. Similarly, the
paper does little to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the policies discussed. This is
left to an extensive literature, to which the author himself has contributed.
Policy in the Great Moderation
The standard pre-crisis paradigm
The decade prior to 2007 was characterised by a largely stable macroeconomic
environment. Most central banks had been granted at least operational
independence subject to mandated targets for key aggregates. In the case of the
Bank of England and the European Central Bank these targets were for levels
of consumer price ination,1 whilst the Federal Reserves remit was, and remains
the broader and slightly more vague objective of "maximum employment, stable
prices and moderate long-term interest rates".
As can be seen in gures 1-3, the advanced economies did indeed evolve
broadly in line with these mandates throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s
and this period of stability became known as the Great Moderation.
The implementation of monetary policy had been considered distilled to a
science. Following the seminal analysis by Poole (1970), central banks had moved
away from the quantity of money as the predominant instrument, and rather
focused on the price of money; the short-term nominal interest rate. Work by
John Taylor had shown that a simple policy rule involving ination and output
was su¢cient to stabilise the economy as long as nominal interest rates moved
more than one-for-one with deviations in ination, as this would then ensure that
real rates would move appropriately to bring the economy back to equilibrium,
1In 1997 the UK government set the Bank of England a symmetric target of 2.5% for the 12
month change in the Retail Price Index before updating the mandate to 2% annual growth in
the Consumer Prices Index. The ECBs target is symmetric and aims for "close to but below
2%" annual change in the Euro Area Harmonised Consumer Price Index.
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Taylor (1993).
At a technical level, central banks still varied the quantity of money in order
to ensure that the money market cleared at their target interest rate, but this
was considered of second-order importance for policy and often nothing more
than a practical detail. The central bank set the aggregate quantity of reserves
in the banking system, and the price at which it would be willing to provide
additional funds via open market operations. By declaring this rate, central banks
e¤ectively controlled rates in money markets as no bank in need of reserves would
pay signicantly more than this to borrow from another bank if they could just
go to the central bank and pay the policy rate. Likewise, unless the central bank
had grossly oversupplied reserves to the system, no one bank would nd itself
so ush with excess reserves that it would accept a price much below the policy
rate to lend them on. In order to lower the base interest rate in the economy, the
central bank need only loosen the price at which it o¤ered central bank money
by cutting the interest rate, and then provide any additional reserves demanded
on aggregate by the banking system at the new rate. If the aggregate quantity of
reserves was set appropriately with respect to aggregate demand for them from
the nancial system, then the central banks targeted policy rate should prevail
and interbank markets should attenuate asymmetric demand and supply shocks
between individual agents.
In practice, the supply of reserves was controlled through open market
operations, in which the central bank provided newly created money to a
counterparty in exchange for an asset in a repurchase agreement, or the pledge
of an asset as collateral on a loan. These operations were normally of very short
terms and relatively small amounts.
The Bank of Japan: the early exception
The rst major central bank to deviate from this paradigm was the Bank of
Japan.
Having grown rapidly through the 1980s, the Japanese economy began to
slow signicantly in the early 1990s. The Bank of Japan responded by cutting
its primary policy instrument, the uncollateralised overnight call rate. Over a
four year period between 1991 and 1995 the overnight call rate fell from 8%
to 1
2
%, which although large was carried out at such a slow pace that it did
little to strengthen condence and bolster demand. Kuttner (2014) explains
that the Bank of Japans hesitancy to cut rates decisively at this juncture was
even more pronounced when adjusting for the path of ination. He posits that
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this was a dening di¤erence between the Bank of Japan in the 1990s and the
Federal Reserve in the 2008 crisis and was a fundamental reason for the worse
outcome for the Japanese economy. The 1995 banking crisis solidied Japans
now persistently weak economic performance and on 12th February 1999 the
Bank of Japan made its nal cut in the overnight call rate to "virtually zero",
which in practise meant that they oversupplied reserves to the system in order to
"encourage the uncollateralised call rate to move as low as possible", gure 12.
Despite this, deation intensied which meant that with the nominal rate
bounded by zero, real rates began to increase, exacerbating the deationary cycle.
At this point the Bank of Japan moved its focus from the price of money to the
quantity, o¢cially changing its operating target from the overnight call rate to
the level of current account balances (CABs) held with it by private banks on
the 19th March 2001. The policy became known as quantitative easing, due to
the prominence it a¤orded the quantity of central bank money. In many ways
it harked back to the monetary policy of the 1970s and 1980s where targeting
monetary aggregates was pervasive. The theoretical arguments put forward then
by Freidman (1987), Tobin (1969) and others about why quantities of money and
assets were important in and of themselves had fallen out of favour in the New
Keynesian revolution of the 1990s, but they were once again pertinent in the
context of the lower bound on interest rates.
From a mechanistic point of view the expansion of current account balances
(CABs) di¤ered little from traditional open market operations. The Bank of
Japan would purchase assets from the banking sector and in exchange provide the
counterparty with a credit in their current account. This expanded the quantity of
central bank money in the system, and it was hoped that this would incentivise the
banks to extend more loans to the wider economy, further boosting the monetary
expansion.
Aside from the shift in operating target from the interest rate to the size
of the monetary base, the other main di¤erence between the Bank of Japans
quantitative easing policy and traditional OMOs was the sheer size of the
programme. At inception, the target for CABs was =Y5trn, but this was raised a
number of times as economic conditions failed to pick up. By 2004 it was =Y35trn,
almost ten times the required reserves level of 2001. To achieve this the Bank
of Japan bought a huge number of Japanese government bonds (JGBs), initially
at a pace of =Y400bn a month, but eventually reaching =Y1.2trn a month. By the
height of the policy in December 2005, the Bank of Japans balance sheet reached
=Y155trn and their assets consisted of around =Y100trn of Japanese government
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bonds, gure 8.
By 2006 annual consumer price ination was reaching 1 per cent and looked
to be consistent with the Bank of Japans aim of eliminating deation. The
targets for CAB were dropped and the overnight call rate once again became
the main operating tool for policy, though it was set at zero per cent. The pace
of government bond purchases was scaled back signicantly and CABs reduced
quickly.
The onset of a crisis
By 2007 it began to become apparent that a number of large nancial institutions
were heavily exposed to the now souring US mortgage market. In July 2007, Bear
Stearns was forced to liquidate two of its hedge funds and a month later, BNP
Paribas stopped withdrawals from three of its investment funds, both due to
losses sustained on sub-prime mortgage investments. In September the British
bank, Northern Rock sought liquidity support from the Bank of England as it
became the rst UK bank in 150 years to face a bank run. These events were
dwarfed in September 2008 when American investment bank Lehman Brothers
was allowed to go bankrupt.
This nancial turmoil and the uncertainty over who was exposed to what
caused spreads in money markets to increase and the amount of interbank
and wholesale lending to contract heavily. The day of the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy, LIBOR-OIS spreads, a measure of perceived risk in the banking
sector, spiked at over 350 basis points. This was signicant because over the Great
Moderation, commercial banks had become increasingly reliant on short-term
funding obtained in wholesale interbank markets. By 2007, 50% of UK banks
funding came from wholesale depositors. As part of their maturity transformation
role, banks borrow short and lend long, and as they found it harder to roll-over
their short-term funding they risked becoming insolvent through illiquidity.
Lender of last resort and liquidity provision
In 1873, Walter Bagehot wrote the now world-renowned book Lombard Street,
Bagehot (1873). In it he described the mechanics of a nancial crisis which was
eerily prescient of the world economy in 2008. His remedy was for the central bank
to be ready to lend freely and in an unlimited supply to all solvent institutions
who could post good quality collateral, but at a penalty rate, so as to avoid
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inherent moral hazard. In doing so, the central bank would quell any panic in
the market and may ultimately not have to advance any loans at all. This policy
prescription became known as the lender of last resort role of the central bank,
and as credit markets tightened in 2007 and 2008, the major central banks all
undertook a range of policies aimed at fullling this role in one way or another.
The ECB supplied liquidity to its banking system merely by modifying
the way it implemented its traditional open market operations. On the 15th
October 2008 they announced that the main renancing operations (MROs) and
long-term renancing operations (LTROs) would no longer be carried out by
auctioning a xed quantity of funds. Instead, they would employ a xed rate, full
allotment system under which they would supply funds in an unlimited quantity
perfectly elastically at the designated policy rate. The quantity of loans was then
determined by the demand of the banking sector, and limited only by the amount
of eligible collateral each borrower had. This saw the ECBs balance sheet expand
by roughly 500bn euros, to just over 2 trillion euros. This applied Bagehots idea
of lending freely, and against good collateral, but neglected to charge a penalty
rate of interest.
The Bank of Japan also provided funds perfectly elastically to its banking
system. In December 2008 it introduced its own version of full allotment,
the Special Funds Supplying Operations. Providing counterparties had eligible
collateral they could borrow for 3 month terms at the Bank of Japans
uncollateralised overnight call rate.
On the 12th December 2007 the Federal Reserve launched its Term Auction
Facility (TAF) which o¤ered loans to any depository institution which was
nancially sound. These loans were o¤ered at a longer term than traditional
borrowing from the Federal Reserve and could be secured against a wider range
of collateral.2 By requiring that borrowers be nancially sound and charging a
penalty above the market rate, TAF was close in spirit to Bagehots principles.
The policy proved e¤ective and at its maximum size in March 2009 $500bn of
funds were extended under TAF. When the crisis intensied with the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, the Fed supplemented TAF with the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Lending Facility (TALF). ABS markets are one of the key drivers of
funding to the wider economy, supplying credit for all manner of activity to
consumers and businesses. With this in mind, on the 25th November 2008 the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York announced that, in an attempt to support
2At rst they were loans up to 28 days, but this was extended further in August 2008 to 84
days.
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the issuance of ABS, borrowers would be able to request non-recourse loans of a
3 or 5 year duration against AAA rated ABS. Initially the facility was granted
permission to extend $200bn of loans, but less than anticipated demand meant
that only $70bn was actually lent. Borrowers were eager to rid themselves of
TALF nancing as, like TAF, it came at a penalty, so as conditions in credit
markets improved, many paid back TALF loans early, securing funds privately.
The non-recourse nature of these loans meant that if the borrower cannot repay
the loan, the collateral behind it, which can range from student loans and credit
cards to small business loans or loans on commercial property, can be claimed by
the Federal Reserve and sold. This had important implications for the risk faced
by the central bank, helping to mitigate a lot of the risk which could potentially
occur through fullling this lender of last resort role.
As the strain in nancial markets subsided, banks could once again borrow
from their regular sources and both TAF and TALF unwound naturally. TAF
was closed o¢cially in March 2010 and the last repayment of funds to TALF was
made in October 2014.
In the UK, banks had been increasing their reserve targets since mid-2007.
This had the e¤ect of increasing the overall quantity of reserves in the system as
the Bank of England met this heightened demand with increased supply consistent
with maintaining its target for Bank Rate. However, concerned that banks
still were not holding su¢cient liquidity, towards the end of 2007 the Bank of
England began to over supply reserves. In order to incentivise banks to hold
these increased levels of reserves without the policy rate falling below the target
for Bank Rate, the Bank of England started remunerating a larger range of excess
reserve balances. This placed a oor on the rate of interest in money markets
as commercial banks could always deposit their excess reserves at the Bank of
England and receive Bank Rate, rather than lend them on the interbank market.
In December 2007 the Bank of England also o¤ered term loans to banks
against a broad range of collateral in the form of 3 month repos. These extended
collateral long-term repos (eLTRs) were initially o¤ered at a penalty rate (one
higher than Bank Rate) in line with Bagehots principles, but as nancial
conditions worsened this penalty rate was dropped. At rst eLTRs were o¤ered
in relatively small amounts, auctions of £10bn. As the crisis deepened they were
expanded signicantly, as was the range of collateral against which they could
be secured. At their height in January 2009 they amounted to approximately
£180bn.
The Bank of England also made use of a number of o¤-balance sheet operations
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to improve the liquidity position of UK banks. The Special Liquidity Scheme
(SLS) was launched on the 21st April 2008. Under SLS banks could swap high-
quality assets such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) for UK Treasury bills.
The idea was that, although high-quality, market uncertainty was rendering MBS
and other such assets temporarily illiquid, even though the asset itself was sound.
To avoid moral hazard, only assets held by banks prior to the announcement
of the policy were allowed to be used in SLS transactions, and the maximum
term for which the swap could be e¤ected was 3 years. At its height, the SLS
reached £185bn, but as it was a swap of one asset for another for which a fee
was charged, it never appeared on the Bank of Englands balance sheet. What is
more, no central bank money was created to fund SLS, so the monetary base was
una¤ected. The programme was nanced by sales of T-bills and although these
might be considered a close substitute for money at low interest rates, they do
not appear in the monetary base.
In October 2008, the SLS was supplemented with another o¤-balance sheet
measure, the Discount Window Facility (DWF). The DWF was similar to the SLS
in that counterparties could borrow gilts from the Bank of England in exchange
for posting collateral. A fee was due, but unlike the SLS, this fee varied with
the quality of the collateral o¤ered. This allowed the Bank of England to justify
lending against a much wider range of collateral than before, as it was being
compensated for the additional risk. The term of lending was initially 30 days,
but in January 2009 this was extended to 364 days, conditional on an increased fee
being paid. It was feared that borrowing from the DWF may send an unwanted
signal to the market and banks would be hesitant to use it due to the implied
stigma. To overcome this, data on the DWF was published with a considerable
lag, allowing banks who needed it to borrow with a degree of anonymity.
The international nature of nancial markets presented an additional
complication for central banks over this period. The ability of a central bank
to act as an e¤ective lender of last resort originates from the fact that it can
create money, so is not constrained in how much it can lend. However, this
is only true in its own currency. The international nature of many nancial
institutions however means that they may be required to settle certain contracts
in a currency which is not their own, and so need access to liquidity in a range of
currencies. This problem was particularly acute with dollar funding in economies
outside of the US. To combat this, in December 2007 the Federal Reserve opened
up dollar liquidity swap lines with 14 other central banks around the world,
including the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the ECB. These were
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designed to allow foreign central banks to lend to institutions in their economy,
but in dollars.3 The foreign central bank sold a quantity of its own currency to
the Federal Reserve in exchange for dollars with the agreement that it would buy
back that currency at a later date with an additional payment for interest. These
dollar swaps were designed to leave the Federal Reserve as little exposed to risk
as possible. As their agreement was with the foreign central bank they make no
direct interaction with the ultimate borrower, so face little to no default risk.
What is more, swap contracts stipulated that the second leg of the transaction
was to be carried out at the same exchange rate as the rst, therefore insulating
the Federal Reserve from exchange rate risk.
These dollar liquidity lines were drawn on by all central banks that had them
made available and peaked in December 2008 at $580bn. When the Euro Area
crisis intensied in 2011 a number of these lines were reopened, but they were
only drawn on to a maximum of $100bn.
As can be seen in gures 4-11 all of these liquidity provision policies acted
to expand the balance sheets of all four central banks. In this way they could
be characterised as a form of quantitative easing. However, the expansion of
the quantity of money was not their primary objective, much like the change in
the money supply was only a secondary concern for traditional open market
operations throughout the Great Moderation, and so they are normally not
described in this way.
Asset purchases to improve market functioning
As well as providing liquidity to their respective nancial systems through loans,
many central banks also made outright purchases of assets. The purpose of
these purchases di¤ered from the broad liquidity provision of the various lending
facilities. They were designed to support the functioning of specic markets which
were deemed to be particularly impaired but of importance to the functioning of
the economy and transmission of monetary policy.
The Fed buys commercial paper and MBS
On the 7th October 2008, the Federal Reserve began buying high quality
commercial paper via the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF). The
purchases were of newly issued, non-interest paying commercial paper of 3 month
maturities which were held for the full term. Agents who were dependent on
3As a precaution the Federal Reserve also opened currency swap lines in which it could
borrow funding in other currencies, however it never drew on these.
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commercial paper funding had seen interest rates in these markets rise over the
nancial crisis, and the term they could borrow at fall. The CPFF was designed,
not only to act as an immediate source of funding for such agents, but also to
instill condence back into markets so that more private sector lenders would
participate and rates would come down. The Federal Reserve charged a fee for
making purchases, which placed the cost at lower than the prevailing market rate,
but above the rate that would prevail under ordinary market conditions. This
meant that, as with the lending facilities, the programme unwound naturally
when it was no longer required as, under normal market functioning, issuing
commercial paper to the CPFF was less attractive than going to the market. At
its largest, in January 2009, the facility held around $350bn of commercial paper,
approximately two-thirds of which was unsecured.
On the 25th November 2008 the Federal Reserve also announced it would buy
$500bn of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the three large government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae.4 This
was designed to "reduce the cost and availability of credit for the purchase
of houses which in turn should support housing markets and foster improved
conditions in nancial markets more generally." FOMC 2008. The purchases
were funded through the creation of new reserves and so caused an expansion of
the Federal Reserves balance sheet.
The Bank of Japan buys commercial paper and corporate bonds
In March 2009 the Bank of Japan supplemented its ongoing monthly purchases
of government bonds with a series of purchases designed to alleviate strains in
particular markets, specically =Y3 trillion of commercial paper and =Y1 trillion of
corporate bonds. In relation to the Bank of Japans balance sheet, and even to
their annual purchases of JGB, these interventions were tiny.
The Bank of England sets up the Asset Purchase Facility
The Bank of England also looked to buy commercial paper and corporate bonds in
early 2009. On the 19th January, following discussion with the Bank of England,
the UKTreasury established a special purpose vehicle, the Asset Purchase Facility
(APF), which would buy private sector assets. These assets were to be funded by
the issuance of debt by the Treasury, much like the DWF, and so would e¤ectively
be sterilised and would not a¤ect the size of the Bank of Englands balance sheet.
4The Fed would also purchase $100bn of debt owed by the 3 GSEs.
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At this stage, the APF was tasked with buying private sector assets to maintain
market functioning as and how it saw strains develop, but up to a maximum of
£50bn.
Policy rates hit the lower bound
Throughout this rst stage of the crisis, the lender of last resort role of
central banks had few implications for how they pursued their more permanent
macroeconomic stabilisation objectives. As economic activity weakened and
ination fell below target, central banks began to cut their policy rates in order
to stimulate demand. However, by early 2009, policy rates had been cut to
such an extent that they were considered at, or approaching their e¤ective lower
bounds, gure 13. Despite these historically low rates of interest, many economies
continued to contract and price growth failed to pick up. With their traditional
instrument constrained, policymakers now looked to their balance sheets not only
for liquidity provision, but more innovatively as a way to stimulate activity and
generate inationary pressure.
Asset purchases to boost demand
Quantitative Easing in the UK and US
The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve took very similar approaches in
employing their balance sheets to stimulate demand.
In February 2009, the then Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King,
requested permission from the Chancellor of the Exchequer to use the APF "for
monetary policy purposes". This was duly granted and on the 5th March 2009
the Bank of England announced it would buy £75bn of UK government securities
with a remaining maturity of between 5 and 25 years. These purchases would
be funded by the creation of new central bank money, expanding the Bank of
Englands balance sheet and the monetary base. The initial focus of the policy
was its impact on the money supply, and it was framed by King as "similar to
the current implementation of monetary policy, except the instrument of policy
would shift towards the quantity of money provided rather than its price" King
(2009). In this respect it was similar to the policy change made by the Bank
of Japan in 2001. An important di¤erence was that unlike the Bank of Japan,
who had bought its assets almost exclusively from the banking sector, the APF
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would buy gilts from non-bank nancials. This mattered because one of the chief
criticisms of the original Japanese policy was that banks used the additional
funds to mend their balance sheets and hoard liquidity and in doing so failed
to expand lending. This limited the increase in broad money, and therefore the
impact on wider economic activity through the monetarist channel was severely
dampened. By buying assets directly from the non-bank private sector the APF
would expand the broad money supply and the cash holdings of economic agents
directly, almost regardless of the decisions of the banking sector.
The policy was extended a further 3 times; rst to £125bn in May 2009, then
£175bn in August, and lastly to £200bn in November. The August extension was
accompanied by a widening of the gilts which were eligible to be sold to the Bank
to any gilts with a remaining maturity of greater than 3 years. The evolution
of the policy can be seen in gures 11 and 12. On the asset side, the APF is
included in the Other Assets section, as o¢cially what was held on the Bank of
Englands balance sheet was the loan made to the APF, while the APF itself
held the bonds which had been purchased. However, it is still possible to see the
expansion throughout 2009 which more than o¤set the drawdown on the liquidity
provision programmes. The corresponding liability can be seen on gure 11 as
the quantity of reserves increases dramatically.
The Federal Reserve had to all intents and purposes begun a quantitative
easing programme with its purchases of MBS, but its announcement on the 18th
March 2009 that it would increase these by $750bn and supplement them with
$300bn of purchases of US Treasuries of medium maturity signied an important
change. Unlike the MBS purchases, which were designed to work in a specic
market, the Treasury purchases were aimed at bringing rates down more generally
in the economy. Unlike the Bank of Japans QE though the focus was not on the
expansion of the money supply and the central banks liabilities, but more on
the asset side of the balance sheet, building on the imperfect substitution and
portfolio rebalancing theories of Tobin (1969) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966)
to motivate a relationship between changes in the relative supplies of assets and
their prices.
Adjusted for the rate of exchange, $300bn was equivalent to the Bank of
Englands gilt purchases, but as a share of the available market they were drawing
from it was considerably smaller. £200bn represented 29% of the free-oat of UK
gilts, while $300bn was just a little under 5% of the outstanding supply of US
Treasuries. Combining the three asset classes purchased in the Federal Reserves
rst large-scale purchase programme they bought 14.5% of the total market of
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US Treasuries, MBS and agency debt.
Interestingly, despite the creation of new reserves to fund the large-scale asset
purchases, the Federal Reserves balance sheet failed to expand noticeably in
2009. This was because, as with the Bank of England, the introduction of
quantitative easing coincided with the drawdown of the liquidity programmes as
the rst stage of the crisis passed. The possibility exists that the introduction of
cheap funding through large scale asset purchases hastened the withdrawal from
liquidity programmes as agents substituted one form of liquidity for another.
Extensions
QE2
In the US, the recovery which had been seen at the start of 2010 had waned
as the year went on and by the middle of the year there were worries about its
sustainability. In his speech to the Jackson Hole conference on 27th August 2010
FOMC chairman Ben Bernanke laid the groundwork for expanding the Federal
Reserves asset purchase programme, Bernanke (2010), and on the 3rd November
2010 it was announced that the Federal Reserve would purchase a further $600bn
of longer-dated US Treasuries over a period of 8 months. As with the original
LSAP these would be funded by the creation of new reserves and so represented
a large increase in the Federal Reserves balance sheet.
The Maturity Extension Programme
The rst half of 2011 saw the US economy pick up again, but as the mid-
year slump struck again the Federal Reserve looked to loosen policy once more.
Against a political backdrop of bitter rows over US Federal borrowing and the
remit of the Fed itself, the FOMC was hesitant to expand its balance sheet further
so instead in September 2011 they announced they would buy $400bn of longer
dated Treasury securities funded by equivalent sales of short-term securities with
the aim of increasing the average maturity of its securities portfolio from 75
months to over 100 months. These sterilised purchases left the size of the balance
sheet unchanged and acted as pure debt management, a¤ecting the composition
of the Federal Reserves and therefore the private sectors debt portfolio. By
lowering the supply of longer dated debt in the publicly available market,
especially relative to shorter-term debt, the Maturity Extension Programme
(MEP) was expected to lower rates at the long end, attening the yield curve.
The MEP was as much a throwback as a new innovation in policy as it harked
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back to the Operation Twist policy carried out by the Federal Reserve and the
US Treasury in the 1960s.
Open-ended asset purchases
In 2012 the US economy experienced its now seemingly annual mid-year slump
and on the 13th September 2012 the Federal Reserve announced a return to
balance sheet expansion. This time however, rather than announce an ultimate
quantity of purchases, they determined to buy assets at a set pace until the
economy no longer warranted monetary expansion, or specically until conditions
in the labour market improved "substantially". This was reminiscent of the
Bank of Japans original QE programme. The Federal Reserves open-ended
QE3 programme would buy $85bn of assets each month, of which $45bn would
be US Treasury securities and $40bn MBS.
Tapering
In one of his last acts as Chairman of the FOMC, on 18th December 2013 Ben
Bernanke announced that the pace of asset purchases would be reduced by $10bn
in January 2014 to $75bn. He also announced that this reduction was expected to
continue by a further $10bn a month each month until the purchases had tapered
away to zero. This path for policy was honoured by the incoming Chairwoman
Janet Yellen and by October 2014, no more purchases were being made under
QE3. It is worthy of note here that even under the taper the Federal Reserves
balance sheet was expanding, just at a slower rate than previously. In fact, over
the taper period, the Federal Reserve bought $400bn of assets. In this way,
although it was considered the rst step towards the Federal Reserve exiting QE,
it was really a continuation of monetary easing.
The Bank of England expands QE
In the UK the Bank of England chose to restart its asset purchase programme in
October 2011, despite ination being around 3 percentage points above the 2%
target. The rapid price growth was attributed to a number of temporary factors,
such as the high oil price, which could not be controlled by the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) and would drop out before the 2 year horizon with which the
MPC were concerned. Meanwhile the underlying performance of the UK economy
was weak. It was feared that this weak demand would weigh down on ination
in the medium term, especially once the temporary factors had dropped out of
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the calculation. Coupled with this, the coalition government elected in May 2010
had begun a programme of scal contraction which was expected to weigh down
on growth further. In light of these headwinds the Bank of England looked to
loosen policy.
The second round of asset purchases followed the blueprint laid out by the
rst. The APF purchased UK gilts from the secondary market nanced by the
creation of new reserves. The original announcement was for an additional £75bn
of purchases, but this was subsequently extended by £50bn in February 2012 and
a further £50bn in July, bringing the total size of the APF, accounting for QE1
and QE2 to £375bn.
Japan returns to quantitative easing
Comprehensive monetary easing
Faced with falling prices, on the 5th October 2010 the Bank of Japan unveiled
a multifaceted comprehensive monetary easing (CME). This involved a number
of elements, each designed to stoke inationary pressure. The rst was a largely
symbolic cut in the uncollateralised overnight call rate target from 0.1% to 0-0.1%.
More signicantly, this was accompanied by an increasingly explicit clarication
of the conditions required for the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates from
virtually zero.5
The nal element of the CME was an asset purchase programme (APP)
through which the Bank of Japan would buy assets from a much wider range
of asset classes than had been done by any central bank to-date. These included
Japanese government bonds, commercial paper, corporate bonds, exchange
traded funds (ETFs) and Japanese real estate investment securities (J-REITs).
The APP was initially set at =Y35trn, but =Y30trn of this had already been
announced under other programmes. Of the additional =Y5trn, =Y3.5trn was
JGBs with the rest made up of eclectic private sector assets. The APP was only
supposed to be a temporary measure, however it was extended 8 times between
October 2010 and the end of 2012, from the original =Y35trn to =Y101trn. Almost
all of this further expansion came through purchases of JGBs.
The Abe government and QQE
In December 2012 Japan elected Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister. The Abe
government quickly set about an extensive set of policies to stimulate the Japanese
5See later section on forward guidance.
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economy, a central tenant of which was more aggressive monetary activism.
In January 2013, the Bank of Japan was given an explicit target to achieve
2% ination within 2 years. By March 2013 the Bank of Japan had a new
Governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, who had been previously outspoken about the need
for additional monetary stimulus in Japan, and a month after being appointed
he unveiled a massive Quantitative and Qualitative Easing programme (QQE).
Under QQE the Bank of Japan o¢cially changed its primary policy objective
from the overnight call rate to the quantity of money in the system. By making
=Y60-70trn worth of asset purchases a year QQE would double the monetary
base in two years. The majority of the assets purchased, =Y50trn a year, would be
Japanese government bonds. Importantly the majority of these bonds would be
considerably longer-dated than under the Bank of Japans previous programmes
and the average maturity of their government securities portfolio would rise from
around 3 years to 7 years, in line with the average maturity of the entire JGB
market. This was intended to lower longer yields more by coupling the supply
e¤ects of the previous programmes with a complimentary maturity e¤ect (see
Meaning and Zhu (2012)). The remainder of the monetary expansion would be
accomplished through purchases of ETFs, J-REITs and loans to banks. Although
the pace of purchases was laid out for two years in line with the horizon for hitting
the new ination target, crucially QQE was open-ended, meaning that the Bank
of Japan committed to carry on expanding the monetary base until ination was
stable around 2%.
QQE - a second boost
The start of 2014 saw ination begin to pick up in Japan. Alongside monetary
activism, Prime Minister Abe introduced a VAT increase in April 2014 to
generate inationary pressure. This had the e¤ect of bringing forward households
consumption plans as they sought to spend before the tax rise took e¤ect. This
front loading spurred demand and fuelled a return to positive ination. An artice
of the tax rise itself was that ination jumped to 3.4% in April 2014 compared
with 1.6% a month earlier in March. However, higher prices with no signicant
pick up in wage growth, meant that households spending power deteriorated,
and as 2014 wore on and the fall back from the front-loaded consumption took
e¤ect demand looked to be weakening. Ination remained elevated as a result
of the tax increase but it was feared that once this fell out of the calculation,
ination would fall back to zero.
So, on the 31st October 2014 the Bank of Japan moved preemptively to
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counter this, expanding the pace of the QQE programme to over =Y80trn a year.
Almost all of this additional monetary expansion would be through increased
purchases of JGBs and the Bank of Japan increased the target maturity for its
portfolio further from 7 years to 7-10 years. Purchases of private sector assets
increased slightly, but still made up just =Y3trn of the overall =Y80trn.
The ECBs road to quantitative easing
The European Central Bank has had a conicted relationship with quantitative
easing over the last 6 or 7 years. Vocal opposition from a number of member
states, but most notably Germany to monetary expansion has at times appeared
to tie the hands of the ECBs governing council. This has meant that the design
and emphasis of the ECBs intervention has been quite di¤erent to the other
central banks discussed above.
Corporate bond buying programme
July 2009 saw the ECB undertake its rst programme of outright asset purchases.
The Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP) was more like the CPFF than
the large scale asset purchase programmes of the Federal Reserve and Bank of
England in that it was aimed at helping banks to secure longer-term funding in
an impaired credit market. Between the 2nd July 2009 and 10th June 2010, the
CBPP purchase 60bn euros of covered bonds. Although these purchases were
not sterilised, the ECB was keen to stress that the CBPP was not expected to
expand the balance sheet in a material manner as banks would use covered bonds
to substitute for other forms of central bank nance such as LTROs. As such
there was no quantitative easing element to the CBPP and it was instead credit
easing, changing the composition of balance sheets rather than their size.
The Securities Market Programme
In 2010, as the other major economies were coming out of the worst of the
nancial turmoil, the Euro Area was faced with a new challenge. Over the Great
Moderation large scal imbalances had built up in the Euro Area with periphery
economies persistently running large decits whilst Germany and other northern
European economies ran surpluses. This was exacerbated by the banking crisis
and recession of 2008/2009 which necessitated large increases in borrowing to
support the nancial system and fund the automatic scal stabilisers.
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Markets began to question the sustainability of large debt and decit ratios,
which caused yields on Euro Area periphery debt to increase, intensifying the
problem. The nancial crisis had evolved into a sovereign debt crisis.
The ECB responded by launching the Securities Market Programme (SMP)
on the 10th May 2010. Under the SMP the ECB would buy sovereign debt in
the secondary market, much like the quantitative easing programmes of the other
three central banks. The SMP di¤ered in two crucial aspects. First, purchases
were made on an ad hoc basis as deemed necessary, rather than the pre-announced
purchase schedules employed by other central banks. Second, the purchases were
sterilised, meaning that the extra liquidity provided by SMP purchases was o¤set
by the issuance of short-term (one week) interest-bearing deposit certicates by
the ECB. As these ne-tuning operations only lasted one week though they had
to be continually renewed. The result of this was that the quantity of liquidity
in the system and the size of the ECBs balance sheet were left una¤ected. This
was because the stated aim of the SMP was not to expand the monetary base, in
fact it was explicitly not a loosening of the monetary policy stance, rather it was
intended to alleviate strains in particular markets, in this case sovereign debt,
which might hamper the usual transmission of monetary policy.
Initially purchases were made of Greek, Irish and Portuguese government
bonds, but as the sovereign debt crisis escalated this was expanded in August
2011 to Italian and Spanish government debt. In September 2012, when the
policy was at its largest, the SMP held 218bn euros of Euro Area sovereign bonds,
approximately half of which were Italian. Although no more purchases were made
after this point, the assets which had been bought were held to maturity and at
the time of writing still total around 140bn euros.
Balance sheet expansion through LTROs
Although the SMP and the ECBs other asset purchase programmes had been
designed to be balance sheet neutral, by the start of 2012 the ECBs balance
sheet had expanded from roughly 1trn euros in 2006 to over 3trn euros. This
tripling was almost entirely a result of growth in long-term renancing operations,
gure 6. These loans to banks had long been part of the ordinary conduct of
monetary policy, but crucially from 2008 onwards their quantity was demand
determined. As long as banks could post eligible collateral and were willing to
pay the renancing rate then the ECB would provide them funds. As credit
conditions in the market tightened and uncertainty rose, demand for secure
funding surged, and with it so did the central banks balance sheet. What is
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more, the ECB repeatedly extended the assets it would accept as collateral and
the term it would lend at, inviting more demand. In essence LTROs were a form
of monetary expansion conducted through lending rather than outright purchases
of assets.
Outright Monetary Transactions and "whatever it takes"
The ECB continued to focus its outright asset purchases on promoting good
market functioning. In November 2011 it reopened its corporate bond buying
programme (CBPP2) this time buying just 16.4bn euros of Euro Area corporate
bonds.
However, by the summer of 2012 the sovereign debt crisis had intensied.
Spreads on Euro Area periphery bonds had rocketed and there was a growing
expectation that such debt servicing costs, and perhaps even the single currency
itself were unsustainable. The ECBs answer was a programme of Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMTs). OMTs would replace the SMP and were
designed to "eliminate the unwarranted and self-fullling fears of a Euro Area
break-up" Coeure (2013).
Like the SMP, OMTs would consist of purchases of Euro Area government
bonds in the secondary market. Also like the SMP, these purchases would
be sterilised. However, unlike the SMP, OMT purchases were subject to
conditionality. The state whose bonds were being purchased had to be in receipt
of aid from one of the Euro Areas bailout funds. These bailouts came with their
own conditions on structural reform and to qualify for inclusion in the OMTs, the
state in question had to adhere to their bailout terms. The economy must also
prove it was capable of raising funds in private markets by successfully issuing
at least a 10 year government bond. If all of these conditions were met, and the
ECB deemed it necessary, then purchases could be made of the states sovereign
debt with a residual maturity of 1-3 years.
An important design feature of OMTs was that the ECB ranked pari-passu
with other creditors in the event of a default. This meant they received no special
treatment and if the sovereign defaulted they would lose alongside the private
sector. This was designed to instill condence in the market that the ECB would
not allow a sovereign to default on its debt.
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of OMTs though was that there was no ex-
ante quantitative limit. When the policy was announced Mario Draghi, the ECB
Governor now famously said the ECB would do "whatever it takes to save the
euro". This commitment in of itself was a powerful signal to the market and
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was undoubtedly e¤ective as yields on periphery debt fell signicantly and stayed
down for much of the next 12 months despite not a single government bond
ever being purchased under the OMT programme. By committing to step in an
unlimited capacity should the need arise the ECB removed the need to intervene
at all.
Targeted Long-term Renancing Operations
By 2014 the worst of the sovereign debt crisis looked to have been weathered. The
SMP and Draghis "whatever it takes" commitment seemed to have reassured
markets that there would be no break up of the currency area and yields on
Southern European debt remained low. As the nancial turmoil subsided, so did
banks demand for funding from the ECB and the quantity of LTROs began to
reduce steadily until by the start of 2014 the central banks balance sheet was
around 2trn euros.
As the year progressed however there still remained signicant weakness in
credit availability, especially in the Southern European economies that needed it
most. To counter this asymmetry and get credit owing, in June 2014 the ECB
announced it would o¤er targeted long-term renancing operations (TLTROs).
These di¤ered from their ordinary LTROs by coming with conditions linking their
cost and availability to the amount of lending banks made to the real economy.
In this respect it was very like the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) set up in
the UK.6 There were to be two initial operations in September and December
2014 where Euro Area banks could borrow funds up to 7% of their stock of loans
to the non-nancial private sector, measured on 30th April 2014. In aggregate
this amounted to a total potential size of around 400bn euros. Then in 2015
and 2016 the banks could borrow funds each quarter equivalent to 3 times their
net lending to the private non-nancials (PNFCs). This meant that the more
banks lent to the real economy, the more they were rewarded with cheap term
funding. It would seem that cheap funding was not what was constraining Euro
Area banks as demand for the rst two TLTROs was weak at just 82.6bn euros
in September and 130bn euros in December. This meant that only just over half
of the funds available through TLTROs were drawn upon. What is more, net
lending to Euro Area PNFCs has failed to increase substantially.
Also at its June 2014 press conference, the ECB announced it would no longer
continue to sterilise the assets held under the SMP. This meant it would halt the
6For a more detailled discussion of the FLS, see
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/pages/s/default.aspx
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weekly ne-tuning operations which absorbed the funds created by the SMP and
thus increase the amount of cash held by the private sector by the size of the
programme.
Asset-backed Securities Purchase Programme and further corporate
bond purchases
Ination in Europe failed to pick up. In fact it deteriorated further, and by
September 2014, consumer price ination had fallen to 0.3% having been below
1% for 12 consecutive months. With ination so far from 2% the ECB took action
to stimulate the economy. Hesitant to embark on purchases of government debt,
the ECB introduced two new sets of private sector asset purchases. The rst,
launched on 20th October 2014 was a second extension of the Corporate Bond
Purchasing Programme (CBPP3). The second, unveiled a month later was the
Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) in which the ECB will
buy ABS from Euro Area banks. The hope is that by taking ABS o¤ the balance
sheets of banks and giving them cash, the banks will be incentivised to use that
cash to extend new credit to rms which the banks can once again securitise,
rebalancing their portfolios. Both CBPP3 and ABSPP are intended to run at
least until September 2016.
Quantitative Easing - The Public Sector Purchase Programme
The lack of inationary pressure in Europe at the end of 2014 was exacerbated
further by an unexpected fall in the world oil price of over 50% between November
and January 2015. As this pushed the Euro Area into deation there were growing
signs that ination expectations at the 2 year horizon were beginning to decouple
from the level consistent with the ECBs mandate. With almost no option but to
respond the ECB announced on the 22nd January 2015 that it would nally begin
a programme of large-scale purchases of Euro Area member states sovereign debt.
The purchases would be carried out by the national central banks of member
states, but would be funded by the printing of new central bank money by the
ECB. What is more, the programme was open-ended, but expected to run until at
least September 2016. The purchases themselves began in March 2015, targeting
a pace of 60bn euros a month. The purchases would be spread across member
states, divided so as not to take too much supply from any one particular sovereign
market. Importantly, Greek government bonds were not eligible to be purchased
under the scheme as the ECB had signicant concerns about the solvency of the
Greek government.
60
The particular institutional arrangements of the Euro Area have thrown up
some unique questions for Euro Area QE. The appropriation of risk is clearly
a concern. By keeping the majority of risk with the national central bank,
the ECB is avoiding exposing taxpayers in Northern Europe to the default risk
associated with Southern Europe. However, by eliminating such risk sharing they
are perhaps hobbling a signicant channel through which the programme could
lower yields and stimulate demand.
Forward Guidance
As well as measures which a¤ect the balance sheet, all four central banks
considered in this paper have made use of another policy tool - forward guidance.
In essence this is the shaping of agents expectations about the future path
of policy through communication. Its theoretical foundations can be found in
the canonical New Keynesian model as described in Woodford (2003) which
stipulates that current demand can be represented as a function not just of the
contemporaneous interest rate, but also of agents expectations of the entire path
of future interest rates. Therefore, by altering these expectations, policy makers
can either loosen or tighten policy without the need for interest rates to change
today. As should be clear, this is a particularly attractive result when short-term
interest rates are constrained by the lower bound and so cannot be moved today.
The policy prescription of the New Keynesian model in this case is to commit
to hold rates lower for longer, a position explained famously by Eggertson and
Woodford (2003).
Forward guidance can also be used to clarify the central banks reaction
function. This has been especially useful in recent years when the degree of
uncertainty has been high. By using forward guidance in this way, policymakers
are not seeking to commit to anything inconsistent with their reaction function,
but just to pull agents expectations of the future path of the economy in to line
with their own.
As with quantitative easing, the Bank of Japan was a forbearer for forward
guidance, using it alongside the original asset purchase programme in the
early 2000s. It applied what is known as state-contingent forward guidance,
conditioning the moment it would raise rates on a particular outcome. In this
case it was that it would maintain the monetary expansion until "the core CPI
register(ed) stably zero percent, or an increase year on year".
It then reawakened the policy in 2010 when it initiated the Comprehensive
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Monetary Easing. This time however it was vague, stating only that it would
maintain the zero-interest rate policy "until price stability is in sight on the basis
of the understanding of medium- to long-term price stability". As this proved
ine¤ective in generating a signicant shift in agents expectations, the guidance
was hardened in February 2012 when an explicit target for price growth of 1 %
was introduced. This was strengthened further with the introduction of QQE.
The state-contingent target was raised from 1 % to 2 % in the hope of lifting
ination expectations, with the Bank of Japan promising to continue QQE "as
long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner". This
was accompanied by a partial time-contigent element of guidance though as the
policy statement also noted "The Bank will achieve the price stability target of
2 percent . . . at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about two
years".
The Federal Reserves forward guidance began in 2008 with the loosely time-
contingent comment that rates would be close to zero for "some time". This
language was beefed up marginally in March 2009 when rates would be low
for "an extended period". In August 2011 though it signalled an explicit time-
contigent target that rates would be low at least until the middle of 2013. This
was subsequently pushed back a number of times until a state-contingent form of
forward guidance was introduced in December 2012.This stated that the FOMC
would not begin to raise rates until the unemployment rate had fallen below 61
2
%,
conditioned on ination staying below 21
2
% and ination expectations remaining
anchored. At the time of writing the US unemployment rate stands at 51
2
%
and the Fed Funds rate is yet to be increased. The FOMC has supplemented
the guidance it gives by publishing what has become known as the "dot plot", a
gure which shows where each of the committees members feel rates should be
over the near and medium term.
The Bank of England adopted forward guidance o¢cially in mid-2013 with
the arrival of Governor Carney, Carney (2013). Seemingly learning from the
Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan, the Monetary Policy Committee opted for
state-contingent guidance from the beginning. The MPC stated that it would
not even consider raising Bank Rate until the unemployment rate was below 7 %.
Importantly it stressed that this was not a trigger at which points rates would
automatically rise, but very much a threshold after which they would reconsider
their options. They also included a series of "knock-outs" which would cause them
to raise rates before unemployment of 7 %. The blurred line between state- and
time-contingent forward guidance was perhaps at its clearest here, as the Bank
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of England produced a forecast for unemployment which, when combined with
the 7 % threshold could be used to intimate when the Bank expected to begin
tightening policy. What transpired showed the di¢culty of such an approach as
the UK labour market performed unexpectedly well and the 7 % threshold was
crossed just 7 months later, not the 18 months or so that the Bank of England
had forecast at its inception.
Following this the Bank of England reverted to a more general form of forward
guidance based on a broad range of indicators relating to slack and the labour
market. In practice they have returned to a form of guidance not dissimilar to the
style of communication they used prior to 2013 with individual members talking
about their view of the appropriate stance of policy and the balance of risks.
The ECB has tried to avoid forward guidance in any overt manner, seemingly
for fear of constraining itself in future periods. Instead Governing Council
members have spoken about their personal views on the state of the Euro Area
economy and the likely policy decision one meeting at a time. However, in July
2013 Mario Draghi ventured to give the vague reassurance that rates would be
low for "an extended period of time", just as the FOMC had done in 2009.7
Exit
As economic growth has strengthened, discussion in the US and the UK has
turned from further easing to the timing and nature of exit. The current market
forecast is that the Federal Reserve will move rst, with forward curves pricing
in a rate rise in the nal quarter of 2015. The Bank of England is expected to
follow shortly after, with an increase in Bank Rate around the turn of the year.
In both cases, policymakers have sought to avoid surprising markets by managing
expectations through regular communication in the hope that this will limit the
volatility around the turn in the monetary policy cycle.
Exit presents a number of challenges to policymakers. First is the coordination
of the various policy instruments. Both the Bank of England and the Federal
Reserve have stated that they expect to raise rates a number of times before they
turn to reducing the size of their balance sheets. However, with both policy tools
eventually operating simultaneously, it will be hard to judge the actual stance of
policy.
7For further detail on forward guidance the interested reader should refer to Bernanke (2013)
for the Federal Reserve, Dale and Talbot (2013) for the Bank of England, Curé (2013) for
the ECB and Shirai (2013) for the Bank of Japan. Filardo and Ho¤man (2014) also provide an
informative insight into the rationale and e¤ectiveness of forward guidance as a policy.
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Then there is the question of how exactly does one unwind such a large balance
sheet expansion when the time comes. There is the option to sell assets back to
the market, or alternatively one could merely hold the assets to maturity and
then no longer reinvest the proceeds of the redemption. As discussed in Chadha
and Meaning (2012), Kirby and Meaning (2015) and McLaren and Smith (2013)
the specics of this process will not only have implications for monetary policy,
but also for the scal authority.
Unwinding quantitative easing will also require some skilful reserve
management to drain the huge amounts of liquidity the programmes have pumped
into the system with losing control of the headline policy rate. As presciently
discussed in Goodfriend (2002), this may require manipulation of the rate of
interest paid on reserve balances.
But even before the question of how central banks should shrink their balance
sheets, one must decide if this is the correct aim. Governor Carney has repeatedly
stated that he expects the Bank of Englands balance sheet to remain permanently
bigger than it was prior to 2007. His rationale is that there has been a structural
change in the demand for liquidity and reserves which central banks will have
to meet. This opens up the discussion for whether or not asset purchases could
be used in normal times as a direct way of targeting movements in longer-term
interest rates.
Whatever form exit eventually takes, it looks certain that balance sheets will
continue to be an important feature of monetary policy for the foreseeable future.
Conclusions
The last decade has seen signicant change in the manner in which monetary
policy is conducted. Central banks in the advanced economies have moved from
relying almost exclusively on the short-term nominal interest rate to achieve price
stability to manipulating the size and composition of their balance sheets in
pursuit of an expanded set of objectives. At rst central banks used their balance
sheets to fulll their lender of last resort role and provide liquidity to support the
nancial system after the 2007/08 crisis. Then, as the lower bound began to
bind, their focus shifted to quantitative and credit easing policies designed to
stimulate demand and act as a replacement for the traditional policy instrument.
The result has been that central banks have seen their balance sheets grow vastly
compared to where they were a decade ago. Not only this but they now consist
of a much more varied mix of assets.
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Each central bank approached this problem in its own unique way. The Federal
Reserve, where the housing market collapse had been most acute, bought both
mortgage-backed securities and government debt in large quantities, lowering
rates in those markets whilst simultaneously increasing both liquidity and the
money supply. The Bank of England focused almost solely on UK government
securities, buying up to 1/3 of the market. The Bank of Japan has expanded its
balance sheet so extensively that it has diversied and bought a wide range of
assets, though as with the Federal Reserve and Bank of England, a high degree
of importance has been given to sovereign debt. The ECB meanwhile, more
constrained by political pressures and conicting interest groups refrained for
a long time from undertaking explicit quantitative easing, preferring instead to
extend loans to the nancial sector and sterilising any outright purchases.
We have now reached a period of divergence in monetary policy cycles. Both
the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve are on the cusp of tightening
policy for the rst time in over six years. This turning point will no doubt be
accompanied by a degree of volatility as markets adjust, but if the central banks
can communicate their reaction functions clearly then this should be limited.
The ECB and the Bank of Japan on the other hand are continuing to loosen
monetary conditions and expand their balance sheets through large-scale asset
purchase programmes. In all cases, a return to balance sheets of the magnitude
and composition to which we were accustomed to before the crisis is a long way
o¤, and perhaps not likely to be seen at all. It is highly likely that the conduct of
policy on a practical level has been changed at a deep level by the developments
of the last decade.
Similarly this period of ux for practical policy has provided a whole new set
of questions for academic economists, and reawakened some old, half-forgotten
ones at the same time. Some of these will be the subject of the remainder of this
thesis.
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The nancial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent Great Recession have
required monetary policymakers to implement a raft of new, unconven-
tional policies. The most prominent of these has been the large scale
purchasing of government securities known as quantitative easing. How-
ever, without reliable empirical estimates of the impact these purchases
have had on key nancial and macroeconomic variables it is impossible
to accurately calibrate their use going forwards, or evaluate their success
with hindsight. To that end, this paper employs 4 di¤erent econometric
techniques to quantify this impact for policies carried out by the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England; an event study, a panel regression, a
cross-sectional regression and time-series analysis. The key result, that
yields on government securities have been signicantly lowered by central
bank asset purchases, is consistent across methodologies and can be quanti-
ed at between 20 and 150 basis points depending on the exact programme
and the characteristics of the security in question. These estimates can not
only be used to inform future bouts of quantitative easing, but also pro-
vide a metric to calibrate the growing array of structural models which
incorporate channels for asset purchases.
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1 Introduction
For any policy tool to be of practical use it must be to some degree quantiable.
Without that it is impossible to accurately calibrate or subsequently evaluate the
impact of the policy.
This was one of the big challenges facing policymakers in 2009 as they moved
to design and implement large scale asset purchase programmes. Unlike tra-
ditional monetary policy which had a wealth of empirical work quantifying its
transmission and impact on nancial markets and the real economy, prior to
2009 there existed little to no research which put rm estimates on the e¤ects of
large scale asset purchases by central banks.
Without this knowledge, policymakers cannot make fully informed decisions,
for instance on the quantity of assets to buy in order to achieve a particular ob-
jective. This meant that in 2009 they were implementing these unprecedented
policy measures blind, or at least partially sighted, using a combination of ed-
ucated guesswork and trial and error to nd their way in setting quantitative
easing to stabilise their ailing economies. They were learning as they were going.
In order to make asset purchases an e¤ective policy tool it is therefore vital
that we build up a comprehensive understanding of their e¤ects based on robust
empirical evidence. This paper looks to contribute to this process by applying a
number of di¤erent frameworks to provide estimates of the impact of asset pur-
chase programmes undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England.1
These range from a methodologically simple event study analysis to more complex
panel and cross-sectional regressions of data at the level of individual securities
and nally, time series methods.
By employing a range of techniques, it is the aim of the paper to draw on
common results and provide some robust, quantied statements on the impact
of quantitative easing. For instance, across all frameworks we nd a signicant
lowering of yields in government securities that were purchased by the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England. This can be quantied at between 20 and 150
basis points depending on the specic programme in question and the character-
istics of the bond being purchased.
Our empirical work also sheds some light on the transmission mechanisms of
asset purchases, which is intended to inform the concurrent theoretical debate.2
1While both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have bought a range of assets,
this paper focusses on the purchases of nominal government securities which have made up the
majority of the quantitative expansion of their balance sheets.
2See rst chapter in this thesis.
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We nd evidence that some policy announcements reduced long-term yields by
lowering expectations of the policy rate in future periods, consistent with the
expectations hypothesis and the implied result of the canonical New Keynesian
model. However, in line with a number of other studies, we nd evidence of
imperfect substitutability between assets and a signicant impact on yields em-
anating from changes in supply. This supports theoretical positions such as the
preferred habitat theory of Modigliani and Sutch (1966) and the failure of Wallace
Neutrality, Wallace (1981).
In the nal section we also present empirical evidence that the Federal Reserve
has lowered longer yields in the US not only by reducing supply, but also by
withdrawing maturity from the publicly available supply of Treasuries, whilst
the US Treasury itself has acted to add maturity to the same market, a result
which calls for further debate on the optimal coordination between monetary
policymakers and the scal authority concerning asset purchases which equate to
debt management in sovereign debt markets.
The paper will rst discuss the results of the event study and its limitations
before applying the analytical framework laid out by DAmico and King (2010) to
policies in the US and UK in order to more robustly test the hypothesis of imper-
fect substitution between assets. This is followed by time series analysis for the
US of both supply and maturity e¤ects in the form of an error-correction model.
The paper is concluded with thoughts on what insight the range of analyses can
provide.
2 Event Studies
Many of the initial studies evaluating asset purchases were based on the event
study framework. This had the benet that it was relatively simple to implement
and did not require a long data set. By its nature, it could also give a result
almost immediately after the policies were announced, which made it extremely
useful for central bankers in need of a metric by which to measure the strength
of their actions, and thus calibrate further policy.
The premise is simple; identify moments where information on the policy is
released to the economy, or events. Next, construct an event window around
each event from a moment preceding it, when the information is assumed to be
unknown by agents, to a moment after the event when agents are assumed to
have internalised the new information. This could be a signicant speech by
a policymaker, or a formal policy announcement, for instance. The change in
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variables over this event window is attributed to the event itself. Repeating this
for all events pertaining to the policy would give its cumulative impact. The idea
is to isolate moments when the market has taken on information about the policy
in question from all other moments in which movements in variables are being
driven by other factors.
2.1 Event studies in the literature
Gagnon et al (2011) apply this methodology to the initial US asset purchase
programme looking at the change of seven key interest rates in response to all
FOMC announcements and speeches which referred to asset purchases between
25th November 2008 and 17th February 2010. They nd that yields on 10 year
treasuries fell by 60-90 basis points over the event windows despite a trend of
increasing rates over the period as a whole.3 The reductions in rates on 10 year
agency debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are even greater, between
110 and 160 basis points. Joyce et al (2010) nd similar results when studying
how UK gilt yields across the entire yield curve reacted to key announcements
surrounding the Bank of Englands initial QE programme. Their event study
suggests a reduction of between 55 and 120 basis points, depending on the exact
maturity in question. By comparing this to the change in rates of OIS contracts
of the corresponding duration they aim to separate out the extent to which this
change is a consequence of changes in agents expectations of the path of future
Bank Rate (proxied by the change in OIS rates) or other factors, which they
attribute to portfolio rebalancing. In their analysis, the biggest driver of the fall
in interest rates is portfolio rebalancing. They also carry out a useful robustness
check on the sensitivity of their results to variation in the size of the event window
and nd it has little material impact on the headline results.
These core ndings for the Bank of Englands rst purchase programme are
supported by the event study in Caglar et al (2011) which nds broadly equivalent
falls in UK gilt yields, along with a signicant attening of the UK government
yield curve.4 They extend the narrow focus of earlier event studies to look at a
wider range of variables including interest rate forwards, corporate bond rates,
exchange rates and equity indices. The results suggest that QE in the UK had
an impact on the economy beyond the direct e¤ect in the government bond mar-
ket. In a more recent paper Fic (2013) applies the event study methodology to
3They also calculated the change over just a core of 8 events and found that the reduction
in yields was marginally larger.
4Meier (2009) also o¤ers support to the signicant downward impact of asset purchases on
UK interest rates, but doesnt cover even the entirety of the rst purchase programme.
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policies by the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank, as well as to
those of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. In line with the other
studies mentioned, she nds evidence of a signicant reduction in yields in all
cases but then goes further, feeding these estimates into the National Institute of
Economic and Social Researchs global econometric model (NiGEM) to investi-
gate the macroeconomic impact on the developed economies implementing them,
and the developing economies which experience policy spillovers.
2.2 Our event study
The event study presented here draws on work by the author in both Caglar
et al (2011) and Meaning and Zhu (2011). We rst identify a series of events
relevant to each quantitative easing programme. These events are selected on the
basis of when new information became publicly available to markets so comprise
of signicant policy announcements and speeches by the Federal Reserve and
Bank of England relating to their purchases of government securities.5 We then
measure the change in variables over a two day window around each event, from
the close of business the day before the event to close of business the day after it.
This is consistent with Joyce et al (2010) and other studies and is preferred by
this author as it allows for some slight lag in impact as markets internalise the
information, or in case there exist frictions in the process of settling transactions.
Evidence of such frictions is provided in the later ow analysis.6
We then analyse movements in a range of variables over these identied win-
dows and compare the changes in these periods to those over the average two day
window in the full sample period concerning quantitative easing.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative impact of each programme on the yields of
government securities of di¤erent maturities and ten-year corporate bonds of
di¤erent grades. This is dened as the sum of changes on days associated with
QE events. It is clear that each asset purchase programme had a signicant
negative impact on yields at all maturities. For the UK this got stronger the
further along the yield curve one looks, lowering yields at the long end by over
100bps. Both US programmes on the other hand exhibit a peak around 5 year
rates of over 30bps. This di¤erent pattern can be explained both by the shorter
average maturity of the US government debt portfolio and also the di¤erence in
the maturity of the purchases carried out by the Federal Reserve and the Bank
of England. The second US programme had a stronger impact on ten-year rates
5A full list of events and their rationale for inclusion can be found in Table 1.
6The results prove unchanged in any signicant way when a one day window is applied.
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than the rst. This is to be expected as the Federal Reserve began buying more
longer-dated securities under US QE2 so as not to withdraw too much of any one
area of the market and to take advantage of duration e¤ects.
Table 2 presents a breakdown of the cumulative impact by event. In the
UK the rst two announcements are clearly dominant, contributing much of the
nal value. This is not surprising as they can be assumed to have had much
more informational content than later announcements as they outlined not only
the quantity of assets to be bought, but also their type and the relevant mecha-
nisms by which this unprecedented policy for the UK economy was to be applied.
They also reect the larger size of purchases announced in March 2009, £75bn
compared to later extensions of £50bn and eventually £25bn. Looking at the
announcement on 6th August, one can also clearly see the market reaction to the
Bank of Englands shift towards purchasing longer-dated securities reected in a
larger fall in 20 year rates.
Corporate yields fell over the event windows by a comparable amount to gov-
ernment securities. This implies spillover e¤ects as news of central bank purchases
of government bonds encouraged demand for their corporate counterparts. This
may suggest a degree of substitutability between the two asset classes, supporting
the portfolio rebalancing theory of transmission, or just that the asset purchase
programmes increased condence more widely and that moved investors into asset
classes which had been seen as more risky, such as corporate bonds.
Aside from the limited size of the event window, designed to keep out non-
policy related factors, we also look to conrm that the fall in yields is not just
due to a downward trend in the data. A limit of the event study methodology
is that such a trend would cause a fall across event windows and non-event days
similarly. To combat this we construct a primitive counterfactual. Tables 2-4 also
show the average two-day change for yields over the whole sample period.7 In all
cases they are less than one basis point in absolute terms, and for government
securities in excess of one year, they were actually increasing making the falls
observed over the event windows even starker.
The impact on equity markets is less clear. On average, the FTSE100 rose
by 0.12% over event windows associated with QE in the UK, Table 2. This is a
negligible rise, especially when taking into account that over the full sample period
the average two-day change was an increase of 0.22%. The implied volatility also
rose by an average of 0.65% for events, whilst falling by 0.18% on average for
7The full sample average is calculated by taking the average two day change from the rst
event window to the last.
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the full sample, suggesting that, to the small extent QE did inuence UK equity
markets, it only increased volatility. US asset purchases had a much stronger
e¤ect on equities, at least for the rst programme where associated two day event
windows experienced an average change of over 1% compared to just 0.2% for
the full sample. As with corporate bonds, it seems that US QE served to bolster
investment sentiment in other assets. It also reduced implied volatility by an
average of 2.6%.
Initial asset purchases resulted in signicant currency depreciations for both
the US and UK. QE in the UK reduced the sterling nominal e¤ective exchange
rate by an average of 0.68% per event. In the US this was slightly higher, at
0.76%. However, taking into account the counterfactual of the full sample where
the UK experienced a very slight appreciation and the US a small depreciation,
the exchange rate implications of the two programmes are almost identical. This
result may be thought to correspond to a monetary view of the exchange rate
where increases in the money supply devalue one currency against another, or
it may be that markets envisaged asset purchases being successful at lowering
interest rates, both long and real, and adjusted the exchange rate in a manner
consistent with interest rate parity.
Whilst this paper is not directly concerned with the transmission mechanisms
behind asset purchases, it is interesting to note that one year OIS rates fell sig-
nicantly, especially in the US. As it is based on a geometric average of the
overnight rates over the period of the contract, the OIS rate is often considered
a good proxy for market expectations of the policy rate. This fall then lends
support to the transmission mechanism put forward by Eggertson and Woodford
(2003) and others that unconventional policies work by manipulating agents ex-
pectations of the future path of policy rates. Combined with our other results
this suggests that both portfolio rebalancing and the expectations channels have
a role to play.
These results must be viewed with some caveats in mind which derive from
the limitations of event study methodology itself. Firstly, events may be muddy
to varying degrees as it is impossible in some instances to completely isolate
when information reaches markets concerning purchases from the release of other
information. A clear example is the 5th March 2009 announcement by the Bank
of England where they simultaneously announced the asset purchase programme
and a cut in Bank Rate. The March event window will inevitably capture the
market absorbing both these pieces of information, although the cut in Bank Rate
was widely anticipated so to a large extent would have already been built in to
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agents behaviour.
This highlights another limitation of event studies. If the announcement is
anticipated then it will be priced in by markets prior to an event window which
straddles the announcement. This was not as much of a problem at the incep-
tion of QE as its novelty meant that people had very limited knowledge of how
it would be implemented and, crucially, of the central banks reaction function
concerning asset purchases. However, as time has progressed the reaction func-
tion has arguably become clearer, to the extent that it should be almost explicit
in the case of forward guidance, and thus the power of event studies is weaker.
This would lead to an underestimation of the impact of the policy and is a po-
tential explanation for at least part of the diminished impact observed in later
announcements in Tables 2-4.
More generally, an e¤ective event study relies on correctly identifying all the
moments where data was internalised by the market. This is hard to do as agents
may change their behaviour in anticipation of a policy, when it is announced, or
perhaps not until it is completed. It could also be anywhere in between. Failure
to capture a relevant event may bias the estimated impact of the policy.
3 The DAmico and King Framework
Amore complete methodology is that of DAmico and King (2010). They propose
two estimations. The rst is a panel regression on daily data at the individual
security level designed to capture the ow e¤ects associated with the physical
act of making purchases. The second is a cross-sectional regression, again at the
individual security level, but this time looking at the change in variables from the
day prior to the inception of the policy, to the day of the last physical purchase
has been made. This cross-sectional approach aims to elucidate on the more
permanent "stock" e¤ect that results from reducing the supply of a security in
the publicly available market, relative to the existing demand for it.
We estimate both e¤ects for asset purchase programmes in the US and the
UK.
3.1 Data
Underlying the analysis of both ow and stock e¤ects is the same database. It
contains daily data on individual government securities dened by their unique
CUSIP identier in the US and ISIN code in the UK. As in DAmico and King,
all ination linked securities are removed, as are any securities with a remaining
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maturity of 90 days or less to avoid contamination by the di¤ering behaviour of
investors as a security approaches its redemption date. The sample consists of
239 securities for US QE2 and 40 for the Bank of Englands rst QE programme.
For each security, tranches of substitute securities within the sample are con-
structed. Any security with a remaining maturity within two years of that of
security i is deemed its near substitute. A remaining maturity of between two
and six years from that of security i is considered a mid-substitute whilst a dif-
ference of more than 6 years makes it a far-substitute.
The raw purchase data, which is sourced directly from the Federal Reserve
and the Bank of England, is normalised by dividing each purchase amount by
the total outstanding supply of the security and its near substitutes. This has a
number of benets. It means the data now shows the fraction of the supply of a
given security type that the central bank buys and removes from the market in
each operation. The depth of a particular part of the market is thus controlled
for. After all, £10mn of purchases in a part of the market where total supply
is only £20mn could reasonably be expected to have a di¤erent impact than the
same £10mn of purchases in an area of the market where the total supply is
£20bn. The normalisation also controls for changes in the total supply caused
by new issuance by the scal authority.8 Lastly, it makes the coe¢cients easily
comparable.
A nal comment to make is that, for the sake of simplicity, all of the analy-
sis is conducted in price space9. The implied impact is then converted into an
equivalent change in yields using the modied duration of the security.
Ultimately, we are left with a set of time-series on the price, supply and supply
of substitute securities for a large number of securities which we use to build both
our panel, and also our cross-sectional database. For the panel we bring together
the individual time series and maintain the daily frequency of the underlying
data. For the cross-section we simply take the change in each time series from
the rst day of the policy to the last, reducing each time series to a single data
point.
8This is likely to a¤ect the price and highlights the monetary-scal interaction inherent in
these policies.
9Though DAmico and King (2010) nd that their results are little changed if the same
procedure is carried out using yields.
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3.2 Flow E¤ects (Panel Regressions)
Flow e¤ects are those observed on the day of the physical act of purchase of
a security or its substitutes.10 In a world of complete information, frictionless
markets and perfectly rational agents ow e¤ects would not exist as investors
would have already priced in the impact of the purchases when the policy was
announced This may have been true to some degree on the aggregate level, but
on the individual security level, agents were unaware exactly how much of exactly
which securities would be bought and when. There may also have existed other
frictions which caused investors to ine¤ectively price in the policy until the day
of the purchase. It is therefore worthwhile estimating the extent to which ow
e¤ects were present.
The ow e¤ects are estimated by a panel regression of the form
Pit
Pit−1






it + εt (1)
The proportional daily change in the price of security i depends on the quantity
of that security purchased by the monetary authority, qit, and their purchases of





The panel nature of the regression allows us to control for a security specic
xed e¤ect, αi, and a daily time dummy, δt. The security specic xed e¤ect en-
ables us to capture any characteristics which are idiosyncratic to a given security
but relatively constant across the sample period. The time dummy lets us take
account of any unobservable inuences which a¤ect prices more uniformly across
the full spectrum of securities on a given day such as policy announcements or
the release of additional economic information to markets. In essence, a large
number of external inuences should be captured and controlled for by one or the
other of these dummies, though it is not possible to back them out individually.
For the estimation each sample is sub-divided on the basis of two criteria; rst,
whether an asset had more or less than 15 years of remaining maturity at the
time of purchase and second, whether it was eligible or not for the purchases.11
For instance, the UK QE set eligibility requirements for gilt purchases with an
initial purchase range (IPR) of 5-25 year maturity. As investors knew which se-
curities would be targeted, yields might react di¤erently for eligible and ineligible
10These ow e¤ects are directly comparable to the auction e¤ects investigated by Breedon et
al (2012) and Banerjee et al (2012)
11The Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have carried out their asset purchases via
reverse auctions, announcing in advance of each auction a range of eligible securities which
they are willing to buy in that particular operation.
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securities.
We then estimate equation 1 for each purchase programme. The sample period
for US QE1 runs from 25th March 2009 to 29th November 2009, US QE2 from
4th November 2010 to 30th June 2011 and QE in the UK from 25th March 2009
to 29th October 2009.12
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions alongside the original result of
DAmico and King.
Consistent with the result of DAmico and King, we nd that both pro-
grammes exhibit signicant ow e¤ects and that they are of an approximately
similar magnitude. Each billion dollars spent on Treasuries by the Fed lowered
the yield of the security purchased by 0.4 basis points in US QE1 and 0.6 basis
points in US QE2.13 In the UK QE, each billion pounds of purchases lowered
the yield of the security being purchased by 1.5 basis points, which, taking into
account the dollar-sterling exchange rate equates to an almost identical marginal
impact for the ow e¤ects across all three policies.
If we then substitute the mean values of each purchase type from our samples
into our estimated equations we nd that the average operation in US QE1 low-
ered yields on the average security by 3.5 basis points, in US QE2 by 4.7 basis
points and for the UK QE by 1.5 basis points. This highlights an interesting
dynamic between the US and UK approach to asset purchase programmes. US
QE1 and the UK QE were more or less the same size and had the same pound for
pound e¤ectiveness. However, the US programme took place over a much shorter
time period and used just over half of the number of operations. Therefore the
size of each operation had to be bigger which is reected in the higher average
ow e¤ect per operation.
These results also provide an insight into the transmission mechanism of ow
e¤ects. The β
2
coe¢cients on close substitutes are also signicant and almost as
large. This suggests that purchases of substitutes directly a¤ected the price of
a security, whether the security itself was purchased or not. This implies a high
degree of substitutability between securities and seems to support the idea that
asset purchases work, at least in part, through portfolio rebalancing. In general
the coe¢cient estimates wane once we move towards mid and far substitutes,
indicating that policy e¤ectiveness diminishes as the degree of substitutability
12Only days when purchases occured are included in the sample.
13The price change per billion dollars of purchases is calculated dividing the coe¢cient on qi
by the average amount of near substitutes over the sample. This is then converted to a change
in yield by multiplying the price change by -ϕ where ϕ is the inverse of the average modied
duration of the sample.
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falls.
It can also be noted that these ow e¤ects are short-lived. When we regress
the right hand side of equation 1 on the one-period lead of the price change instead
of the contemporaneous price change we nd that the coe¢cients drop in value
by around a third in our main samples. However, most do remain signicant
suggesting the existence of frictions in settlement which may cause some of the
ow e¤ects to not be priced in until the following day. This provides support for
our use of a two day event window in our event study analysis.
3.3 Stock E¤ects (Cross-sectional Regressions)
Stock e¤ects, as detailed by DAmico and King are the change in yields resulting
from the more persistent change in supply of an asset. In this sense they are very
similar to the supply e¤ects discussed in the rst chapter of this thesis and by
other authors, including DAmico et al (2012). In the standard New Keynesian
framework, such e¤ects should not exist as complete and perfectly functioning
nancial markets should lead to full arbitrage and render supply inconsequential
for price. However, if there exists imperfect substitutability between assets and
market frictions which limit arbitrage such as those discussed in Tobin (1969),
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) and Andres et al (2004), then demand will be less
than perfectly elastic and supply will have consequences for price.
To test for the existence of these the stock e¤ects, DAmico and King present
a cross-sectional regression which analyses the change in price from the day im-
mediately prior to the rst announcement of the programme to the end of the
day of its nal auction. This is one of the biggest strengths of the methodology.
On the rst date of the sample it is reasonable to assume that there is little to no
information about purchases of individual securities. However, by the time the
nal auction is completed, by denition there is full information on how much
of which securities have been bought by the programme. Agents may internalise
this information set at any point between these two dates. In fact, it is likely that
they will take on partial information at a number of moments over the period.
Identifying and isolating when this happens is one of the key challenges of the
event study methodology. The cross-sectional approach allows the change to be
captured whenever it becomes internalised, be it at the moment the broad policy
is announced, not until the physical purchases are all carried out, or anywhere in
between.
One limitation this imposes is that only securities which are in issue for the
entirety of the policy can be included in the regression. This reduces our sample
90
sizes to 188 securities for US QE2 and 31 for UK QE.
Another concern highlighted by DAmico and King (2010) is the potential
endogeneity which may arise if the monetary authority targeted particular secu-
rities which were underpriced and could be expected to experience a larger change
in price regardless. To counter this we use a two-stage least squares regression
instrumenting the amount of purchases with the Svensson tting error of the se-
curity on the day prior to the announcement of the policy, Svensson (1994), and
a range of other control variables. The Svensson tting error is the di¤erence
between the observed price and the price implied by a yield curve tted using the
methodology outlined by Svensson (1994). Therefore, any security whose price
lies above the yield curve is considered overpriced, and any whose price is below
is considered underpriced.
The rst stage regression therefore takes the form
Qi = α + βSi + δjφj;i + ε (2)
where Qi is the total quantity of security i bought over the complete duration
of the programme, Si is the Svensson tting error and φj is a set of controls, j.
The results of the rst stage regression are shown in Table 6. They show that
the central bank for all three policies successfully targeted underpriced securities,
although in the case of the Bank of England this was applied to underpriced areas
of the yield curve, not specic securities themselves.
The results of the rst stage are then applied to construct a series of instru-
mented purchases, ·Qi, and this is in turn used to create a series of purchases of
near substitutes. This allows us to control for endogeneity in the near substitute
purchases whilst maintaining consistency with own purchases. We then use this
to run the second stage regression
Pi
P ∗i
= + κnQ˙i + ωnQ˙
N
i + γ1Mi + γ2M
2
i + ε (3)
where Pi is the price change for security during the purchase programme, P
∗
i
is its price on the day before the start of the programme. Q˙i is the instrumented
value of purchases of security i and Q˙Ni is that of near substitute purchases during
the asset purchase programme.14 Mi is the remaining maturity of security i.
We do not include further macroeconomic controls. This is for a number of
14Considering the possibility that our coe¢cients of interest, κ and ω, may vary for di¤erent
maturities, forUS QE2 we include interaction dummies which separate securities with less than
15 years of remaining maturity from the rest. For UK QE, we use interactive dummies to
separate gilts which were within the initial purchase range from those which were not.
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reasons, the primary of which is that the methodology does not allow for it.
The estimations work on the individual security level in cross-section so any
macroeconomic variable we choose to include would posit the same value for all
securities in the sample and thus provide no additional information. However,
this aside, the ne nature of the data renders further controls unnecessary. To
some degree it may be assumed that shifts in ination and growth expectations,
for example, would a¤ect the spectrum of nominal treasury securities more or less
uniformly and the extent to which this is not true, the majority of di¤erences in
impact will be due to shifts in the slope of the yield curve and thus captured in
the remaining maturity controls we do include.
The results of the nal regression for each programme are presented in Table
7 and several key points emerge.
We see that purchases did indeed have a positive impact on prices and that
there is, as in the ow regressions, some evidence of substitutability and portfolio
rebalancing between securities. Introducing the actual data on amounts of each
security and its near substitutes purchased we can calculate the change in the
price due to the asset purchase programme. We then convert this to a change in
yield and subtract it from the observed yield on the last day of each sample to get
a counterfactual of what the yield would have been in the absence of the policy.
This implies that US QE1 lowered yields by around 30 basis points, but in the
10-15 years to maturity sector this was as high as 50 basis points. For US QE2
it was 21 basis points on average, peaking at 108 basis points in some securities
with around 20 years to maturity. The UK QE programme reduced yields by as
much as 74 basis points15, and 27 basis points on average.
When interpreting these estimates one has to bear in mind that the di¤erent
programmes varied in size. At $300bn, US QE1 was roughly half the size of US
QE2 and its maximum e¤ect was approximately half. This suggests a degree of
linearity in the impact of asset purchases.16 However, the average e¤ects across
the yield curve was similar between the two programmes, suggesting that US QE2
was less e¤ective per billion dollars spent than US QE1.
One also needs to consider the impact of each programme relative to the
quantity of the total stock of securities. In absolute terms, US QE1 and UK
QE were of almost an exactly equivalent size. Based on the maximum e¤ect of
15In securities with a remaining maturity of around 12 years.
16The amount of $600 billion in Treasuries may understate the true extent of supply with-
drawn by the Fed as US QE2 was supplemented by additional securities bought by the Fed
reinvesting funds originated from other Fed programmes. Taking this into account, the Fed
purchases made over the course of US QE2 were just under $750 billion and our results suggest
a slight diminishing return to the second programme.
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both policies, the British policy was therefore more e¤ective. However, $300bn
represented just 4.7% of the total Treasury stock outstanding in 2009, whilst the
£200bn of purchases carried out by the Bank of England accounted for around
29% of the free oat of gilts. Even the $600bn of purchases under US QE2 only
amounted to 6.6% of the US Treasury debt stock. Thus to get a broadly similar
marginal e¤ect, the Bank of England had to withdraw a much higher proportion
of total supply than the Federal Reserve.
These results are largely in line with those of previous work. For instance,
Williams (2011) adjusts estimates from a number of existing studies by vari-
ous authors by the size of asset purchase programmes. For a $600bn operation,
the estimated impact on longer-term bond yields ranges from 14 basis points
in Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) and 15 basis points in Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) to 18 basis points in Gagnon et al (2011) for US asset
purchases, and 40 basis points in Joyce et al (2011) for UK purchases.
4 Time-series Analysis
The novel nature of quantitative easing in most economies has posed problems for
time series analysis, limiting the sample sizes which cover periods of large scale
asset purchases. This is a problem which, by its nature, will dissipate over time
as the longer the policies last, the more extensive the time series we have at our
disposal.
However, although there exists only a relatively short period in which QE
has been formally carried out, central banks have been e¤ecting asset purchases
in government securities markets for decades. In an open market operation the
central bank provides newly created funds to commercial banks in the form of
reserves in exchange for collateral in the form of government securities. Whilst
the size and duration of these operations may di¤er from the large scale asset
purchases, both actions amount to a manipulation of the quantity of government
debt available to the public, and consequently the amount held on the central
banks balance sheet, and both are underpinned by the same theoretical construct.
In this respect we have a wealth of time series data to draw upon.
Therefore, using monthly data on the US economy from January 1990 to June
2011 we estimate the following general equation to investigate the historical link
between the central banks balance sheet and interest rates.




t + β3Qt + β4rt + Φtj (4)
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y is the yield on a ten year nominal treasury security. Q is the fraction of
the total outstanding stock of US treasury securities which is held on the Federal
Reserves balance sheet. This is intended to capture the supply e¤ect of asset
purchases in much the same way as the stock e¤ect in the earlier section. To cap-
ture the impact of changes in the composition of the balance sheet we also include
MF , which is the average maturity of the Federal Reserves treasury portfolio.
Obviously the Federal Reserve is not the only policymaker engaging in such debt
management-style policies, so to control for the e¤ect of debt management by
the scal authority (over and above the pure supply e¤ects implicitly captured
in the denominator underlying QE) we include MT which is the average matu-
rity of the stock of Treasury debt available for private purchase.17 To control for
traditional monetary policy we include the e¤ective Fed Funds rate, r, and lastly
Φtj represents a set of macroeconomic controls, j.
ADF tests reveal that a number of the variables of interest exhibit non-
stationarity, or at the least, heavy persistence, Table 8. To overcome this we
adapt the basic regression in equation 4 to error correction form using the two-
step Engle Granger process, Engle and Granger (1987).
In the two-step step Engle-Granger process we rst establish the long-run
relationship for our I(1) variables by regressing our non-stationary independent
variables onto our dependent variable. We use AIC and BIC criteria to nd which
combination of macroeconomic controls yields the best results and nd it to be
the parsimonious equation




t + β3Qt + β4rt + εt (5)
We then test the residual from this estimation, ε, and nd it to be I(0).
This means equation 5 represents our long-run relationship, whilst our residual
represents our error correction term and can be written as
εt = y
10




t − β3Qt − β4rt (6)
To formulate our ECM we then regress the one period lag of our error cor-
rection term, along with the rst di¤erences of our I(1) variables and other I(0)
variables on to the rst di¤erence of Y to get our short-run dynamics. Now all
variables in our regression are I(0). We again use AIC and BIC criteria to estab-
lish an appropriate combination of variables in the short-run dynamics leading to
the nal regression of
17We have tried di¤erent variants of these policy variables, but the key results remain un-
changed.
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t − β3Qt − β4rt

+ ̺t
The results from both stages of the baseline regression are shown in Table 9.
Focussing on the long-run relationship, we can see that each of the policy variables
has a signicant impact on the ten year treasury rate. As with our previous
estimation frameworks, there is a signicant inverse relationship between the
quantity of assets held by the central bank and interest rates. Specically, each
1% of the stock of Treasuries outstanding which is removed by Federal Reserve
asset purchases leads to a 20 basis points decline in yields. 10 year yields are
also inversely related to the average maturity of the supply which is withdrawn
so that purchases of longer-dated bonds can reduce 10 year rates even without
an expansion in size of the balance sheet. This suggests there is potential for
"Operation Twist" style sterilised asset purchases to be e¤ective, changing the
relative supply of longer-term securities and attening the yield curve without
burdening the Fed with additional funding requirements. But there is no free
lunch, and there are clear limitations and drawbacks from relying solely on the
maturity channel.
First, the strategy is limited by the size of current holdings of shorter-maturity
assets. Second, carrying a substantial share of longer-maturity Treasury securities
or alternative private assets on its portfolio can expose the Fed to potentially
much higher risks of future capital losses. There is also the possibility of the Fed
becoming a major player in certain segments of nancial markets as a consequence
of focussing on longer-term debt. This could reduce trading and lead to the exit
of some market participants, hampering normal market functioning. What is
more, selling short-term securities to sterilise purchases may increase short rates
and bank funding costs.
The implied strength of the maturity channel is such that each month increase
in the average maturity of the Federal Reserves security holdings lowers the yield
on ten year securities by 3.4 basis points. Looking at the scal authoritys debt
management variable, the same one month increase in the average maturity of
the publicly available securities portfolio would actually raise long-term rates by
7 basis points, double the impact of the same move by the monetary authority.
The stronger e¤ect is to be expected when one considers the relative size of the
portfolio being inuenced by the Treasury compared to the portfolio held by the
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Fed. Once we control for size, debt management by the monetary authority is
much more e¤ective.18 The opposite signs of the coe¢cients on the two debt
management variables (and implicitly the two supply variables underlying the
numerator and the denominator within QE) is logical as each policymaker is
acting on the publicly available supply of securities from opposite sides. This
highlights the potential for coordination issues between independent monetary
and scal authorities when both use debt management as a policy tool.
Of note is that the long-run relationship between the ten year yield and the Fed
Funds rate is 0.22, which is fully consistent with the consensus in the literature
where 0.25 is the canonical gure, inferring that a 100 basis point hike in the
policy rate causes long-term rates to rise by 25 basis points.
Using the estimated coe¢cients and the realised data, we can decompose the
change in yield associated with policy factors into its constituent parts, Figure 2.
The rst thing to note is that the estimates are highly supportive of our estimates
derived from other methodologies, around 40 basis points for US QE1 and 120
for US QE2.
Secondly, the driving force in both policies is the balance sheet expansion.
This is unsurprising as manipulating the maturity of the Feds securities port-
folio was never an explicit objective of either of the rst two asset purchase
programmes. In US QE1 the maturity e¤ect is minimal, but perhaps more re-
vealing is that in US QE2 the maturity e¤ect actually works against the Federal
Reserves objective. This tells us that by targeting purchases at assets with an
average maturity of less than its existing portfolio, US QE2 actually undoes some
of the desired impact resulting from the expansion of the balance sheet. The
implications of this result for the design of future policy are that maturity mat-
ters. The e¢cacy of asset purchases can be enhanced if purchases are targeted
at a long enough maturity that they lengthen the average maturity of the central
banks own portfolio, causing a complimentary maturity e¤ect.
Thirdly, in both cases the Treasurys debt management policy works against
the maturity and quantity e¤ects of Fed policy. This brings us back to the issue of
coordination for debt management between the monetary and scal authorities.
It is worthy of note here that as the Federal Reserve has worked to remove supply
and duration from the Treasuries market, the Treasury itself has been increasing
both.
18See later section for estimation of equation standardised by market share.
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4.1 Alternative specications and robustness
In addition to our baseline regression, a number of alternative specications were
estimated as a means of testing the sensitivity of our result. The more interesting
of these are presented in Table 10. Our core result of a signicant impact on yields
from changes in the size and composition of the Federal Reserves balance sheet
is robust to all alternative specications, with some variance in the magnitudes
of coe¢cients, but never in sign or signicance.
Our rst test is to the obvious questions of a structural break in the series
caused by the nancial crisis. Estimating over a pre-crisis sample which runs
from January 1990 to December 2007 we nd that the coe¢cients on the vari-
ables associated with Federal Reserve policy are smaller, but remain signicant,
suggesting that asset purchases had a weaker impact prior to the nancial crisis.
This makes intuitive sense for a number of reasons. First, the size and maturity
prole of the Federal Reserves balance sheet was not an explicit policy tool prior
to 2008, and as such was less likely to be thought to contain information on the
stance of policy. Second, theory on the imperfect substitutability of assets would
imply that changes in the relative supplies of assets should have a greater impact
on prices when there is a greater degree of market segmentation, as is widely
accepted of the period since 2008. However, it is an important result that we still
nd a signicant relationship in a non-crisis sample when markets were consid-
ered to be operating relatively freely with few frictions. This suggests that the
usefulness of asset purchases, and the existence of supply e¤ects, is not limited
to periods of crisis.
We control separately for two forward looking variables; ination expectations
and forward interest rates. The rst acts to lower the size of the coe¢cients on
policy variables slightly compared with the baseline and is included to capture
the impact of change views on future prices will have on the nominal yield. The
inclusion of forward rates is intended to proxy for expectations of the path of the
policy rate, acknowledging that agents are likely to be concerned with rates over
the life of the bond, not just the contemporaneous Fed Funds rate. However,
the coe¢cient turns out to be insignicant and the policy variables are left little
changed.
We also look at di¤erent ways of measuring the policy variables. Using the
fraction of the relevant portfolio with a remaining maturity of 5 years or higher, as
in Kuttner (2006) does little to a¤ect the magnitudes implied by the coe¢cients.
We also replace the average maturity of the stock of US Treasuries outstanding
with the average maturity of their net issuance, as this is the variable that the
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scal authority can directly control in any one period. The e¤ect is signicantly
smaller, which is not surprising given that newly issued securities represent a
relatively small fraction of the total market.
The last set of controls are adjusting for the relative sizes of the two policy
actors. It could be realistically expected that a one month extension in the average
maturity of the total supply e¤ected by the US Treasury would have more of an
e¤ect than a one month extension of the Federal Reserves holdings purely because
the Federal Reserve is a much smaller player in the market. To counter this we
divide the average maturity series by the size of the Federal Reserves balance
sheet and the total supply of Treasuries outstanding respectively. We see that in
a like-for-like comparison that debt management carried out by the monetary
authority is actually more e¤ective than that carried out by the scal authority.
5 Conclusions
Across a range of techniques, we nd that central bank asset purchase programmes
have had a signicant impact, lowering yields in all cases. The magnitude of this
impact is broadly consistent across all techniques, and as such represents a robust
result which sits within the range of other estimates in the literature.
We nd empirical evidence in support of asset purchases a¤ecting yields by
shaping expectations of the future path of policy rates, as would be consistent
with the canonical New Keynesian view of the world. Alongside this though we
also nd a signicant role for both the supply and composition of asset mar-
kets to inuence prices. The relevance of these factors is something the baseline
New Keynesian model struggles to convincingly reconcile with its assumptions of
complete and frictionless nancial markets and a representative agent. Our em-
pirical results, combined with the growing body of literature within which they
sit, inform the theoretical debate and validate the investigation of breaks in these
assumptions, such as the preferred habitat theory.
The implications of our results for policy are that asset purchases can be an
e¤ective way to manipulate interest rates, even when the short-term nominal
interest rate is constrained. However, they caution on the need for coordination
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Table 1: Event Study Policy Announcements
Date Policy relevant event
US QE1
1st December 2008 Governor Bernanke gives sp eech declaring the Fed cou ld purchase
longer-term Treasury securities. . . in substantia l quantities"
16th December 2008 FOMC statem ent
28th January 2009 FOMC statem ent
18th March 2009 FOMC statem ent announcing the decision to purchase up $300bn
of longer-term US Treasury securities and increase purchases of
agency debt and MBS
29th April 2009 FOMC statem ent
24th June 2009 FOMC statem ent
12th August 2009 F irst FOMC statem ent where "up to" is not included when referring
to Treasury security purchases and the pace of purchases is slowed
23rd September 2009 FOMC statem ent
4th November 2009 FOMC statem ent announcing that purchases of agency debt would
b e "around $175bn"
US QE2
10th August 2010 FOMC statem ent signalling that "the pace of econom ic recovery is
likely to b e more modest in the near term than had b een anticipated"
and FOMC "w ill employ its p olicy tools as necessary"
27th August 2010 Chairman Bernankes Jackson Hole sp eech
21st September 2010 FOMC statem ent
12th Octob er 2010 FOMC m inutes released
15th Octob er 2010 Chairman Bernanke gives sp eech at Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
3rd November 2010 FOMC statem ent announcing a further $600 b illion of longer-term
Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011
at a pace of ab out $75 billion p er month
UK QE
11th February 2009 Publication of the Ination Report and press conference in which it
is  rst suggested the Bank of England is likely to embark on a
large-sca le asset purchase programme
5th March 2009 F irst announcem ent by MPC of £75bn of asset purchases
7th May 2009 Extension of asset purchases to £125bn
6th August 2009 Extension of asset purchases to £175bn and expansion of the purchase
range to any gilts w ith a residual m aturity of m ore than 3 years
5th November 2009 F inal extension of QE1 asset purchases to £200bn
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Table 2: Event Study for the UK QE Programme
OIS Rates1;3 Government Securities1;3 Corporate Bonds1;3 Equities2;4
3 month 1 year 1 year 5 years 10 years 20 years AAA BBB FTSE100 Volatility NEER2;4
11th February 2009 -16 -23 -31 -40 -34 -15 -31 -69 -0.26 -1.28 -1.55
5th March 2009 12 20 5 -34 -68 -89 -91 -41 -3.15 15.2 -0.16
7th May 2009 0 -2 1 9 1 1 10 8 1.49 3.72 -0.84
6th August 2009 2 -4 1 -4 -3 -26 0 -4 1.82 -4.48 -0.80
5th November 2009 2 -3 -3 4 10 5 8 8 0.68 -9.93 -0.05
Sum/Average 0 -12 -27 -65 -94 -124 -104 -98 0.12 0.65 -0.68
Full Sample -0.2 0.3 0.1 0 -0.5 -0.4 0.22 29.16 0.04
1: basis points change
2: percentage change
3: sum across all events
4: average percentage change per event
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Table 3: Event Study for the US QE1 Programme
OIS Rates1;3 Government Securities1;3 Corporate Bonds1;3 Equities2;4
3 month 1 year 1 year 5 years 10 years 20 years AAA BBB S&P500 Volatility NEER2;4
1st December 2008 -4 -9 -13 -28 -25 -24 -9 -5.29 13.93 -0.26
16th December 2008 -13 -9 -5 -15 -33 -28 -51 4.13 -12.19 -3.19
28th January 2009 -1 -2 4 28 28 28 13 4 -0.07 0.9 0.2
18th March 2009 0 -4 -9 -36 -41 -35 -31 0 0.76 7.06 -4.64
29th April 2009 0 0 -3 5 11 7 -6 0 2.16 -3.82 -0.72
24th June 2009 -1 1 -3 -13 -1 -5 -4 -24 2.81 -13.8 0.79
12th August 2009 -1 -5 -3 -11 -12 -3 -13 16 1.85 -4.92 -1
23rd September 2009 -1 -2 -3 -8 -6 -4 -8 -4 -1.95 8.1 0.74
4th November 2009 0 -4 -2 -1 7 7 8 5 2.03 -11.73 -0.72
Sum/Average -21 -34 -37 -79 -72 -57 -101 -3 0.71 -1.83 -0.98
Full Sample -0.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 -1.8 0.23 -0.48 -0.08
1: basis points change
2: percentage change
3: sum across all events
4: average percentage change per event
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Table 4: Event Study for the US QE2 Programme
OIS Rates1;3 Government Securities1;3 Corporate Bonds1;3 Equities2;4
3 month 1 year 1 year 5 years 10 years 20 years AAA BBB S&P500 Volatility NEER2;4
10th August 2010 0 -1 -1 -10 -14 -11 -7 -10 -3.4 14.68 1.37
27th August 2010 1 -1 1 1 4 5 1 15 0.16 -0.58 0.45
21st September 2010 0 -1 -1 -10 -16 -14 -20 -46 -0.74 4.7 -1.35
12th October 2010 1 0 1 2 5 9 14 -3 1.1 0.58 -0.53
15th October 2010 0 0 1 -4 0 3 -27 6 0.93 -3.97 0.56
3rd November 2010 0 0 -1 -11 -10 4 -11 -29 2.3 -14.14 -0.94
Sum/Average 2 -3 0 -32 -31 -4 -50 -67 0.06 0.21 -0.07
Full Sample 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 -1.9 0.24 -0.28 -0.16
1: basis points change
2: percentage change
3: sum across all events
4: average percentage change per event
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Table 5: Flow E¤ect Panel Regression Results
US QE1 US QE2 UK QE
Eligible Ineligible Eligible Ineligible PR OPR
<15 YTM >15 YTM <15 YTM >15 YTM <15 YTM >15 YTM <15 YTM >15 YTM
β
1
- Direct purchases 0.2763 -0.1063 - - 0.6072 -0.1850 - - 0.1220 -
(0.053) (0.098) (0.046) (0.091) (0.021)
β
2
- Near substitutes 0.2403 -0.1238 0.0665 -0.0268 0.5668 -0.1922 -0.0050 -0.3019 0.0842 0.1681
(0.048) (0.044) (0.018) (0.053) (0.039) (0.038) (0.021) (0.120) (0.014) (0.059)
β
3
- Mid substitutes 0.1700 0.0501 0.0047 -0.007 0.5732 -0.0860 -0.0370 -0.1661 0.0680 0.1806
(0.045) (0.026) (0.0099) (0.021) (0.036) (0.070) (0.017) (0.041) (0.013) (0.024)
β
4
- Far substitutes - - -0.0238 0.0021 - - -0.0807 -0.1026 0.0341 -0.0502




Note: results for US QE1 are taken from DAmico and King (2010)
PR= Securities inside the purchase range
OPR= Securities outside the purchase range
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Table 6: Stage One Instrumented Variable Regression
US QE2 UK QE
Remaining maturity 0.0000559 0.00497
(0.000) (0.002)
Squared remaining maturity -0.000000126 -0.000013
(0.000) (0.000)
Svennsson tting error -0.0070341 0.4741
(0.003) (0.204)
Fitting error of near substitutes -0.3635
(0.0191)
Old bond dummy -0.0020395
(0.001)
R2
Table 7: Second Stage Stock E¤ect Regression Results
US QE2 UK QE
<15 YTM >15 YTM IPR OPR
Direct purchases 2.351 3.215 0.1583 -
(1.049) (0.022) (0.062)
Near Substitutes 0.031 -0.146 -0.0283 0.010
(0.022) (0.231) (0.025) (0.022)
Remaining maturity -0.146 -
(0.000)





PR= Securities inside the purchase range
OPR= Securities outside the purchase range
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Table 8: ADF tests
Number of lags
0 1 2 3
y10 -1.812 -2.080 -1.937 -2.018
MF 0.4161 0.2736 -0.7905 -0.9853
MT -1.104 -1.043 -0.9577 -1.256
Q -1.023 -0.9196 -1.251 -1.580
r -1.272 -1.768 -2.090 -2.296
πe -3.025 -2.968 -2.807 -2.631
VIX -4.347 -4.510 -3.698 -3.278
GDPe -2.626 -2.908 -3.099 -3.212
ADF critical values: 5%=-2.87 1%=-3.46
Table 9: Error-correction Regression Results
Variable Baseline




Speed of adjustment -0.11










Table 10: Alternative specications for time series exercise
Pre-crisis sample Ination Forward Alternative measure Average maturity Adjusting for
1990-2007 expectations rates of maturity of issuance balance sheet size
MF 0.080 -0.018 -0.049 -0.034
(0.018) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008)
MT 0.093 0.052 0.096
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008)
Q 0.126 -0.11 -0.239 -0.011 -0.08 -0.057
(0.035) (1.326) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.019)
r 0.262 0.15 0.178 0.15 0.233
(0.027) (0.021) (0.024) (0.051) (0.025)















Figure 1: Cumulative Impact of Event Studies
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The money multiplier, the ratio of narrow money and broader monetary
aggregates, is often an integral part of macroeconomic models and a key aspect
of the judgement on monetary policy. However, the collapse of the bank money
multiplier since 2008, and the failure of huge expansions of narrow money in
many advanced economies to bring about a sustained growth in broad money has
led some commentators to announce not only the death of the multiplier as a
useful concept but also to pronounce on the failure of non-conventional monetary
policies. Broadly speaking the bank multiplier has not really grown much from
the basic proposition that the commercial banking sector simply lends out some
xed multiple of what is otherwise held as cash and reserves.1 The fallacy of
this assumption is immediately apparent if one looks at any data series on money
multipliers, especially since the current nancial crisis. In a paper focussed on
the empirical evaluation of the relationship between central bank reserves and
broader money and bank lending, Carpenter and Demiralp (2012) nd little
evidence supporting the standard money multiplier story, but suggest that a
more complex relationship between monetary policy and the quantity of lending,
one where demand for loans and reserves, which are dependent on interest rates,
could play a role. Accordingly in this paper we try to impose a more formal
optimization problem for commercial banks in the management of the asset side
of their balance sheet.
Of course, the majority of central banks conduct monetary policy through
manipulation of the short-term nominal interest rate.2 And many models
employing the short-term nominal interest rate do still characterize monetary
policy as controlling the quantity of central bank reserves in order to achieve
their desired rate i.e. withdrawing supply through open market operations to raise
rates and increasing it if they are targeting a lower rate. Disyatat (2008) explains
how this amounts to an exercise in reverse causality. What happens in practice
is that the policy maker sets the lending rate it will lend at and then provides,
through open market operations, as much narrow money as commercial banks
demand at that rate. Narrow money is thus demand determined. Commercial
banks then supply loans at the market interest rate, which determines broad
money. A key insight here is that the evolution of monetary aggregates reects
1See Garnkel and Thornton (1991) for a precursor to our argument that the multiplier
cannot be thought to be exogenous and ought to be interpreted with reference to policy and
underlying economic conditions, including nancial spreads.
2The consensus rationale for this can be found in Poole (1970).
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prevailing interest rates rather than determines them.3
We suggest thinking about variations in the money multiplier as an optimal
portfolio choice on the part of commercial banks that matches deposit demand
from households with a choice about assets as reserves or loans.4 The use of non-
conventional monetary policies, which have increased the supply of base money
to commercial banks allows us a background against which to judge our model.
Accordingly, we build on the money and banking sector model of Goodfriend
and McCallum (2007) in which the overall level of deposits is determined
by narrow money from the central bank, and loans produced by commercial
banks. However unlike theirs which has a xed ratio between the two monetary
aggregates, we derive a demand schedule for narrow money from banks prot-
maximising condition and allow this to determine the level of narrow money,
with the central bank meeting this demand perfectly elastically. The quantity of
loans is then derived from the banks optimising condition and loan production
function and so we can observe richer dynamics in the money multiplier as the
two aggregates evolve in response to macroeconomic and nancial conditions.
A further innovation is the inclusion of open market operations as a practical
mechanism to e¤ect these changes in reserves. We model the central bank
exchanging newly created reserves with the private sector for deposits, which are
backed up with increased reserve holdings on commercial banks balance sheets.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we briey outline recent
developments in the money multiplier and discuss what may have been driving
them with particular regard to policy in the US. We then provide an exposition
of the model. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of our model for the money
multiplier, which is the inverse of the reserve-deposit ratio, and how this a¤ects
banks and the wider economy. We show that, by allowing the multiplier to vary as
the relative returns/costs of narrow and broad money change, banks can remain
optimal in how they meet deposit demand. To illustrate these points more clearly
in Section 6 we present the impulse responses of the models key variables to both
real and nancial shocks and show that a exible money multiplier improves the
response of the macroeconomy when compared to a model where the multiplier is
held xed. To strengthen this conceptual point, in Section 7 we carry out welfare
analysis by deriving a welfare loss function for the representative household from
a second order approximation to utility.
Finally, in Section 8 we apply the model to the recent nancial crisis and
3See Chadha, Corrado and Holly (2014) for a thorough analysis of this issue.
4See Gale (2011) on this point.
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nd it does a passable job of matching the evolution of key variables in the US
economy since 2008. We then investigate what the results of the model imply for
the money multiplier and nd that following a shock similar to that experienced
by the US during the nancial crisis, it is optimal for banks to demand much more
narrow money and for credit money in the form of loans to contract. This leads
to a signicant fall in the money multiplier consistent with that observed in the
data. We then perform a counterfactual exercise in which we subject the model
to the same shock but hold the money multiplier xed. The model implies that,
had the Federal Reserve not massively expanded narrow money and maintained
a xed multiplier, broad money would have fallen by signicantly more and the
US economy may have experienced a contraction in output 1% greater, ination
would have fallen by an additional 2.5% and employment would have been 2%
lower. The recovery would also have been more protracted, taking roughly twice
as long to return to equilibrium.
2 Money, Multipliers and Recent Policy
The fall of money multipliers in the Worlds major economies has been a feature
of the recent crisis. Figure 1 shows how the ratio of broad to narrow money in
the US fell rapidly as the crisis intensied. However, what this also shows is that
the level of broad money proved relatively resilient. So, what has driven this fall
in multipliers? The rst factor driving it is the contraction of new credit and
lending by commercial banks to the wider economy. After su¤ering heavy losses,
and facing increased uncertainty, banks have become more cautious in their new
lending and sought to repair their balance sheets and shrink loan books. The
second factor, which is clear in Figure 1 that the Federal Reserve has massively
expanded the quantity of central bank money through the quantitative easing
programmes. Figures 2 and 3 show how the Federal Reserves balance sheet has
evolved with an unprecedented rise in the level of reserves, mostly e¤ected through
the Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) in which the Fed purchased mostly
Government bonds and Mortgage-Backed Securities with newly created reserves.
In this way, the LSAPs can be thought of as analogous to traditional open market
operations, albeit di¤ering in the quantity and type of assets purchased, and the
duration for which the assets are held.
In November 2008 the Fed announced it would begin purchasing housing
agency debt and mortgage-backed agency securities to the value of $600bn in
response to the housing crisis and in order to promote the health of mortgage
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lending. In March 2009 this was increased to $1.25 trillion. These purchases were
largely of maturities between 3 months and 5 years. As they reached maturity, the
principal was reinvested to fund the purchase of Treasury securities and maintain
the value of the agency debt and agency backed securities section of the LSAP.
Accompanying this extension was the announcement that the Fed would buy
$300bn of Treasury securities, over 60% of which were of between 3 and 10 year
maturities. The purchase of Treasuries was designed to support falling asset
prices by acting as a large buyer and through the portfolio balance channel this
should spread to other assets in the economy.
These large scale asset purchases were predominantly funded by the creation
of several trillion dollars of new reserves, making them the largest quantitative
easing programme enacted since the crisis. In November 2010, in light of a
continuing weakness in economic forecasts, the purchase of longer-term Treasuries
was extended further by $600bn under a second round of quantitative easing
(QE2) which took the total LSAP to over $2 trillion. In September 2011, the
FOMC announced a maturity extension programme under which it bought an
additional $400bn of longer-dated treasuries but simultaneously sterilised these
by selling short-term Treasuries to the same value. The goal was to lower longer-
term yields without increasing the size of the central banks balance sheet by
"twisting" the yield curve and increasing the average maturity of the Feds
Treasuries portfolio by 25 months. In September 2012 the Fed announced QE3.
This heralded an important change in the setting of asset purchase programmes
as, unlike the previous policies, QE3 was open-ended, with the Federal Reserve
committing to buy $40bn of MBS a month until the outlook for the labour market
"improves substantially....in a context of price stability". It was also a direct
injection of liquid reserves into the economy aimed at improving condence and
conditions in impaired credit markets. The purchases were eventually halted
in October 2014 after accumulating some $4.5Tn in assets. By explicitly tying
the duration of the programme to conditions in the macroeconomy the Federal
Reserve hoped to relieve uncertainty and return condence to agents to make
longer-term decisions about investment and spending.
If the assumption of a xed money multiplier were to hold, this huge expansion
in narrow money would be expected to lead to an equivalent boom in broad
money. Similarly, the contraction in the credit supply and loan issuance of
commercial banks would act to reduce broad money. As already observed though,
the level of broad money has been reasonably constant, implying that the increase
in narrow money has worked to almost exactly o¤set the contraction in credit
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money. Whilst these two e¤ects pull in opposite directions on the broad monetary
aggregate, they both act to move the money multiplier in the same way, down,
as narrow money has formed an increasing fraction of the total money supply.
We will go on to show how this fall in the multiplier may be explained by banks
optimising behaviour causing them to rebalance their portfolio between narrow
and credit money as the relative returns/costs of each vary and this may have
acted to reduce the duration and severity of the economic downturn by o¤setting
an escalation in market-determined premia.5
2.1 The Central Bank Balance Sheet
We suggest a simple framework for analyzing the e¤ect of balance sheet monetary
policies.6 For simplicity, since we abstract from other forms of central bank money
and concentrate on bank reserves alone in our model, high powered money is
identical to reserves. More traditionally the central bank controls the stock of
at money (outside money) and nancial intermediaries create other forms of
money, which are claims on the private sector. As nancial intermediation allows
alternative assets to serve as money, it o¤ers a close substitute to (outside) at
money and the ability of the central bank to determine the overall nominal level
of expenditure depends on the relationship between outside and inside money.
The central bank has a powerful tool to regulate nancial intermediaries and to
a¤ect the quantity of money in circulation: reserves, which may be either or both
of fractional and or voluntary.
Private Sector
Assets Liabilities
















Reserves r Deposits D
Loans (D − r)
Central Bank
Assets Liabilities
Bonds (1− γ)B Reserves r
Capital (1− γk)K
5See Walsh (2009) for a very interesting attempt to understand policy at the ZLB.
6See Chadha, Corrado and Meaning (2012) for more detail.
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We rst look at the private sectors balance sheet. The private sector has
three forms of assets: deposits, D, held at banks and some fraction of bonds, γB,
issued by the government and a fraction of total capital.7 Their liabilities are
loans, D − r, provided by banks and capital, K. Capital is also on the liability
side of households balance sheet because households own the rms and rms
treat capital as a liability. The government sector has liabilities in the form of
outstanding public debt, B and assets given by the present discounted value of
future taxation. The commercial banks balance sheet liabilities are deposits, D.
Some fraction of liabilities, r, is held as reserves and the rest, D − r, is available
to be lent to the private sector. The central bank holds assets in the form of some
fraction of government bonds, (1−γ)B, and a fraction of capital, (1−γk)K, with
liabilities determined by central bank money, which are reserves in this model.8
The net assets of commercial banks and of the central bank are both zero. The
private sector has net assets given by D+ γB + γkK −
 











iti = B, we can note that the net
private sector assets are also zero.
We can see from this ow of funds the mechanism by which unconventional
policies occur. The central bank can perform quantitative easing by increasing
the size of its balance sheet. It does this by extending an increased level of
reserves to commercial banks which must be backed by an increased holding of
either bonds or capital, which in turn must be bought from the private sector.
Alternatively, credit easing is conducted through the composition of the balance
sheet. With their liabilities unchanged, the central bank can buy capital from
the private sector, increasing its own holdings. It funds these purchases by selling
bonds back to the private sector, leaving the net e¤ect on the size of both the
central bank and private sectors assets at zero. Due to the di¤ering properties of
bonds and capital as collateral in loan production, this exchange has implications
for levels of deposit demand which we will discuss later.
3 The Model
We now present the model, which is an extended version of that developed by
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and extended by Chadha and Corrado (2012).
Primarily it is a Calvo-Yun monopolistically competitive production economy
with sticky prices and three main agents; households, who can work either in
7In this example we assume that the private sector is represented by households.
8If we operate in an open economy, central bank assets would also include foreign exchange
reserves rf .
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the goods producing sector or in the banking sector monitoring loan quality,
banks, who meet consumers deposit demand via reserves and a loans production
function, and the monetary authority.9
3.1 Households
Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we present the model in terms of the
optimising problem of the typical household before then aggregating up under
the assumption that there exist many similar households.
The typical household in our model consumes a bundle of di¤erentiated
commodities, supplies labor, and saves. They also own and operate the rm and
produce for sale a di¤erentiated good. Lastly they also operate a (competitive)
banking rm.









where ct is consumption during period t of Dixit-Stiglitz consumption bundles
and (1−nst−m
s




t represent labour provided to goods
producing rms and banking rms respectively, though these need not necessarily
be those rms owned by the household itself.
The household then maximises this utility subject to three constraints. The
rst is a budget constraint which states that the household has income in any
period equal to the net sale of capital goods, qt(1 − δ)Kt − qtKt+1, the net sale
















t) − wt(nt + mt) and what it
can earn for sale of the di¤erentiated good it produces less the cost of its own
consumption basket, cAt (
Pt
PAt
)1−θ− ct. There is also a lump-sum tax payment, and

























− wt(nt +mt)− ct − taxt = 0
where qt is the price of capital and Kt is the quantity of capital. Pt is the price
9There is also a scal authority which runs a balanced budget. We x levels of government
debt as constant unless exogenously shocked, thus the governments role within this set-up is
benign.
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of households produced good while PAt is the consumption good price index. nt
is the labour demanded by household as producer, mt, is the labour demanded by
households banking operation. nst and m
s
t are the quantities of labour supplied
by the household to each sector for which it is paid the real wage, wt. Dt is the
nominal holding of broad money, taxt is the real lump-sum tax payment, R
B
t is
the nominal interest rate on government bonds purchased in t+ 1, Bt+1.
cAt is the aggregated consumption in the economy, which the individual
household takes as given, but the household has market power in the product that




represents the share of the aggregate consumption the typical household supplies.
Πt is a transfer of prots from the banking rm owned by the household. The
Lagrange multiplier of this constraint is denoted as λt.
The second constraint is a deposit-in-advance constraint which establishes
bank deposits as the means of transaction within our model and requires the
household to hold deposits with a nancial intermediary in a given period in




This is a key element of the model, and provides a direct link between
consumption demand/economic activity and demand for broad money.
As owners of a rm, the typical household is also subject to a sales equals net
production constraint
Kηt (A1tnt)
1−η − cAt (Pt/P
A
t )
−θ = 0, (4)
where η denotes the capital share in the rm production function and A1t is a
productivity shock in the goods production sector whose mean increases over time
at a rate ̺ As above cAt (Pt/P
A
t )
−θ reects the monopolistic competition the rm
faces when selling its own di¤erentiated good. Thus the constraint requires that
everything the rm produces is sold. The Lagrange multiplier of this constraint
is denoted as, ξt
Lastly, price adjustment is subject to a nominal rigidity that follows the







where Pt in this setting refers also to P
A
t as all households and rms face
the same economy wide ination rate. The marginal cost MCt depends on the
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lagrangian multipliers from our household budget constraint and the rms sales






Deposit demand is determined by the household. It is then met by the nancial
sector, whih is where our model begins to deviate from that of Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007).
Deposits are created in two ways in our model; they can be created by the
monetary authority through the creation of narrow money, which appears as
central bank reserves on the balance sheets of commercial banks; alternatively
deposits can be created by banks themselves who produce loans and in doing
so generate a deposit for the household. This view of broad money creation is
outlined and discussed in more detail in [reference].
From this, we can write a simple identity which describes both broad money
and the balance sheets of the commercial bank.
Dt = Lt + rt (7)
where Lt is the total amount of one period loans supplied in time t and rt is the
quantity of narrow money of reserves supplied by the central bank. D
r
therefore
represents the money multiplier and, as the only source of narrow money in our




, which equals the reserve ratio.10
To produce loans, and thus create deposits independently of the central bank,
banks apply a technology to collateral posted by households in the form of
bonds, b, or capital, qK. This process is captured by a standard Cobb-Douglas




t = F (γbt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
α(A2tmt)
1−α 0 < α < 1, (8)
A2t denotes a shock to monitoring work, A3t is a shock on capital as collateral




t+1). The parameter k denotes the inferiority of capital
10Under a 100% reserve system, the broad money supply, and thus consumption within our
model would be restricted by the creation of narrow money by the central bank. In this variant
Dt = rt and the subsequent problem of reserve demand simplies to depend purely on demand
for consumption at the given policy rate.
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as collateral in the banking production function11, while α is the share of collateral
in loan production. Increasing monitoring e¤ort is achieved by increasing the
number of people employed in the banking sector and therefore reducing the
employment in the goods production sector, for a given level of total employment.
Alternatively, deposits can be created by the central bank. They can do this
at no cost to themselves. However, they do charge a rate of interest for supplying
these reserves to the banking sector. They do this to be able to control the
prevailing benchmark interest rate in the economy, operating much like open
market operations at a discount window in practice. In actuality, the rate of
importance here is the di¤erence between the rate that must be paid to borrow
reserves and the rate paid on reserve holdings stored at the central bank. For
simplicity of exposition however we set the rate of interest paid on stored reserves
as zero, and so this collapses to be just the rate paid at the discount window, Rt.
We assume that the monetary authority supplies reserves perfectly elastically to
satiate demand from commercial banks at the given policy rate. We derive the
underlying demand function for reserves below.
3.2.1 The banks problem
The banking sector itself is perfectly competitive and following Baltensperger
(1980) banks seek to maximise total returns within period. Thus their
optimisation problem can be written
maxΠt
rt





RTt (r − rt)
2 − τ t(r − rt) (9)
The latter half of this equation relates to a series of additional costs faced
by commercial banks and motivated by concerns over reserve management. We
assume that banks have an exogenous target for the level of reserves, r, perhaps
set by custom and practice or by legislation.12 We assume that any deviation from
this target imposes two costs on the bank. The rst is symmetric and derives from
the banks desire to smooth the path of reserves and avoid any sharp swings in
its asset position as these may signal mismanagement and result in reputational
loss. In the model the cost of such deviations from target is the uncollateralised
interest rate, RTt . This is because if rt < r, the commercial bank will fund its
shortfall at the penalty rate, and if rt > r the commercial bank will have missed
11Capital is considered inferior as there are increased costs to the bank of verifying its physical
quality and condition as well as its market price. It is also less liquid should it need to be called
upon in the case of default.
12In practise, most major economies have a minimum level of required reserves relative to
depositis.
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the opportunity to lend out those reserves at the same penalty rate and thus
incurs the opportunity cost, RTt .
The second term relates to the need of commercial banks to hold a certain
level of reserves to meet its desired reserve target in any given period. Whilst
exogenous in our framework, this target is most likely driven by the level of
required reserves set by the regulator (Basel III, 2010), although banks may set
a target in excess of this minimum limit if they have heightened precautionary
motives for holdings safe, liquid assets, such as central bank reserves. Therefore,
the second term can be thought of as an exogenous shift in the ex-ante probability
of a reserve shortfall. It represents shifts in the level of reserves necessary to meet
the banks target holdings, so an increase in τ corresponds to bank reserves being
below the target level r.
Lastly, banks are constrained in that they must fully meet the resultant
demand for deposits using one of the two methods at their disposal. Therefore
Dt = Lt + rt (10)









RTt (r − rt)
2 − τ t(r − rt) (11)
Solving this problem for the optimal level of reserves gives us the commercial
banks demand curve for reserves from the central bank, and can be written as











t is a positive function of the probability of the commercial bank being short
its obligated level of reserves, r, and negative in Rˆt, and, Rˆ
L
t , which is the cost
of reserves and the opportunity cost of reserves, the loan rate. We therefore
emphasize that the relative cost and returns of the two mechanisms of meeting
deposit demand change, so do the banks optimal quantities of each.
Any consumption above the level equivalent to the quantity of reserves
requires households to borrow from the commercial banks, and thus receive a
deposit which can be used to e¤ect transactions.13 Loan demand can thus be
13In this way our model di¤ers from others where loans are used to fund investment and have
a direct productive purpose. However, by creating broad money and funding consumption they
are acting, through the sales equal net production constraint, to achieve a similar e¤ect.
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pinned down to the di¤erence between deposit demand and the quantity of
reserves demanded by the commercial bank. By combining equations (6), (7)
and (10) we can write the quantity of credit money the banking sector should
extend in the form of loans as










We can then show how total deposits depend on both money created by the
central bank in response to commercial bank demands and that created by the
banking sector through loans.










+ F (γbt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
α(A2tmt)
1−α.
Finally, we can put this back in to the deposit-in-advance constraint which
allows us to neatly show the interconnectivity between the real economy, the
nancial sector and the banks decision between monetary aggregates:
ct = vt





which can be re-written as:
ct = vt
τ t −Rt −RLtRTt PAt + r| {z }
base
+






The rst two terms inside the square bracket represent narrow money, whilst
the third is money created by the banking sector. If it becomes optimal for
commercial banks to create less credit money through loans, then the only way
to support a given level of broad money, and thus activity, is to increase the
quantity of narrow money equivalently. As the central bank is the only agent who
can create narrow money, they must increase the supply of reserves, and in our
benchmark framework this is exactly what they do, meeting the increased demand
for reserves perfectly elastically. This allows commercial banks to always achieve
their optimal asset mix. We will later discuss the implications of an alternative
scenario in which the central bank only provides reserves as a constant fraction
of total deposits (a xed money multiplier).
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3.3 Interest rates and spreads
The inclusion of such a banking sector as outlined above gives rise to a number
of interest rates and nancial spreads. First, we derive a risk-free rate of interest
by imagining a one-period default-free security that cannot be used as collateral
by the holder. From the households problem above we can write the return on
this security RTt , as a standard intertemporal nominal pricing kernel, priced from
expected real consumption growth and ination. In essence it is a one period
Fisher equation.




The policy rate of the central bank is the market clearing rate for reserves.
Implicitly this is also the interbank rate, although given our assumptions on the
banking sector we do not explicitly model interbank transactions. The rate is set
by a feedback rule responding to ination, πt, and output, yt, with parameters,








How this rate is connected to other rates within our model is of clear
importance. First, should a bank wish to make an uncollateralised loan at the
risk-free rate it would need to incur all of the costs associated with loan production
through monitoring work. This cost can be characterised by the factor price of
monitoring, which is the real wage wt
PAt
, divided by the partial derivative of the












(1−rrt). This means the real cost of loan management on an uncollateralised




In theory, the commercial bank could obtain funds from the central bank at
Rt, applying the required monitoring work as described above and then loaning
those funds on at RTt . This creates a no-arbitrage condition and means that we
can describe the relationship between the risk-free rate and the central banks
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policy rate as












This spread can be thought of as an uncollateralised nance premium.
However, in practice most loans made to households will be collateralised
to some extent, taking some of the burden of loan management away from
monitoring work. The bank only takes the burden of the share of production
costs associated with monitoring and so in a collateralised loan we must multiply
our premium derived above by that share, 1−α. The central banks rate and the









is the collateralised external nance premium, EFPt. This is the real marginal
cost of loan management, and it is increasing in velocity, vt, real wages, wt,
monitoring work in the banking sector, mt, and the reserve ratio, rrt, and
decreasing in consumption, ct. Recall that rrt =
1
MMt
so the EFP is also
decreasing in the money multiplier, meaning that in this model banks switch
to narrow money taking more of the burden of meeting deposit demand, when
the external nance premium is higher.
The yield on government bonds is derived by maximising households utility











This spread can be interpreted as a liquidity premium on bonds. ctλt measures
the household marginal utility relative to households shadow value of funds while

t is the marginal value of the collateral. It is in fact these key margins -
the real marginal cost of loan management versus the liquidity service yield -
that determine the behavior of spreads. In the above expression, φ denotes the
125
consumption weight in the utility function whereas λt is the shadow value of
consumption, ct. The interest rate on deposits is the policy rate, Rt, minus a
term in the reserve deposit ratio:




As these spreads inuence the portfolio decisions of banks they will also impact
on the resulting path of consumption. When we come to the analysis of the model
we will discuss these premia as a way of understanding our key results.
4 Monetary Policy
This model framework allows us to capture a number of interesting elements
of monetary policy. In our benchmark model the direct instrument of monetary
policy is the short-term nominal interest rate, which we have seen is set in response
to a standard Taylor rule. By varying this rate, the policy maker is changing the
cost to commercial banks of obtaining reserves. The endogenously determined
external nance premium also changes the return on loans. The liquidity premium
impacts on the value of collateral available to households and the deposit rate,
a cost of funding, is a negative (positive) function of the reserve-deposit ratio
(money multiplier). These e¤ects will change the opportunity cost of meeting
deposit demand with narrow money from the central bank rather than extending
loans and cause the bank to reset its portfolio mix between narrow money and
loans. We will show in Section 6 why this matters for the wider economy.
4.1 Open Market Operations: A Mechanism to Control
Reserves
Under non-conventional and conventional monetary policies, the central bank also
varies the size of its balance sheet, increasing or decreasing the quantity of reserves
in the economy to meet the demand of commercial banks perfectly elastically at its
target policy rate.14 Previous models have lacked a realistic mechanism by which
the quantity of reserves in the economy can be controlled by the central bank. We
aim to more accurately approximate the practicalities of reserve management by
modelling open market operations whereby an asset, primarily bonds, is bought
from the private sector in exchange for newly created money. The central bank
now holds more bonds on its balance sheet. The private agent from whom the
14See Berrospide (2012) for an analysis of the demand for liquidity.
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bonds have been purchased receives a newly created deposit in their commercial
bank account, whilst their commercial banks own account with the central bank
is credited with an equal increase of freshly created reserves.15
To incorporate this mechanism into our model we assume the central bank
must match its only liability, reserves, by holding just one class of assets,
government bonds, the total supply of which is held xed unless exogenously
shocked.16 When the central bank buys bonds through an open market operation
it increases the fraction of the total bond supply which it holds, and decrease that
held by the private sector. We can therefore dene total bond holdings as the






As central bank bond holdings must equal reserves, we can substitute and re-
arrange to give
bpt = bt − rt (25)
It is this newly dened variable bp which determines the amount of collateral
households have available and thus bp which features in our equations for loan
supply and the marginal value of collateralised lending as well as the consolidated
government budget constraint17.
The mechanism outlined here abstracts entirely from sterilised open market
operations in which the purchases of assets are funded not by the creation of
new reserves, but rather by the sale of other assets on the central banks balance
sheet. Given this papers focus on the quantitative impact of policy, such sterilised
interventions are deemed irrelevant as they do not change the quantity of reserves
in the system and would instead act through "credit easing" channels as dened
by Bernanke (2009):
In a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves,
which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on
15We abstract from the possibility of banks themselves holding bonds and acting as the
central banks counterparty in an open market operation. Whilst this would be closer to how
traditional open market operations have been carried out, it is not consistent with recent large
scale asset purchases carried out by central banks which avoided buying assets directly from
banks. In the context of our model, the distinction between the two frameworks holds little
importance.
16Variants of the model in which the central bank can swap reserves for capital, or even
capital for bonds can be explored in future work.
17As we deal with a consolidated government budget constraint, the net e¤ect of interest
payments on bonds held by the central bank is zero.
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the asset side of the central banks balance sheet is incidental.... In contrast, the
Federal Reserves credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities
that it holds and on how this composition of assets a¤ects credit conditions for
households and businesses.
5 Calibration
Table 2 reports the values for the parameters and Table 3 the steady-state values
of relevant variables.18 Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose
the consumption weight in utility, φ, to yield 1/3 of available time in either goods
or banking services production. We also set the relative share of capital and
labour in goods production η to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity of substitution
of di¤erentiated goods, θ, to be equal to 11. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99
which is close to the canonical quarterly value while the mark-up coe¢cient in
the Phillips curve, κ, is set to 0.1. The depreciation rate, δ, is set to be equal
to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, ̺, is set to 0.005 which corresponds to 2%
per year. The steady-state value of bond holding level relative to GDP, b, is set
to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005. The steady state of private sector bond
holdings relative to GDP is set at 0.50, consistent with holdings of U.S. Treasury
securities as of end of year 2006.19
The deep parameters linked to money and banking are dened as follows.
Velocity at its steady state level is set at 0.276 which is close to the ratio between
US GDP and M3 at fourth quarter 2005, yielding 0.31. The fractional reserve
requirement, rr , is set at 0.1. This is consistent with the reserve ratio set by the
Federal Reserve on all liabilities above the low reserve tranche and approximately
equal to the average tier one capital ratio in the US since the mid 2000s.
This leaves us three key deep parameters to manipulate which may inuence
the rest of the steady state variables. Interestingly these are three nancial
variables and so are of particular interest to our debate on policies. α is the Cobb-
Douglas weight of collateral in loan production. This is the degree to which banks
base their lending on collateral as opposed to monitoring work or information
based lending. The benchmark calibration in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)
of 0.65 is within a range throughout the literature of 0.6 to 0.89, Zhang (2011), so
we follow this. k, is the degree to which capital is less e¢cient as collateral than
18The equations for the steady-state equations are listed in the technical appendix, available
on request.
19The steady state of the transfer level, the Lagrangian of the production constraint and base




bonds as it entails higher costs to the bank in order to check its physical condition
and market price. It is also less liquid should default occur and the collateral be
called upon to repay the value of the loan. We set this parameter to 0.2 which
not only follows Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), but is validated by data on
the Term Security Lending Facility which found less liquid assets were swapped
for bonds in a ratio of 0.21. F, can be thought of as total factor productivity in
loan production, or a measure of the e¢ciency with which banks use the factors
of production to produce loans20. As in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we set
this to ensure the rest of our steady state values meet three criteria as closely as
possible;
• a 1% per year average short-term real riskless rate that is the benchmark
in the nance literature,
• a 2% average collateralised external nance premium that is in line with the
average spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the postwar
United States,
• a share of total U.S. employment in depository credit intermediation as of
August 2005 of 1.6% as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The value this yields is F = 9.14.
With these parameter values we see that the steady state of labour input, n,
is 0.31 which is close to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the banking
service sector, m
m+n
, is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, is not far from
the 1.6% share required. As the steady-states are computed at zero ination we
can interpret all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, RT , is 6% per annum.
The interbank rate, RIB, is 0.84% per annum which is close to the 1% per year
average short-term real rate. The government bond rate, RB, is 2.1% per annum.
Finally the collateralised external nance premium is 2% per annum which is in
line with the average spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the
US. The model is solved using the solution methods of King and Watson (1998)
who also provide routines to derive the impulse responses of the endogenous
variables to di¤erent shocks, to obtain asymptotic variance and covariances of
the variables and to simulate the data. For the impulse response analysis and
simulation exercise we consider the real and nancial shocks described in Table
20Some authors have also described it as a measure of credit conditions within the economy.
The rationale for this seems plausible as when credit conditions are tight, banks will require
more collateral and will employ more monitoring work to provide the same amount of loans to
the economy.
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4, which reports the volatility and persistence parameters. These are standard
parameters in the literature.
6 Why the Money Multiplier Matters
Having outlined a model which incorporates both narrow and broad money, we
can begin to think more profoundly about how the balance between the two, and
thus the money multiplier (also the inverse of the reserve ratio in this paper),
may a¤ect banks and the wider economy. Banks, with two sources for meeting
deposit demand, make their choice between obtaining narrow money from the
central bank or creating their own deposits by issuing loans. As the policy
rate falls, narrow money becomes a relatively cheaper way of meeting deposit
demand.21 Similarly, if the return on loans were to fall, or the cost of producing
them to rise, then it becomes less protable for banks to originate deposits in
this way. The optimal quantity of narrow money has now increased, whilst the
amount of loans has fallen, meaning that the optimising money multiplier is
now lower. By providing more narrow money as a cheaper means of meeting
deposit demand when loan production becomes more costly the central banks
can e¤ectively subsidize deposit creation. If the central bank were to increase the
cost of narrow money by raising the policy rate, or the costs of producing loans
were to fall (their returns to rise) then the converse would be true and it would
be optimal for the money multiplier to rise.
Using our model we are able to trace this story through to the wider economy
by analyzing the response of the model to various shocks. Firstly, Figure 4 shows
the impulse responses of the models key variables to a negative shock to the
value of collateral households have available to provide in return for loans. It
can be thought of as akin to the shock which hit the US housing market in the
second half of the last decade. We rst analyse the situation, as in Goodfriend
and McCallum where the money multiplier is held xed. When the shock hits,
asset prices fall, eroding the value of collateral available for loan production. To
21An interesting point of note here is that, although it is not the purpose of our paper, this
framework allows for the possibility of paying interest on reserves. Without a zero lower bound
imposed on the policy rate charged at the discount window can go negative. In such a setting,
charging a negative rate to borrow reserves is equivalent to paying banks to take reserves. This
turns the cost implied by Rtrt in equation (8) into an income stream, paid by the central bank.
This is a useful way of thinking about the expansion of reserves under recent quantitative easing
programmes and the need for interest on reserves. With rates charged at discount windows cut
to zero, and central banks seeking to expand reserve supply either further, interest on reserves
(or a negative cost of holding reserves in our framework) was essential to maintain demand for
the increased supply.
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produce the same quantity of loans, banks now need to employ more monitoring
work, as they cannot rely on collateral. Not only does this push up the cost of
loan production, but it also draws resources out of the production sector, causing
a fall in production and employment in the real economy. The higher cost of
loan production leads to a fall in loan supply, whilst the lower production reduces
deposit demand both of which lower the level of broad money in the economy.
As the central bank seeks to maintain a xed money multiplier, it responds by
withdrawing narrow money from the economy in the same proportion, amplifying
the fall in deposits. Consumption/output and ination then fall due both to the
lack of available funds caused by the contraction in broad money and also the
fall in production as resources are drawn in to the nancial sector. In response
the central bank cuts the policy rate, incentivising consumption by households
and the take-up of narrow money by commercial banks, eventually stabilizing the
economy.
Alternatively, if when the shock hits commercial banks can optimise the mix of
narrow money and loans, the response of broad money, and the macroeconomy is
much changed. As before we see that asset prices fall. However, as loans become
a relatively more expensive way of creating deposits the central bank steps in to
increase the supply of relatively cheaper narrow money, which it injects through
open market operations. As mentioned, this depresses the money multiplier
and acts to support deposit creation, allowing banks to shed costly monitoring
e¤ort. This in turn attenuates the rise in the external nance premium and
actually supports loan production. With less resources being drawn away from
the production sector into monitoring work and broad money being supported
both by increased narrow money and a smaller reduction in loan creation, output
and ination fare much better, falling by less and returning to equilibrium more
quickly. In this instance the cut in the central bank policy rate acts to make
reserves an even cheaper way for banks to meet deposit demand and further
increases their demand. When met by the central bank with increased supply
this adds to the shock-attenuating e¤ect of varying the money multiplier.
We observe a similar story when considering a real shock. Figure 5 shows the
response of the model to a negative shock to productivity. As productivity falls,
so does output. With less economic activity, deposit demand from households also
falls, which under a xed money multiplier necessitates an equivalent reduction
in narrow money and loans. However, when the money multiplier is exible
and banks are allowed to optimise, they facilitate the fall in broad money by
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shedding relatively more narrowmoney than loans, raising the money multiplier.22
Although this slightly worsens the output response it militates the inationary
impact of the shock even with a less aggressive interest rate response from the
monetary authority and brings the EFP back to equilibrium quicker.
7 Welfare Analysis
Having discussed in the previous section why variance in the money multiplier
can improve welfare over the cycle we seek to strengthen this result by quantifying
its impact on the representative household. To do this we carry out some more
stringent welfare analysis by deriving a welfare loss function from a second order
approximation to utility.
7.1 Deriving The Welfare Loss Function
The welfare approximation derived from the canonical New Keynesian model
nds that welfare of the representative household only depends on the variance
of output and ination (Galí, 2008). We wish to investigate whether this result
continues to hold when applied to our richer class of model. The use of the
approximation allows us to quantify precisely the welfare rankings arising from
each of our policy rules, possibly allowing some normative statements. Thus,
we derive a quadratic loss function using a second-order Taylor approximation
to utility by using the labour demand function, marginal cost function and
sales-production constraint to substitute for household consumption.23 Once re-
ordered and simplied we are left with a loss function with relevant terms in the
variances of consumption, ination, wages, employment in the goods sector and
the marginal cost.
22This is due to a combination of the now higher return on loans and the increased cost of
obtaining narrow money caused by the policy maker increasing the short-term nominal interest
rate in response to higher ination.
23The additive nature of our households utility function allows us to take a Taylor expansion
of each term and substitute it back into the original function. The labour demand function is
then rearranged for monitoring work, a second order expansion taken and substitution made.
This process is then repeated for the marginal cost equation. Following Galí (2008) we substitute
the resulting linear term in goods sector employment for a second order term in ination using
the sales equal net production constraint.
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> 0, so more
stable marginal cost, consumption and ination improves welfare.24
Remark The welfare of the representative household in this model, as in the original
New Keynesian framework, is approximated by standard variables on the
supply side rather than those specically attributable to nancial factors.
This means that changes in nancial conditions only impact on utility in so
far as they impact on the variance of consumption, ination, wages, labour
supply hours and marginal costs.
Table 5 shows the asymptotic standard deviations and the contemporaneous
cross-correlations with consumption from a simulation of each. We use these
values to calculate the welfare loss in each model. We can see that the welfare
loss under a regime where the central bank allows the money multiplier to vary
over the cycle, supplying narrow money perfectly elastically to meet the demand
of commercial banks is signicantly smaller than one in which it maintains a xed
money multiplier. It is also notable that the additional welfare loss associated
with the zero lower bound is minimal in both regimes.
8 Capturing the Crisis
We now look at the ability of the model to help us understand the response of
the economy and the nancial sector to the initial shock of the nancial crisis
and examine what it may tell us about the behaviour of the multiplier in this
period. The obvious problem is how to replicate the shock(s) that a­icted the
US economy, culminating in the recession of 2008. This particular crisis had a
number of characteristics which are compatible with our model. House prices fell,
reducing the value of collateral the private sector had to post against loans from
24Whilst it is likely to derive a di¤erent loss function through a di¤erent sequence of
substitutions, ours seems both plausible and parsimonious.
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the nancial sector. Banks also tightened credit conditions and, due to increased
precautionary motives and economic uncertainty, increased their preference for
liquidity. Whilst the exact sizes and interconnected nature of each of these
factors may for practical purposes be intractable, it seems plausible that some
combination of shocks along these lines is an appropriate, though rudimentary
way to think of the origins of the crisis, and one that it is within the capabilities of
our model to capture. We therefore subject the model to simultaneous shocks to
liquidity, collateral, monitoring and velocity. We make a simplifying assumption
that each element carries equal weighting on impact, but that the persistence
of each shock remains as outlined in Table 4. We also constrain the short-term
nominal interest (policy) rate as mentioned above as the ZLB has been a key
feature of the recent economic milieu.
Table 7 compares the initial changes of variables within the model in light
of our composite crisis shock to those observed in US data over the period.
Real GDP in the US fell 4.7%, from peak to trough. Employment, measured
by non-farm payrolls, went from 139 million in November 2007 to 130 million in
August 2009, a fall of 6.3%. CPI ination fell to -2.1% as prices contracted25. The
external nance premium, interpreted as in our model as the prime rate spread
over the Federal Funds rate, rose by 0.7% following the crisis. The responses
of our model are extremely close in both their matching of each variable to its
observed counterparty, but also in their impact relative to the other variables
within the economy/model.
Whilst, as with any model of this ilk, there remains a degree of
oversimplication, the model we have outlined manages to capture well the
general evolution of the US economy in the second half of 2008. And what
can this tell us about the money multiplier? Figure 6 plots the impulse responses
of variables following the crisis shock. What we see is that, following a shock not
unlike the one experienced by the US in 2008, the optimal money multiplier falls
dramatically. This is consistent with the observed movement in the multiplier
shown in Figure 1. The narrative from our model is that as the external nance
premium rose and loans became much more expensive to verify and produce,
banks maximising behaviour drove them to reduce loan production and shrink
the supply of broad money. However, this e¤ect was attenuated by the increased
supply of narrow money, demanded by banks and supplied by the Fed through
large scale asset purchase programmes and the massive expansion of its balance
sheet.
25In our model steady state ination is set to zero.
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To provide a counterfactual we impose the same shock to the xed multiplier
model. The implication is that if the Federal Reserve maintained a xed
multiplier, not only would it not have injected increased narrow money in to
support broad money, but it would have had to actively withdraw narrow money
from the economy to match the contraction in loan supply e¤ected by banks. This
would have worsened the broad money contraction and kept nancial spreads
higher for longer. The model suggests that this could be associated with a
contraction in output 1% greater, ination would have fallen by an additional
2.5% and employment would have been 2% lower. The recovery would also have
been more protracted, taking roughly twice as long to return to equilibrium.
9 Conclusion
It seems that rumours of the death of the multiplier as a useful concept may,
as the saying goes, be greatly exaggerated. But this paper provides a way of
framing the multiplier for the post-crisis world: it is an optimal choice for the
commercial banks as to how they collectively meet deposit demand.26 In this
context, variations in the multiplier, even as dramatic as those experienced by
many economies in the last 5 years, can be explained, and may even be seen to
be approaching an optimum or, at least, welfare enhancing compared to a xed
multiplier alternative.
We have also go some way to addressing the common criticisms levelled at
modelling of both the money multiplier and its role in monetary policy. By
modelling reserves as demand determined, conditioned on the prevalent interest
rates in the economy and allowing the central bank to set the interest rate
and then provide this narrow money perfectly elastically through open market
operations to meet the demand of commercial banks we provide a framework
which is hopefully more recognizable to monetary policy practitioners.
As far as non-conventional monetary policies are concerned, we do not think
they necessarily depart from standard open market operations, other than in
their size or duration. In our model, we nd that the supply of central bank
money, or reserves, whilst not preventing an extended downturn may have played
a substantive role in preventing the downturn turning into a sustained depression.
26See Kashap and Stein (2012) for separate analysis using interest on reserves. That is not
necessary for our result.
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m Labour Input for Loan Monitoring, or Banking Employment
w Real wage









b Real Bond Holding
bp Real Private Sector Bond Holdings

 Marginal Value of Collateral
EFP Uncollateralised External Finance Premium (RT - RIB)
LSY B Liquidity Service on Bonds
LSY KB Liquidity Service on Capital (kLSY B)
RT Benchmark Risk Free Rate




λ Lagrangian for Budget Constraint (shadow value of consumption)
ξ Lagrangian for Production Constraint




β Discount factor 0.99
κ Coe¢cient in Phillips curve 0.1
α Collateral share of loan production 0.65
φ Consumption weight in utility 0.4
η Capital share of rm production 0.36
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.025
̺ Trend growth rate of shocks 0.015
ρ Interest rate smoothing 0.8
φπ Coe¢cient on Ination in Policy 1.5
φy Coe¢cient on Output in Policy 0.5
F Production coe¢cient of loan 9.14
k Inferiority coe¢cient of capital as collateral 0.2
θ Elasticity of substitution of di¤erentiated goods 11
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Table 3: Steady State Parameters
Steady State Description Value
m Banking Employment 0.0063
n Labour Input 0.3195
RT Risk Free Rate 0.015
RIB Interbank Rate 0.0021
RL Loan Rate 0.0066
RB Bond Rate 0.0052
b/c Bond to Consumption Ratio 0.56
bp/c Private Sector Bond Holdings to Consumption Ratio 0.50
γ (bp/b) Fraction of Bonds Held By Private Sector 0.893
c Consumption 0.8409
T/c Transfers Over Consumption 0.126
w Real Wage 1.9494
λ Shadow Value of Consumption 0.457
ν Velocity 0.31

 Marginal Value of Collateral 0.237
K Capital 9.19
KP Private Sector Capital Holdings 9.19
rr Reserve ratio 0.1
r/c Reserves to Consumption 0.36
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Table 4: Properties of Exogenous Shocks




Monetary Policy 0.82% 0.3
Mark Up 0.11% 0.74




Table 5: Impact on the Economy of Flexible Money Multiplier
Policy Flexible MM27 Flexible MM CIR28 Fixed MM29 Fixed MM CIR30
St.Dv Corr St.Dv Corr St.Dv Corr St.Dv Corr
Real Consumption/Output 1.05 1 1.17 1 0.96 1 1.21 1
Ination 0.40 0.62 0.42 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.94 0.84
Employment in Monitoring 3.55 -0.74 3.28 -0.83 2.09 -0.58 1.82 -0.61
Employment in Goods Sector 1.60 0.96 1.81 0.97 1.55 0.95 1.98 0.97
Real Wage 1.69 0.99 1.91 0.99 1.65 0.99 2.11 0.99
Private Sector Bond Holdings 1.79 -0.34 1.85 -0.40 1.65 -0.06 1.92 -0.20
Asset Prices 1.02 0.98 1.14 0.99 1.09 0.99 1.42 0.99
Loans 1.10 0.29 1.15 0.40 2.06 0.32 2.97 0.43
Reserves 1.62 0.73 1.83 0.77 2.06 0.32 2.97 0.43
Policy Rate 1.05 -0.08 0.80 -0.36 1.14 -0.07 0.80 -0.24
Loan Rate 0.68 -0.83 0.70 -0.88 0.47 -0.19 0.63 0.12
Bond Rate 3.99 0.49 3.24 0.50 3.13 0.33 2.62 0.38
Deposit Rate 1.04 -0.16 0.85 -0.45 1.14 -0.07 0.80 -0.24
External Finance Premium 1.37 -0.35 0.82 -0.46 1.19 - 0.82 0.33
Liquidity Premium 4.52 -0.56 3.68 -0.62 3.27 -0.35 2.61 -0.34
27Model with a exible money multiplier determined by demand from prot-maximising commercial banks with an unconstrained interest rate policy.
28Model with a exible money multiplier determined by demand from prot-maximising commercial banks with interest rate policy constrained, holding
the policy rate constant.
29Model with a xed money multiplier and unconstrained interest rate policy
30Model with a xed money multiplier and with interest rate policy constrained, holding the policy rate constant.
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Table 6: Relative Welfare Analysis
Who Determines Reserves Welfare Loss31
Fixed Money Multiplier CIR 10.921
Fixed Money Multiplier 7.829
Flexible Money Multiplier CIR 4.293
Flexible Money Multiplier 3.908
31Loss determined by a quadratic loss function derived using a second-order Taylor
approximation to utility. See Section 7.1
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Table 7: Response of Model to Crisis Shock Vs Stylised Facts
Variable Response From Model Observed in Data
Real Output -4.9% -4.7%
Ination -2.5% -2.1%
Employment -7.5% -6.3%
Liquid Assets/Total -5% -5%
External Finance Premium 0.9% 0.7%
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Figure 1: US Money Aggregates and Money Multiplier
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Figure 2: Federal Reserve Assets32
32Total may di¤er from constituent parts due to rounding.
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Figure 3: Federal Reserve Liabilities
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Figure 4: Negative Shock to Collateral
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Figure 5: Negative Shock to Productivity
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Figure 6: Crisis Shock and Fixed Money Multiplier Counterfactual
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Technical Appendix
1 Model Set Up
This is a modied version of the Goodfriend and McCallums model (2007)
incorporating a government (including bank) budget constraint and a cash-in-
advance constraint with stochastic velocity of money demand from Chadha and
Corrado (2012) to which we add a preference for reserves holdings by bank and










ct denotes real consumption, n
s
t is supply of labour in goods sector and m
s
t is


























− wt(nt +mt)− ct − taxt = 0
qt is the price of capital, Kt is the quantity of capital, Pt is the price of
households produced good, PAt is the consumption good price index, nt is the
labour demanded by household as producer, mt, is the labour demanded by
households banking operation, wt is the real wage, Dt is the nominal holding
of broad money, taxt is the real lump-sum tax payment, R
B
t is the nominal
interest rate on government bonds purchased in t + 1, Bt+1. We also assume
that any prot from the banking sector, Πt, goes to the households sector. The
Lagrangian multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, λt.
• Sales equal net production constraint:
Kηt (A1tnt)
1−η − cAt (Pt/P
A
t )
−θ = 0 (3)
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A1t is a productivity shock in the goods production sector whose mean increases
over time at a rate ̺. In (18) and (19) the superscript A indicates that the
variable is an aggregate taken as given from each household. The Lagrangian
multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, ξt.
• Government (including bank budget constraint):
























So the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
Tt = ret − ret−1
PAt−1
PAt
(1 +RIBt−1) + bt − bt−1
PAt−1
PAt
(1 +RBt ) (6)





vt denotes velocity and Dt are deposits
• Loans:




is the reserve/deposit ratio and rt is high-powered money.
• The banks problem is to maximize prots within period subject to the
returns from loans, Lt, which are lent out at the collateralized interest rate
of RL, reserves obtained from the central bank, rt, at cost interest rate, R,









RTt (r − rt)
2 − τ t(r − rt) (9)
The hard constraint that deposits must equal the sum of loans and reserves
Dt = Lt + rt (10)
means that we can substitute out loans from equation (9), leaving it in terms
of reserves and the overall level of deposits, the latter of which is determined by
the household.
Production function pertaining to management of loans:
Lt/P
A
t = F (γbt+1 + A3tkqtKt+1)
α(A2tmt)
1−α 0 < α < 1 (11)
From (7):
ct = vt





A2t denotes a shock to monitoring work, A3t is a shock on capital as collateral.
The parameter k denotes the inferiority of capital as collateral in the banking
production function, while α is the share of collateral in the loan production
function. For a complete list of all variables and parameters in the model see
Tables 1 and 2 in the main text.
1.1 First Order Conditions
• Derivative with respect to mst and n
s






+ wtλt = 0 (13)












































• Derivative with respect to nt



























































• Derivative with respect to Pt:














































































• Derivative wrt rt of (9):
∂Πt
∂rt
= −RLt −Rt −R
T
t (r − rt) + τ t = 0. (24)





















. Substituting in (23) gives riskless rate RTt :


























measures the household marginal utility relative to households shadow
value of funds while 













where k determines the degree to which capital is collateralizable.








To nd rate relates to the risk-free benchmark rate we must equate marginal
product of loans per unit of labour (1 − α) Lt
mt
to their marginal cost wt
PAt
where





(1 − rrt). So the di¤erence between







Since (1 − α) is the factor share of monitoring, for collateralised lending








The interest rate on deposits is simply:
RDt = Rt(1− rrt). (33)
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2 Steady-State
For the productivity and monitoring shocks we assume a trend growth rate equal
to A2t = A1t = (1+ ̺)
t. In steady state q = 1, A2 = A1 = (1+ ̺), λ shrinks








































































































Equations from (36) to (34) give the steady-state value for m, n, c, K, λ, w,

.






The steady-state value of reserves is:











From the reserve equation setting r = r we derive the steady-state value for
τ :
τ = R +RL (43)
Finally the uncollateralized and collateralized external nance premium in









From (28), (44) and (32) we derive the steady-state values for the central
banks policy rate, the loan rate and the bond rate:
Rt = ρRt−1 + (1− ρ)(φππt + φyyt) (46)
RT = R + EFP (47)
RL = R + CEFP (48)
RB = RT − LSY B (49)















3 The Linearized Model
The model is composed by the following linearized equations.1





bmt − bλt − bwt = 0 (A1)
Demand for Labour (from (16)):




bλt = 0 (A2)
Supply of Banking Services (combining (8) and (11))2:




bc+ (1 + ̺)kK
(bct +bbt) + kK(1 + ̺)
bc+ (1 + ̺)kK
(a3t + bqt)
reported in the main text as:
ct =











b(1− α) + k1

CIA constraint (from (7)):
bct + bPt = bDt + bvt − brrt (A4)
Aggregate Supply:
bct = (1− η)(1 + δK
c
)(a1t + bnt)− δK
c
qˆt (A5)
Marginal cost: cmct = bnt + bwt − bct (A6)
Mark-up (from (22)): cmct = bξt − bλt (A7)
1The model is dened in the Matlab le gmvsys.m. Standard deviation and
persistence structure of the stochastic variables are dened in the driver le gmvdrv.m.
2The relationship is derived by setting b = B
P (1+RB)c
and bt+1 = btct where bt+1 is
dened in (5).
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Ination: bπt = bpt − bpt−1 (A8)
Calvo pricing: bπt = κcmct + βEtbπt+1 + a5t (A9)




(bct − bqt − a3t)− bc
bc+ kK
bbt (A10)




(bct − bqt − a3t)− b
b+ k2
bbt








































Et [cmct+1 + (1− η) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)]
ported in the main text as:
bqt = (δ1 + γ1)Etbλt+1 − bλt+ δ1Etbqt+1 − k







t + a3t+ γ1Et [cmct+1 + (1− η) (bnt+1 + a1t+1)]
Government Budget Constraint4:
T bTt = rr c
v(1 +RIB)
 bret + (1 +R)(bπt − bret−1 − bRt−1)+bbbt + (1 +RB)(bπt −bbt−1 − bRBt )
(A12)
Bond Holding: bbt = a6t (A13)
3Note that in steady-state ξ
λ
= mc and λt+1
λt
= 11+γ :
4We dene the percentage deviation from steady state of ow and stock variables by
lnxt − lnx, while for interest rates and ratio variables they are Rt = R + bRt (rates) and
rt = r+brt (ratio, assuming rt = xt=yt), respectively. It can be shown the approximation comes
from rst-order Taylor expansion: ex ≈ 1+x, while for rate variable: bRt ≈ ln(1+Rt)−ln(1+R)
and for ratio: brt = rt − r = ln(xt=yt)− ln(x=y) = bxt − byt.
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Riskless Interest Rate (from (27)):
bRTt = bλt + Etbπt+1 − Etbλt+1 (A14)
Liquidity Service of Bonds (from (23))5:
1 +RB
1 +RT
 bRBt − bRTt  = φ









External Finance Premium (from (31)):
dEFP t = bvt + bwt + bmt − bct + brrt (A16)
Other Interest Rates: bRt = bRTt − dEFP t (A17)bRLt = bRt + dEFP t (A18)bRDt = bRt − brrt rr(1− rr) (A19)
Policy Feedback Rule:
bRt = (1− ρ)  φπbπt + φycmct+ ρ bRt−1 + a4t (A20)
Velocity:






 bRTt −R bRt −RL bRLt + τbτ ti (A22)
Liquidity:









For notational convenience the relevant log-linearized equations with variables
5Log-linearisation of interest rate is dened as di¤erence from steady state: Rt =
R+ bRt:
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denoting deviation from steady-state are reported in the main text withoutb.
The benchmark model has 22 endogenous variables {c, n, m, w, q, P , π, mc,
D, b, 
, EFP , RT , RB, R, RL, RD, λ, ξ, T , r, re}, 6 lagged variables {Pt−1, Dt−1,
ct−1, bt−1, ret−1, R
B
t−1} and 8 exogenous shocks {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8}. The
equations (A1) through (A24), 6 lagged identities construct the model to be
solved by King and Watson (1998) algorithm. For the simulation we consider
contemporaneous shocks to a1, ..., a8. To obtain the simulated series we have
produced 10,000 draws from a normal distribution, discard the rst 500 and
considered the middle 100.
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4 OMO Model
In the bond-OMO variant as central bank bond holdings must equal reserves, we
can substitute and re-arrange to give the log linear relationship
bpbˆpt = bbˆt − rrˆt (51)
which we add to our system of equations. It is this newly dened variable bp which
determines the amount of collateral households have available so we substitute it
for b in the loan supply and marginal value of collateralised lending equations.6
In the capital-OMO variant, capital could equally be bought by the central
bank in exchange for new reserves in the same way that bonds are. To do this we
introduce an equation dening total capital holdings as a function of an exogenous
shock in the same way we did for bond holdings. The central bank can now hold
two assets on its balance sheet, so we hold the level of bonds xed as before and
set the steady state value of capital held by the central bank at zero. By dening
private sector capital holdings in a log linear form as
kpkˆpt = bbˆt − rrˆt (52)
what we model is a situation where the central bank buys and sells illiquid
assets/capital in exchange for reserves.
The bond-OMO model introduces bpt , and its one period lag as additional
variables whilst the capital-OMO introduces Kt and K
P
t so each have 31
endogenous variables.
6As we deal with a consolidated government budget constraint, the net e¤ect of interest
payments on bonds held by the central bank is zero. Therefore, it is appropriate to also change
the terms in b to terms in bp in this equation as well.
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5 Taylor Approximation
This section outlines the process of approximating a utility function through a









As our function is additive we can estimate our Taylor approximations
separately for each term and then bring them together. First we derive our
approximation of log(ct)




















We can then cancel out like terms to simplify this to
log ct ≈ cˆt +O
3 (56)
The same process for our second argument yields
log(1−mt − nt) ≈ U(1−m−n)(1− m˘t − n˘t) +











(1− m˘t − n˘t) +
1
2












log(1−mt − nt) ≈ (1− m˘t − n˘t) +O
3 (59)
Putting these back into our equation (53) we get:
Ut − U = φcˆt + (1− φ)(1− mˆt − nˆt) +O
3 (60)
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Which is our initial approximation of the deviation of current utility in any
given period compared to steady state utility. However, our aim is to nd our
function in terms of variances (second order terms) so the next step is to simplify
this and eliminate as many rst order terms as we can through substitution of
other equations within our model. We have three rst order terms to deal with
cˆt mˆt and nˆt.
Let us begin with our labour demand function, converting it to log deviations
from steady state:







If we assume (1−α)c
mw
is equal to one in order to simplify the analysis and
substitute this back into equation (60) we get





We can then bring together our terms in cˆt and this cancels to give





Next we can use our marginal cost function:
cˆt = wˆt + nˆt − cmct (64)




cˆ2t ) = w(wˆt +
1
2
wˆ2t ) + n(nˆt +
1
2



















cmc2t )− 12 cˆ2t (66)
Bringing like terms together and ordering our equation so that rst order
terms are together and second order terms are grouped together we get:

























cmc2t − 12 cˆ2t +O3 (67)
















. If we substitute this back into our equation we
eliminate the term in nˆt but replace it with a rst order term in cˆt.




























cmc2t − 12 cˆ2t + 12 θχπˆ2t +O3
We can eliminate the term in lambda by using our mark up equation
cmct = ξˆt − λˆt (70)
Solving for lambda and noting that there is no deviation in ξ:
λˆt = −cmct (71)
so our equation can be written









































Leaving only 3 rst order terms. We can now replace wˆ as a function of terms
of nˆ, cˆ and cmc, leaving us 3 terms still, but one of which is nˆ. We can convert
this nˆ term into a term in the volatility of ination and cˆ leaving us with just two
rst order terms; one in cˆ and one in cmc. We therefore rearrange to make wˆ the
subject leaving us with a rst order term in cˆ and a rst order term in cmc but
with everything else being second order or higher.
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We can see that the welfare function contains linear terms in cˆt and cmct. They
might tend to dominate the second order terms. We therefore choose weights
(1 − φ) and φ so that rst order terms disappear in the welfare approximation.

























Leaving us with the welfare approximation:





























































Therefore our welfare approximation can be written as:



























The above welfare function can be expressed in terms of quadratic loss
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function:

































This is equation (27) in the text.
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